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PREFACE
In my experiences as a Social Scientist for the Human Terrain System (HTS)
program, I was part of a team that conducted over 100 missions to study local cultures and
their needs in Afghanistan. I collected data from interviews on current aid delivery
programs and wrote made reports on completed projects to inform future aid programs.
There was a direct link between my involvement with HTS and this dissertation, because
my employment within the US Army and my months of experience in Afghanistan sparked
my aspirations for this dissertation research. The poverty and injustice that I witnessed was
paramount to my desire to investigate the billions of dollars of USAID money allocated
and to understand where it went. Also, I became involved with many Key Leaders and
local Afghan officials. I understood their perspectives in a unique ways, largely due to my
studies in political science and the fact that I am a Jordanian-American familiar with the
Afghan culture.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
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Problem Statement
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has allocated over 100
billion US dollars since 2001 to the development of Afghanistan, and the United States has
invested over 700 billion US dollars overall. Yet, Afghanistan is currently foreign aid
dependent. There is a breakdown, a problem, in the USAID funding system for
Afghanistan, whereas the money allocated is not always utilized for intended purposes. Is
there accountability for the management of billions of American dollars?
The aim of this research is to examine specific details of what political and social
barriers exist that hinder the effective use of American foreign aid and funding in
Afghanistan, specifically aid allocated through USAID. Today Afghanistan remains a
LDC, or least developed country, with extensive poverty, limited energy supply, poor
infrastructure, and low literacy rates despite extensive spending by USAID, an agency of
the US government. Afghanistan continues to be aid dependent for health care, education,
civil services, infrastructure, economic development, and training of soldiers. Lack of
infrastructure includes basic utilities, such as water and electricity. (Brinkley, 2013 para.
2).
A significant amount of aid to Afghanistan was wasted due to poor governance and
mismanagement on all sides. The governance entities involved in aid allocation and aid
delivery include Afghan national, regional, provincial, and local governments, and the
United States involvement through United States Congress, the Inspector General’s Offices
(OIG) of USAID, the contractors and sub-contractors, and indirectly, the US Army’s
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Human Terrain System. Other agencies involved included SIGAR (Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), the United Nations, and PRTs (Provincial
Reconstruction Teams). All these efforts and funding were to alleviate the chaotic
economic and living conditions for the people of Afghanistan.
USAID describes its mission as follows: “We partner to end extreme poverty and
promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity” 1.
Their mission is to raise Afghanistan out of extreme poverty and to help alleviate the
deficiencies in infrastructure for the nation. Based on modernization theory, if enough
money is poured into a less-developed country, development is predicted to occur, and the
nation will become economically stable and modern. Human capital theory as part of
modernization theory states that education is an investment that benefits people and
societies, spearheading the nation out of poverty into modern development (Tilak 2002).
Therefore, for the context of this dissertation, aid projects will be considered within the
parameters of the education and energy (electricity) sectors.
My experience with the US Army’s Human Terrain System 2 prompted my interest
in writing this dissertation on the efficacy of American aid in Afghanistan for several
reasons. The first and primary reason was the extreme economic degradation I witnessed
during my work there. With so many people suffering, I had to question where the billions
1

See https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values With the war involvement in Afghanistan the USAID
approach to development has been more aligned with the US Army’s winning hearts and minds counterinsurgency
strategies. This is how the unique HTS, Human Terrain System, of which I was a part, became indirectly involved with
aid. Creating the potential for building schools, bridges, and positive outreach became a joint effort of USAID and the
US Army.
2
The Human Terrain System was a small program, which began in 2005 and ended in 2014. The idea was to train and
embed social scientists in US Army platoons while in combat zones to mediate some of the cultural misunderstandings
that undermined winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan (and Iraqi) people.
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of dollars of US/USAID investment had gone. A secondary reason was my observations
of the convoluted and corrupt policies concerning financial transactions within American
agencies as well as among Afghan officials. Most disturbingly, I observed that “winning
the hearts and minds of the Afghan people” became more about excluding their culture,
rather than integrating it within aid distribution, often leaving the people without the
benefits of the aid that was intended to help them.
This study examines conditions found in Afghanistan through specific research on
two aid related projects: energy and education. Topics on foreign aid funding to LDC
nations are addressed herein to find barriers to development, contribute to the body of
knowledge, and assess possible improvements for Afghanistan.
Research questions for this study:
1. What are the barriers or factors preventing the effective delivery of USAID
funding in Afghanistan for the project of the Tarakhil Power Plant and in
the sphere of education?
2. How are project factors perceived by individual stakeholders, government
agencies, government watchdogs, the media, and scholars?
3. If needed, what are some strategies that could improve aid delivery and
address any lack of efficiency and efficacy of aid in Afghanistan?
Conditions in Afghanistan
To study these questions, we must first understand the general conditions in
Afghanistan. Reuters (2014) reports numerous gains made in Afghanistan in recent years:
GDP rose from $4 billion in 2002 to $20 billion in 2013; access to electricity rose from 6%
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in 2002 to 28% in 2013; school enrollment increased from 1 million in 2003 to 8.7 million
in 2013; and high school attendance grew from 224,078 in 2004 to 717,015 in 2013. For
the 40 million people living in Afghanistan today, life expectancy climbed from 56 to 61
years of age. 3 There was a 5% increase in life expectancy, which still makes life expectancy
rather low when compared to other nations. Low life expectancy is expected in a war-torn
country, but there were also low birth rates. With out-migration population, growth would
be slow to increase. Despite these gains, Donati (2014) stated that reconstruction in
Afghanistan was a “development mess.”
After 16 years of US war in Afghanistan, some scholars believe that not only has
the US and allies failed at reconstruction, but that Afghanistan is a failed state. According
to the Fund for Peace: “The twelve CAST (Conflict Assessment System Tool) indicators,
upon which the Fragile States Index is based, cover a wide range of state failure risk
elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or
otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population,
sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or
discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay.
States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over
different time periods.” For 2017, Afghanistan ranks 9th out of 178 countries and scores a
107.3 out of a possible 120 in the Fragile State Index. The trend in Afghanistan from 2006
-2017 has been one of worsening with some minor improvements; the ranking on the
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Donati (2014) From an in-text graphic figure created by J. Pong, Reuters, 12/16/2014.

5

Fragile State Index is worse now than in 2006 4. Building a modernized nation where
generations have suffered through war is difficult.
Throughout history, invaders of Afghanistan have been defeated, earning the
country the nickname “the graveyard of empires” (Huffington Post, August 29, 2017).
Indeed, after $714 billion dollars and 16 years of investment in Afghanistan, most world
leaders believe that America cannot win at nation building in Afghanistan and that America
cannot beat the Taliban, according to Al Jazeera English. The Taliban have a stronghold in
50 to 80 percent of Afghanistan (The Nation, 2017). They have taken over major cities in
almost all the Northern provinces, giving the Taliban back control in these areas.
Violence, criminality, and danger go hand and hand with corruption, especially at
the Durand Line 5, or the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The contested
imaginary line is a frontier boundary unrecognized by the Pashtun (including the Taliban)
as an official border. With many illegal crossings, the line runs through Pashtun territory
and is known for being a hotbed of corruption. The Taliban are predominantly Pashtun 6,
and those operating from Pakistan have centered their leadership against the West (The

4

http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/country-data/ Founded in 1956, the Fund for Peace is an independent nonprofit 501c3 based in Washington, D. C. and Abuja, Nigeria. Produced annually, the Fragile States Index,
ranks 178 countries across 12 indicators of the risks and vulnerabilities.
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The Durand Line was established by the British Empire in 1896 and attempted to force Afghans to
become either Indian (then the British Raj) or Afghan (then an independent state). The Afghan government
has never officially recognized this border. The imaginary Durand Line cut through the Pashtun people’s
land making today some Pashtuns Pakistani and others Afghan today.

6

The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan and the second largest in Pakistan. Pashtuns
speak the Pashto language.
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Nation, 2017). Maps indicate the illegal movements of the Taliban along the Durand Line,
a frontier boundary unrecognized by the Pashtun (or the Taliban) as an official border. 7
The United Nations reports that violence increased by 21% in Kabul in 2016 from
the previous year. Civilian casualties were at a record high, and it was a precarious time in
Afghanistan. Militant attacks increased since the drawdown of American troops, which
began with a speech by President Obama in 2011 and ended in December 2014 leaving
9,800 US troops (Institute of the Study of War). From 2010 to 2017, half a billion US
dollars was spent to improve intelligence units. However, without a provable matrix and
with officers afraid to leave American compounds, it is difficult to know the effectiveness.
Reliable information was and still is vague and opaque (Tritton, 2017).
Security is the number one problem inside Afghanistan with corruption being a
close second, depending on the perspective. According to Transparency International,
Afghanistan ranks 169 out of 176 countries in terms of corruption, and only Libya, Sudan,
Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, North Korea, and Somalia ranked as more corrupt in 2016. 8
Corruption in Afghanistan can be seen in something called the ghost phenomenon.
References are made by survey participants in this study about ghost soldiers, ghost
schools, and ghost teachers all receiving paychecks or funds from American investments,
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“Map of the Durand Line Cutting Through Pashtun Population”. http://nation.com.pk/columns/28-Jan2017/durand-line-saga, and “Map of Taliban Drug Routes from the Pakistan side of the Durand Line.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Drug Transit Routes”, Posted April 30th, 2015, by Naseer Kakar and Niala
Mohammad https://blogs.voanews.com/durand/page/3/
8

www.transparency.org Transparency International was established in 1993 and is now in 100 countries. It
is a non-partisan in its efforts to end corruption.
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but they do not exist. It is money from USAID and the US government that pays these
ghost individuals for work that is never done, and the Government of Afghanistan
sometimes reports exaggerated numbers of individuals in the workforce (Al Jazeera
English, August 1, 2017).
Bribes, false reports, and theft are widespread in Afghanistan. This dissertation
research examines and finds support for claims that corruption and security issues prevent
American foreign aid dollars from modernizing Afghanistan. Still, more money is being
poured into Afghanistan and it remains dependent on American dollars to function. Many
scholars and reporters agree that a complete pullout of funding from Afghanistan would
create a vacuum for the Taliban to fill, and Afghanistan would disintegrate further into a
failed state.
This option is considered unbearable for the people of Afghanistan and the world,
who are alert about the possibility of increased terrorist activities. However, other efforts
have failed as interactions with the Taliban have proven thus far. They target schools and
educated individuals, and undermine those who will not convert to Taliban
fundamentalism. The Taliban destroys and controls road access. They are quite savvy when
it comes to making money in the opium and illegal drug trade. Peace talks have failed, and
Presidents Bush and Obama could not move forward in restraining the insurgents.
In August 2017, President Trump announced that “we are no longer nation
building,”, and that America is fighting to win (Burki, 2017). Trump stated that America
will be with Afghanistan without any conditions “until the end” (PBS News Hour, August
22, 2017). However, with so much corruption and fraud in all facets of the political system
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it will be difficult for outsiders to control the Taliban and the violence. There must be a
political settlement and agreement, and hopes are pinned on parliamentary elections in
2018 and a presidential election in 2019. Also, the Afghan security forces must be actively
involved in any resolution.
A Center for Strategic Studies’ recent report claims the United States has done a
very poor job of training the Afghan police and military (Patel and Ross, 2007, 10). Once
again corruption hinders this effort through waste and inefficient use of money. The
corruption is not only in the Afghan arena. Many Americans, mostly contractors, are
overpaid and mismatched with jobs. There are also hostilities from some Afghans, who
resent the American presence, and some Americans are overtly angry at the Afghans. The
high presence of USAID money is one factor that fuels these conflicts.
An Overview of US Aid Mechanisms
USAID is an agency of the federal government led by US Congress and overseen
by an Inspector General office. In Afghanistan the reconstruction is overseen by the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The World Bank and USAID
boast about their successes. USAID claims to have transformed many communities in
Afghanistan with infrastructure, clean water, schools, and health care. They purport that
they bring investors to the cities to build businesses and hotels and though there are
challenges with the security issues, they give little attention to corruption or fraud.
By 2004, USAID developed plans in the education and energy sectors to build
schools, clinics, and infrastructure using all contractors. USAID funding paid contractors
for projects, many of which were never completed, were mismanaged, or were done poorly.
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There were no routine on-the-ground inspections, no follow-up, or long term maintenance
plans in USAID designs. By 2007, with the approaching presidential election in the US,
there was a huge push to get large-scale projects operational, such as the Tarakhil Power
Plant in Kabul, and the Higher Education Project in 24 colleges and universities around the
country. Some saw hope in the tertiary school system as those who go to college can shape
the future. The belief was that books and pens were mightier than the Taliban’s weapons.
By 2010 both of those projects were documented failures. This study shows that
USAID also denied criticisms, such as the major failure of the TPP. The wasted billions of
dollars in Afghanistan should be a concern for all parties involved, but particularly those
who care about the Afghan people. Their suffering continues every day, while many steal
and selfishly contribute to the perpetuation of a broken system. By 2011 USAID was trying
to stave off accusations of fraud, waste, and the misappropriation of funds through an
increase of evaluations, both internal and external; transparency before the public through
online databases; and an effort to prove to the US Congress what projects were productive
with successful outcomes for the money allocated.
Even though the Inspector General’s office audits projects and SIGAR produces
quarterly reports, problems continue. From 2012 to 2016 US Congress debated the Foreign
Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, giving final approval in 2016. On July 15, 2016,
President Obama enacted H.R. 3766 (114th Congress): Foreign Aid Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2016 to become Public Law 114-191. This new law directly impacts
USAID and increases requirements for transparency and accountability.

10

Additionally, it is important to provide an overview of the US Army’s attempt to
rectify cultural and ethnic misunderstandings through the program of Human Terrain
Systems (HTS). The disconnect between Western and Afghan worldviews impacts and
disrupts aid, and these cultural misunderstandings render much aid wasted. The attempts
through the HTS program to bridge the cultural gaps have had mixed results, not
necessarily because of its idealized notions, but because of internal corruption and
complaints. Also, HTS was not welcomed by all in the US Army partly due to the
controversial approach of trying to use anthropologists and partly due to the HTS workers
being paid at the pay grade level of officers in the US military.
Summary of the Central Research Focus
The central focus of this study is to find the barriers or factors preventing the
effective delivery of USAID funding to Afghanistan. The focus is on two aid projects, or
the TPP and education aid in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017. The study examines official
documents, reports, and investigations. They reveal the systems of goal setting and
processes of aid delivery. The perspectives of stakeholders reveal the effectiveness of the
aid from the recipients’ points of view and clarify barriers to the success of the aid, which
impacted modernization processes for Afghanistan. Thus, the systematic research to reveal
the barriers of effective aid delivery, analysis of the data collected, and subsequent
conclusions are the focus of this dissertation.
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter One is an Introduction
Chapter, which reveals the problem statement, purpose, and focus of the study, along with
the three research questions for the dissertation study. The second chapter is a history of
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the problem concerning the research questions outlined in Chapter One. Chapter Three
reviews the theoretical implications of the study.
Chapter Four presents research data covering two aid sectors in Afghanistan,
energy and education aid funding through USAID. This dissertation research utilizes data
from official aid reports and audits, academic and media reports, the lived experiences of
respondents involved with Afghan aid projects, and HTS research concerning aid projects.
Specifically, the qualitative data uses respondents’ narratives from individuals who
administered and implemented aid, plus those who worked as advisors, interpreters, HTS,
and contractors with knowledge concerning energy and education aid projects in
Afghanistan. I also include data drawn from participant observation as an HTS social
science researcher. Finally, I examine the reports including program audits from the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), reports from
USAID’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), third party research reports, and the
media.
Chapter Five uses multi-level and multi-focus analyses for the data. The end results
from analyses of USAID aid funding data will directly address the research questions, and
also answer the question, ‘Did the Afghan people receive aid benefits as intended?’ The
results of the inquiry into these questions will be beneficial for scholars, development
agencies, policy makers and governmental agencies in the US and Afghanistan. Global
implications may be tested by other scholars in future research. Chapter Five includes
theoretic parameters to analyze the data, and discusses the results of delivering energy and
education aid to Afghanistan. Chapter Six addresses limitations of the study, future
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research needed, and the final research question of what can be done to improve aid
delivery in Afghanistan? Recommendations given propose strategies that could improve
aid delivery dynamics.
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
History of Aid in Afghanistan
The motivation to provide aid to Afghanistan was frequently influenced by the
desire of external governments to increase political stability in the country, because of a
strategic position in the Middle East in relation to other nations (Svensson, 2003, 382). The
geo-political position of Afghanistan was also the cause of three wars with Britain called
the Anglo-Afghan wars (of 1839–42; 1878–80; and 1919). Through wars and other foreign
incursions, several European nations tried to influence Afghanistan through the delivery of
aid money.
In this context, the provision of funds from external stakeholders played an
increasingly prominent and important part in Afghanistan’s economy (Pain and Goodhand,
2002; Rubin, 1995) Afghanistan became what is known as a "rentier" state, or when the
major revenues of a nation is derived from the ‘rent’ of their natural resources to another
nation. Funds for resources were paid in foreign aid, and the implication was that external
political and economic control would follow. Foreign aid from Europe in the 1960s
accounted for more than 40% of the Afghan government's budget, which made it heavily
reliant on aid (Rubin, 1995). While the aid facilitated modernization programs in
Afghanistan, it came with outside influences from the external stakeholders.
A bifurcation of the social and economic situations occurred in Afghanistan due the
influx of this foreign aid. An economically divided society increased the level of inequality
between those who lived in the rural areas with subsistence agriculture, and those in the
urban areas where much of the aid was focused. The impact of foreign aid facilitated the

14

emergence of a new elite social structure, and included the funding of higher education for
Afghan’s top social echelon (Rubin, 1995). The situation became self-sustaining, as those
who gained select status from aid benefits, were invariably the same people who were
placed in control of government positions.
The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan by force in 1979 to end an Afghan civil war
and to annex Afghanistan. 9 The Soviets tried to build Afghanistan into a modern
Communist nation-state through aid projects. Afghanistan’s receipt of aid from many
Western countries came to almost a complete stop in 1979 as a result of the Soviet invasion
(Rubin, 2000). Since the United States was embroiled in the Cold War with the Soviets,
the US sent military aid to the Afghan resistance fighters, the Mujahedeen or “holy
warriors”, to fight against the Soviets. However, it could be argued the country did not
suffer significantly, as occupation by the Soviet Union resulted in an increase in the level
of aid from Soviet sources. Therefore, the alignment of aid with political tug of war was a
repeated historical feature, and continued aid provided by the Soviet Union only served to
increase Afghanistan’s reliance on aid (Rubin, 2000).
The strategic geographical position of Afghanistan, which is next to nuclear armed
Pakistan and India, played a role in the Cold War and the post-Cold War too. (Baitenmann,
1990). The Afghan resistance supported the Mujahedeen, 10 which also received support
from Pakistan. Several of the refugee camps set up by non-governmental organizations

9

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Office of the Historian, Department of State. Retrieved August 28, 2017.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan
10
The plural form of mujahid, the term for one engaged in jihad, or a struggle, according to the Quran.
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(NGOs) aid agencies in Pakistan were then utilized as a base for mujahidin fighters.
Interestingly, the delivery of Western NGO aid for humanitarian purposes mirrored the
delivery of arms to resistance groups against the Russians, and the Western programs
provided a significant element of support for resistance to the Soviets. Those who were
living in refugee camps were required to register with one of seven political parties
determined by the Pakistani government. This identification process separated and
identified different religious and political Afghan groups, of which some were politically
favored over others (Baitenmann, 1990).
From Pakistan, Afghan humanitarian aid from NGOs went to areas controlled by
the Mujahedeen through cross-border operations in a semi-covert manner. The aid
provisions through NGOs facilitated middlemen, which hid the origins of the funding,
reduced transparency, and avoided accountability (Baitenmann, 1990). With this approach,
it was unsurprising there were suspicions of many NGOs, and their potential for aiding
rebels through cross-border operations (Nicholds and Borton, 1990). Until 1988, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations were not able to provide aid
due to sovereignty issues, but expressed concerns regarding the way that NGO aid was
being provided.
Much of Western aid was destined for eastern Afghanistan that was easy to reach
as it was near Peshawar, on the Pakistani border. 11 The location facilitated movement of
aid that utilized other stakeholders with connections to political parties related to the

11

Peshawar was a key city in Pakistan where aid agencies and Afghan rebels congregated.
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Mujahedeen. This was a practical necessity as it was the only route through which aid could
reach those in need (Nicholds and Borton, 1990; Baitenmann, 1990). This system of
secrecy facilitated and even supported the development of political favoritism and
corruption (Baitenmann, 1990). Resistance commanders set up checkpoints in order to
charge taxes on the aid as it was distributed. Wheat distributed through the NGO aid had
"wastage” up to 40%, which was accounted for by local commanders taking "taxes"
(Nicholds and Borton, 1990).
These practices exacerbated the problems of dependency, as levels of food
production decreased in the area as much as 50% to 60% (Rubin, 2000). Therefore the
reliance, supply, and the delivery of aid supported a negative self-sustaining cycle. In order
to continue providing aid, many NGOs remained silent on specific issues including the
humanitarian atrocities caused by the Mujahedeen, and even discussions on pursuing peace
initiatives. The NGOs involved did not tackle these issues to maintain admission and aid
delivery (Rubin, 1999, 2000). The Soviets completed their withdrawal in February 1989,
following a decision of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.
By 1990, a new collapse of the Afghan state resulted in an increased level of support
from the United Nations. Opening up Afghanistan increased aid provided to the entire
country, so the previous focus on the eastern part of the country was broken (Donini,
Dudley, and Ockwell, 1996). This stage of aid up to 1996 was referred to as the secondgeneration of aid (Rubin, 2000). The period saw an increased level of efficiency, as
different NGOs undertook the provisions of aid in a more coordinated manner. The current
pattern of aid was established that placed the official providers of aid as central actors in
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Afghan affairs (Rubin, 2000). The Afghan government’s influence was relatively limited,
and Afghans were relegated to the primary role of recipient rather than partner.
Humanitarian aid efforts to help Afghanistan from the United States started in 1945,
but to a lesser degree until 2001 (Svensson, 2003, 388). The United States’ involvement in
Afghanistan from the years 1979-1992 was largely to support the Mujahedeen rebels
against Soviet Union or what William Blum (2004) called the American Jihad in his book
Killing Hope. With all of the foreign political and economic incursions, Afghanistan’s
stability suffered. “In the years following, many of the funding nations that provided aid
claimed Afghanistan to be a "failed state" and took up roles associated with their
government, effectively becoming "surrogate governance" (Surkhe, Strand, and
Harpviken, 2002, 20). The Afghan government was highly fragmented, and the internal
systems faced challenging conditions from lack of infrastructure. The Afghan government
had so many concerns that overall effectiveness of aid delivery was reduced (Surkhe et al.,
2002, 2). The aid programs developed mostly small projects, with the exception of mining
through the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). Aid projects supported
rural development through the building of roads, helped to support small businesses and
community projects, and for the provision of livestock. The aim was to improve the overall
economy to reduce the potential for conflict caused by competition for resources (Surkhe
et al., 2002, 45).
While this period provided a greater level of successful aid, the Afghan government
lacked structure. Large projects were not viable as there was no national governmental
support systems in place (Surkhe et al., 2002, 46). Attempts by agencies to provide aid on
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a broader scale, such as the utilization of Shuras at a district level, were relatively limited.
Aiding local farmers transitioning from drug programs to other arable programs was also
ineffective (Surkhe et al., 2002, 48). The weak Afghan government resulted in many types
of corrupt venues. An example was the food aid program often resulted in client-lists
benefiting from food distribution (Surkhe et al., 2002; Duffield, Leader, and Grossman,
2001).
With political fragmentation, the rise of the Taliban was enabled. They were sort
of a ‘religious police’ for the people, and monitored and controlled fundamentalist religious
values. The Taliban had many followers, but their values were contradictory to many
international aid goals that emphasized modernization. At odds to the Taliban were the
treatment and rights of women and the establishment of formal education. During this time,
corruption also created difficulties for aid to reach those for whom it was intended (Surkhe
et al., 2002, 51).
As the Taliban took charge politically and socially in 1996, foreign concerns
increased about hindrance of aid delivery, threats of terrorism, and that more drugs would
be produced. Furthermore, Osama bin Laden was living in Afghanistan and working with
the Taliban. The Saudi citizen, bin Laden, was deemed a terrorist by the international
community. This brought international attention, and the United Nations imposed sanctions
during 1999 and 2000. The results of the sanctions reduced aid provided by international
aid organizations. At this time, a strategic framework to promote peace was emphasized
by both the United Nations and the United States (Duffield et al., 2001, 7). Called the third-
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generation of aid, from 1996 to 2001 the emphasis on aid was also accompanied with
concern for humanitarian and diplomatic processes.
When the Taliban fell in 2001 and Afghanistan’s government changed to have
international recognition, once again aid delivery changed too. There was a greater level
of international support, especially from major governments. However, the major supplier
of aid became the United States (Figure 2.1). By the end of 2014, over $100 billion from
the US had been earmarked for Afghanistan (Brinkley, 2013; BBC News, 2012).
Figure 2.1 – US Foreign Aid to Afghanistan (1946-2010)

http://www.pakistankakhudahafiz.com/afghanistan-big-winner-u-s-foreign-aid/
Reflections on Aid Efforts
A historical perspective is very important, when examining political influences
concerning foreign aid. A review is needed on how different types of significant
government structures within Afghanistan influenced levels of aid and methods of delivery
with other government aid benefactors. Starting in 1996, the Taliban’s shadow government
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usurped the rule of law for the Government of Afghanistan, and aid delivery was reduced
(World Bank, 2005). Therefore in 2001, aid was part of the US counterinsurgency plan
against the Taliban, using an international strategy of aid implementation. This plan
utilized aid programs to reduce poverty and improve the material conditions in areas of
conflict to reducing the potential for counterinsurgency (US Army/Marine Corps, 2006).
The ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ counter-insurgency strategy was one of the goals
for the US involvement in Afghanistan. Yet, in many instances, “buying into” the
American way of doing things was muddled by the top-down development of US
strategies, which resulted in inequitable distribution of aid. Contractors and non-Afghans
typically received a majority of the funding from top-down planning for large development
projects. Additionally, beginning in 2001, USAID funding to Afghanistan typically went
to the areas with greatest violence in order to deter the Taliban from gaining control. The
result was that the most impoverished districts with the least violence receive less aid, since
those districts were less strategic for the US.
Bearce and Tirone (2010) and Boyce (2000) agree that local governance is more
likely to support aid programs, when strategic benefits of aid are greater for the recipient
country, rather benefits for the donor country. Therefore, if there are significant strategic
advantages for the donor country in delivering aid, there may be a higher level of resistance
by the recipient government (Bearce and Tirone, 2010). From these conclusions we infer
that the less strategic or smaller scale projects would be most likely to gain support, and
therefore most likely to be more successful. However, elements that contributed to
successes of aid delivery have been highly debated.
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Burnside and Dollar (2000, 4) offered that aid benefited governments that
implemented "good" economic policies. Svensson (2003, 382) agreed that when indicators
supported economic growth, then aid was more likely to be successful. However, these
findings were not unilaterally accepted, and research by Boone (1996, 23) and Easterly,
Levine and Roodman (2004, 776) found no improvement in the impact of aid in areas with
"good" economic policies. Indeed, many examples stemming from aid projects in
Afghanistan supported or derailed aid concepts.
The war on terror included humanitarian aid from the beginning for the Afghan
people. Basic needs such as electricity were viewed as a primary task for reconstruction
efforts led by USAID in Afghanistan, and large top-down projects were implemented for
these Afghan aid projects. The Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP), the subject of analysis in
Chapter 5 of this dissertation, was designed and built by USAID starting in 2007 to provide
electricity for the city of Kabul. However, the diesel power plant cost three times as much
as those in Pakistan and the annual operating cost was 280 million US dollars - more than
a third of Afghanistan’s annual tax revenues. Years later it produced almost no electricity,
because of the costs of diesel fuel. “Juma Nawandish, the former deputy minister of energy
and water, told a reporter that he wanted to develop the gas fields in northern Afghanistan
instead. Nearby lakes and rivers could have provided far cheaper hydropower.” (Gall,
2008) However, US projects were planned and funded one year at a time by Congress,
which caused fragmented objectives.
The “Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA),” signed in May of 2012, outlined the
US-Afghanistan relationship through 2024, but funding was still to be approved annually.
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The new SPA continued to reveal top-down approaches in Afghanistan. For instance, the
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) coalition agreed to fund and support the
Afghan security forces, but the SPA did not say how. The US Administration in 2013 asked
Congress for funding to continue every year, and the same is true for NATO member states,
but there were no guarantees the funding would continue. Yet, the SPA was a step in the
right direction as it created a longer time frame than the prior one-to-two years planning
strategies for the Afghan war (Keller, 2011).
Frost (2012) asserted that future plans should be definable and achievable with an
eye towards long-term success. Furthermore, policymakers needed to apply ‘lessons
learned’ to transition strategies and the future of US operations in the country. Only by
addressing these critical shortcomings could such aid strategies have any hopes of success.
It was also beneficial to look at how successful aid program were implemented.
The 2003 National Solidarity Program (NSP) was the largest development program
within Afghanistan. It was funded by US dollars and administered by the Afghan
government. The NSP process of development was based on intervention that targeted
community and village level initiatives (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 2012, 9). Aid
delivery went to community development councils located in each village. The councils
were elected through a universal vote utilizing equal numbers of both genders (Beath et al.,
2012, 10).
The practical application of this development program started with the
disbursement of $200.00 grants for each household. The village could have a maximum
level of $60,000.00 to undertake selected projects (Beath et al., 2012, 11). The projects
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were usually based on infrastructure development, such as road building, provisions of
clean drinking water, or the building of canals for irrigation. Funds were also utilized to
provide teaching and training, including literacy courses. Different levels of the Afghan
government supported the projects, which may be a significant factor in the success of
more than 29,000 villages benefiting from the aid.
By 2012, the impacts were measurably successful for the 29,000 project villages
with costs of nearly $1 billion (Beath et al., 2012, 15). Research assessed the perceptions
of the quality of life for those in the participating villages. The respondents had a more
positive view of their potential future and current economic conditions in comparison with
villages that did not take part. Depending on the measurements used, such as quality of life
and material improvements, the results were between 12% and 17% greater for
participating villages (Beath et al., 2012, 15). It was also worth noting the villages
displayed a more positive attitude towards the Afghan government and its agencies.
Development aid has been highly criticized for not using the labor of local people and
appropriate technologies. Schumacher’s 1973 Small is Beautiful, describes how village
based economics refute the Western notion of “bigger is better.”
USAID’s Role in Aid
President John Kennedy created the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) in the Foreign Assistance Act in 1962 as part of the executive
branch, with program and funding approval by the US Congress. The main objective of
USAID was the alleviation of poverty throughout the developing world and later within
war zones. Under foreign policy guidance from the President, Secretary of State and the
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National Security Council, USAID played a key role in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
Audits of USAID Afghanistan missions were conducted by the Office of the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR, which was created by
Congress in 2008 and began its work in 2009.
In one of SIGAR’s reports, (SIKA) Stability in Key Areas Programs (July 2013)
stated that for 16 months and $47 million spent USAID had not met essential program
objectives during the reporting period, including the four quarters of 2012 and the first
quarter of 2013. USAID was accused of delays in contracts and a lack of disbursement of
funding to local governments in all four regions. There were problems of misuse of the
funds. Although allocated money was distributed to Academy for Educational
Development (AED) contractors, much of the money was not applied to projects, which
was in violation of United Nations protocols related to corruption. This audit was of interest
to this dissertation study because it pointed to instances of corruption and lack of
accountability from within USAID’s bureaucracy.
USAID has denied any wrong doing and according to the report, “USAID
Engagement in Afghanistan, 2014 and Beyond,” the agency has accomplished
improvements in health, infrastructure, and gender higher education over the past twelve
years. “Our partnership with Afghanistan will extend past the 2014 security transition as
we seek to work with the Afghan government, private sector, and civil society to end
extreme poverty through a focus on agriculture, private sector development, and
maintenance of much-needed infrastructure” (USAID, 2014). According to Sandefur
(2012) at the Center for Global Development, any off-budget or non-secure aid delivery
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problems shifted for the better since the Tokyo agreement of 2012 to keep aid targeted and
on budget in Afghanistan.
USAID aid money in Afghanistan had some successes, such as projects with the
grape farmers, who moved away from opium production due to the 30% higher profits
achieved with growing grapes (Constable, 2013, 22). Furthermore, USAID supported
education, especially higher education for women (Bakhtar News Agency, 2013, 1).
However, while there are some successes, overall goals to alleviate suffering remain
elusive. For example, in counteracting the success of the grape farmers referenced above,
between 2012 and 2013 there was a 36% increase in opium production, from 154,000
hectares to 209,000 hectares (Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013). Constable (2013)
expected that problems may increase if an agreement to move control of aid is realized,
with at least 50% of the funding going through the Government of Afghanistan (2013, 22).
The need for accountability for funding is generally recognized, and checks and
balances, especially regarding taxpayer money to the tune of millions of dollars, should
require accountability at all levels. A chain of accountability is optimal that includes the
responsibility of the donors as well as the recipients. The largest projects for USAID are
associated with very expensive infrastructure projects such as road building and provision
for power. In a chain of responsibility, the NGOs and contractors receiving the aid should
answer to USAID, who in turn answers to the US government. The US government has a
responsibility to the US taxpayers, whose tax dollars are providing the aid funding (Groves
and Hinton, 2013, 25; Scott, Mcloughlin, and Marquette, 2009, 510; Wenar, 2006, 2).
Furthermore, a system of checks and balances should also apply to Afghan leaders and
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stakeholders. A model is needed in advance of project planning and implementation for
checks and balances.
Additional Information on Aid in Afghanistan.
USAID and the Pentagon aid programs in Afghanistan do not meet the stated
mission goals to alleviate poverty. Sandefur (2012) says: “Three points stand out: 1.
Violence is lowest in the poorest provinces. 2. Aid is lowest in the poorest provinces. 3.
There are huge aid flows to unstable provinces where aid development and impact are
questionable.” This shows an evident priority for the US to address the Taliban rather than
comprehensive humanitarian aid. In contrast, aid money channeled through the Afghan
government — like the much-celebrated National Solidarity Program — is, in principle,
much more equitably distributed across provinces and districts. Sandefur (2012) points out
aid focus should be on areas where the security and governance situations allows for
genuine development, rather than implicitly punishing peaceful districts or wasting
projects in insecure areas with unsustainable results. 12 The conclusions of this dissertation
align with Sandefur’s early evaluation of aid projects in areas that were unsecure due to
Taliban insurgency. Both Sandefur (2012) and the Center for Global Development present
clear indications that American development aid is not funneled to the Afghan people that
need it most. I concur with these findings from my HTS research and experiences in 2012
in the Helmand Province.

12

Sandefur, Justin. 2012. Center for Global Development’s blog. July 10, 2012. Accessed March 1, 2017.
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/16-billion-afghanistan-why-less-money-might-be-good-thing
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Other issues associated with accountability are corrupt practices with the supplychain stakeholders, both US and Afghan. US contractors (living in the US or Afghanistan)
may take bribes to exert influence in the allocation of contracts. Government officials and
warlords in Afghanistan may require bribes or payments for aid projects to be implemented
(Department of Justice, 2014, 1; Brautigam and Knack, 2004, 258). Who is accountable
and what are the criteria? The Army and USAID’s use of Agricultural Development Teams
(ADT) proceeds with no knowledge about local climate, labor, or soil needs (Keller, 2011).
Transparency could improve the status of Afghanistan and reduce ongoing reliance on aid
and reveal latent economic systems in place (Draxler, 2014, 39; Fukuyama, 2006, 126).
Several authors noted the potential for conflict of interests in provisions of aid in
Afghanistan (Scott et al., 2009, 509; Rupp, 2006, 284).
The self-interest focus of the US resides with long-term security to promote
Western culture, and to apply controls to an American-model free market economy
(Fukuyama, 2006, 4). In modernization processes, mass corruption must be controlled
through accountability and transparency for both political and economic processes.
Entrenched systems of audits, checks and balances, and safety are vital in the initial stages
of modernization.
In the arena of US policy, Ferejohn (1995) states that one of the first considerations
in terms of accountability is transparency, especially in the context of the US government.
The second aspect is the presence of US elections, so the views and pressure of the
electorate may be felt by government (Ferejohn, 1995, 131). How much do the US
taxpayers know about aid or how funding is being spent in Afghanistan? Whom do they
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believe? USAID typically denies any or all allegations of corruption, even after audits are
published, (SIGAR, 2010).
Without accountability, there is little motivation for any form of change, including
improvements to efficiency or effectiveness in the implementation of aid. According to
Brautigam and Knack (2004), it is established that with a lack of accountability, there is
increased potential for corruption. This is not endemic to Afghanistan, but an issue with
foreign aid everywhere in LDCs. Research found in fragile states within Sub-Saharan
Africa that corruption with foreign aid is a significant issue (Brautigam and Knack, 2004,
258). Others, such as Deaton (2013) believe that it may be an inadequate structure of aid
or funding itself that corrupts political processes in impoverished nations.
The weakness of the Government of Afghanistan is reflected in the continued levels
of military aid provided by the US in order to support political operations. Allied
governments are providing other resources as well, including military support for law
enforcement and training. More recently, Angus Deaton claims in his The Great Escape:
Health, Wealth and the Origins of Inequality (2013), “It is not possible to develop someone
else’s country from the outside.” The presence of traditional and informal political systems
found within the Afghan government is conducive to corruption through nepotism and
networking. Within Afghanistan, the presence of the Tashkeel system remains, which
incorporates civil servants chosen through their familial or tribal alliances. In this manner
they are not held accountable to the electorate. Due to this complex recruitment and
management processes of positions, secrets and corruption are often tightly sealed. The
civil service management results in a mismatch between the central government and local
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levels for provisions of resources and personnel allocations based on legacy and not on
merit or need (Evans, 2004, 38).
The Human Terrain System
As a member of a Human Terrain Team in 2012 and as my experiences are the
inspiration for this dissertation, it is important to briefly map out what the Human Terrain
System was and what role it played in Afghanistan. The HTS program dealt with crosscultural meanings and information in a war zone. Their research benefited both sides as it
mitigated cultural misunderstandings, which were deadly at times. In one instance, guns
fired in salute at a wedding caused the US military to bomb the site, thinking they were
insurgents, and 30 people in the wedding party were killed (Guardian, 2002). This incident
early on in the Afghan occupation created horrendous outcomes for US policies. To
summarize, cross-cultural miscommunication occurs when one ethnicity exhibits a
behavior and another ethnicity assumes incorrect meanings, and conflicts may ensue.
Within this scenario, dominant ethnicities usually escalate circumstances and have more
impact on the results within conflict situations (Schaefer, 2015, 6).
It was recognized there was a cultural knowledge gap between the US military and
local cultures, so the idea for the HTS was first proposed by Montgomery McFate and
Andrea Jackson (McFate and Jackson, 2005). In 2007, HTS was launched under the United
States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as a proof-of-concept, or pilot
program (Forte, 2011). Five initial HTS teams were set up for Afghanistan and Iraq, using
academic professionals from the social sciences, including anthropology, political science
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and other behavioral social sciences (Forte, 2011). The number of HTS teams expanded
over the years in Iraq and Afghanistan within each US military command.
The Human Terrain System (HTS) program operated within the US military to
provide the military staff and commanders with a better understanding of the culture of the
local people through academic research (HTS, 2014). The goal of HTS reports was to
inform military commanders of cultural variances. Through the ‘Winning of Hearts and
Minds’ policy, military commands were assigned large sums of money to infuse into aid
projects at the Commander’s discretion. The funds (called CERP money) aided the PRT
(Provincial Reconstruction Teams) to build infrastructure projects, and to work in tandem
with aid agencies like USAID. Within their missions, HTS often assessed cultural needs
for project planning and evaluated finished aid projects.
The duty of HTS teams was to research the nuances of local Afghan culture and
write informative reports with suggestions to mitigate cultural conflicts. The purpose of
the cultural research was varied and ranged from finding cultural misunderstandings that
impacted the efficacy of aid projects to other cultural actions that created unnecessary
violence. Besides the US Army commands, the reports were shared with the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), who planned reconstruction projects and issued reports to
other aid agencies. USAID aid planning, distribution, and implementation often existed
without specific and intricate knowledge of cultural or religious awareness, and an effort
was made in both Afghanistan and Iraq to close this gap through the Human Terrain
System.
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During deployment, HTS researchers interacted with the local people and gained
cultural knowledge of ongoing political, economic, social, and physical lifestyles through
studies using such mixed methods as interviews, ethnographic studies, observations,
surveys, and document studies. They sought to bring the expertise and ethics of academia
to gain valid and reliable data.
This expertise drew on academic capabilities in anthropology, among other disciplines.
Within the field of anthropology, as in other branches of knowledge, there are over 900
definitions of culture. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,, “Most
definitions characterize culture as something that is widely shared by members of a social
group and shared in virtue of belonging to that group.” Within the multitude of
definitions culture has both human and material variables such as behavior, beliefs,
traditions, language, religion, food, literature, art, music, and artifacts (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018). This is not to be confused with ethnicity that entails
an all-inclusive identity with both culture, genetics, and other factors. The use of ethnicity
replaces the concept of ‘race’, because with new technology racial concepts are proven to
be false (Maybury-Lewis, 2001).
Colonel Thomas Roe, the director of the US Army’s Center for Lessons Learned,
said in an interview that the troops needed to adopt a more cultural approach to fight
effectively in places like Afghanistan. However, this understanding most often took the
form of crash courses in “culture” for soldiers during pre-deployment training. Tens of
thousands of other civilians have also served in Afghanistan, but one would be hard pressed
to identify where increased cultural understanding has become practice (Frost, 2012).
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Cultural understanding has not been a high priority in most avenues of US foreign policies;
especially in LDCs. Outside administrators did not understand the communities’ needs
(Baker, 2009). For instance, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan tried to bring Sesame
Street characters to Afghan education without understanding the Muslim culture of
aversion to reproducing animal or human forms. Furthermore, in an infrastructure without
electricity for children to watch TV, the Sesame Street characters were not understood.
This demonstrates that in this instance, the State Department was as uninformed as the
Army (Keller, 2011).
The academic social science degrees of the HTS personnel enabled navigation
within the complicated and complex venues of the realities of culture and ethnicities in
Afghanistan and Iraq. They brought new and more complete insights to mitigate cultural
misunderstandings, gave voices to those not otherwise heard, and reduced violence on all
sides. The HTS program was critical, because one of the biggest obstacles was the cultural
differences in the commands’ area of deployment. When cultural misunderstandings
occurred, resistance and violence could follow. In Afghanistan, the military faced
increasing IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), which also created an urgency to
improve cross-cultural communications (HTS, 2014).
However, each military deployment was only for twelve months and then
commands were replaced by new units. This was not conducive to successful relationships
or projects, because commanders had to accomplish much quickly, and then hand off to
the next group. Due to different personalities and agendas of the commanders, the
transitions were not always smooth and promises to locals were not kept, which created
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new enemies. Frost (2012) stated, “Decisions [were] made in the moment without
understanding long term consequences.” Therefore, the HTS program also represented
continuity of cultural information from one US Army command to the next.
Unfortunately, HTS was highly criticized by the anthropological academic
community. With no on-the-ground research or other than opinion-oriented inquiries
within academia, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) arbitrarily decided
that social scientists should not conduct social science research in a war zone. They said
research ethics could not be maintained. However, members of the HTS teams often
reported the opposite, or that their research gave a voice to women and those not otherwise
heard. For HTS, academic protocols were to be followed with voluntary permissions,
informed choices, and the other ethical guidelines for conducting ethical research when
respondents were involved. This was accomplished under different research protocols than
the military or even diplomatic inquiries. HTS reports had the potential to save lives of
Afghan people, aid workers, and military personnel.
HTS did not directly administer aid to the Afghan people. It did, however,
participate in many development or modernization projects to provide information and as
a vehicle to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. HTTs (Human Terrain Teams)
frequently aligned themselves with PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and Afghan civil servants. This reduced violence and
enhanced cross-cultural understanding to ensure successful aid delivery (especially for
women’s needs). By August 2013, there were 14 HTS teams in Afghanistan, but by the
end of September 2014 the HTS teams were withdrawn as part of the drawdown strategy.
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The HTS teams had previously left Iraq in 2011. The HTS project has since been disbanded
and defunded.
Conclusions
The history of aid in Afghanistan shows a long and troubled past through invasion
by outsiders and warlords and religious fundamentalists from within. The location of
Afghanistan is of critical importance to world powers for trade and resources. However,
the poverty in the country is dire, so that those who invaded also tried to modernize though
the application of aid funding. Economically, Afghanistan became a rentier state with
dependency on outsiders for survival.
The modern stages of aid delivery to Afghanistan divided into three eras before
2001. The 1960s-1970s foreign aid projects through the Foreign Assistance Act in 1962
were implemented by USAID involvement with programs approved by US Congress, The
Soviet aid projects (1979-1989) sought to make Afghanistan into a modern communist
nation, while the US gave covert aid to the Mujahedeen to fight the Soviets. The post-Cold
War aid (1990 to 2001) flooded the country with help from the United Nations and
international NGOs. The US aid has now continued for another 16 years from 2001-2017.
This time aid was deemed for a ‘Winning Hearts and Minds” campaign connected to
fighting the Taliban; all in hopes the Afghan people would favor the side of US. The
planning and distribution of aid was implemented by either the US Army or USAID and
called the Afghanistan Reconstruction. The efficiency and efficacy of these aid projects for
the last 16 years are the topics of this dissertation.
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With money flowing into Afghanistan through the US military and USAID, the top
down models of aid distribution enabled corruption through the decades. Therefore, those
in need were generally not helped as much as expected in relationship to the incoming
funds. Part of the problem stemmed from a lack of cultural understanding. The US effort
to study the Afghan culture through the HTS program was developed in tandem with the
US Army, but with no real efficacy to implement strategic recommendations to either the
US Army or USAID. Recently in 2014, HTS was disbanded and dismissed as nonproductive and non-important.
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The primary research focus of this dissertation is on the efficacy and sustainability
of aid administered in Afghanistan to attain modernization. What are factors that motivate
modernization according to modernization theory? Western international interests strive to
link modernization to democratic ideologies. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2009, 36)
the process of modernization of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) advances the
conditions necessary for the implementation of democracy. Albeit Western motives for
modernization may focus on the installation of democracy within LDCs, the results of this
literature review recognize there are many other motives for modernization of LDCs.
Essentially, scholars often characterize modernization as a “syndrome of social changes”
that is inherently linked to the expanse of industry, including occupational skill
development/specialization and urban development. Inglehart and Welzel (2009) also link
modernization less evidently to increases in education, improved life expectancy, and
economic expansion in LDCs. The link between modernization and human and social
capital extends from the belief that investments in these elements can support progress and
beneficial change in underdeveloped nations.
Foreign aid agencies like USAID operate to advance modernization and human
capital in underdeveloped areas, such as in war-torn Afghanistan 13. This chapter will
examine the relevant literature for the critical topic of how theories of modernization and

13

The wars in Afghanistan include the British invasion: (1823 to 1926), the Russian invasion: (1979 to
1989), the Civil war: (1989 to 2001), and the recent war by the United States and her NATO Allies
beginning in 2001 to the present day.
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human capital apply to USAID’s work specifically in Afghanistan. Horowitz, Driskill, and
Mendez (2009, 723) noted that a significant amount of academic work has paid attention
to the concept of capital formation for modernization. Similarly, Chaudhary (2013, 34)
emphasizes the importance of understanding the connection between modernization and
any supporting essential skills development, institutions, curriculum, and normative
values, which also influence the processes of modernization. Therefore, understanding the
social and cultural side of the development of education is essential to create modernization
as well as the presence of monetary funds needed for capital developments. Chaudhary
(2013) emphasizes the interconnection of funding and understanding the impact of
education. Governments and aid sources must know the importance of human capital
before they allocate funds.
As this dissertation research is guided by modernization and human capital theories
to provide data interpretation, the study will also compare the efficacy of the aid and
problems with aid delivery expended for nation building efforts by foreign aid agencies
such as USAID in Afghanistan from 2001-2017. Notably, nation building involves both
human capital development and development of physical infrastructure, especially where
external aid is provided. To inquire into the delivery of aid, the study will investigate
projects in two different sectors in Afghanistan. The first concerns the energy sector, with
the Tarakhil Power Planet (TPP) as an example, to increase energy production for the
development of electricity. The infrastructure project of the TPP in Kabul was funded by
US assistance to provide higher levels of energy and electricity nationally. Using
modernization theory, this research will examine whether the project was successful or not.
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Success for aid projects as outlined in a SIGAR report (SIGAR, 2015) was measured by
initial set up attainment, efficacy of outcomes, and sustainability of change.
The next case study in this dissertation will address the role of the aid provided by
USAID and other foreign aid agencies for increasing levels of education to facilitate human
capital growth and play a major role in creating a modern nation in the future. With respect
to human capital theory, the more human capital or the intangible assets and resources that
individuals have are thought to have an aggregate impact on changing the culture of
traditional societies, and eventually will lead a nation to implement and continue a modern
society (Gonzalez, Karoly, Constant, Salem, and Goldman 2008, xvii). As part of
modernization theory, human capital explains the ways in which human capabilities and
resources are utilized to benefit people and to support the modernization efforts in
achieving nation building. While human capabilities and resources are valuable and
provide complex benefits for communities and nations, Inglehart and Welzel (2009, 36)
and Chaudhary (2013, 34-36) believe the greatest human capital investments are found in
education. As a result, human capital theory will be used in this dissertation to examine the
issue of education in Afghanistan and to find out whether or not the aid designated for
education actually developed beneficial educational attributes in this LDC.
In this chapter, discussions of modernization and human capital theory applications
are explained to provide a clear picture of methods for promoting modernization in
Afghanistan, an LDC with heavy reliance on foreign aid. Additionally, the research will
examine problems with US foreign aid delivery and implementation, the central focus of
this dissertation. These theories may contribute to a deeper understanding of the insights
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provided by the data in this dissertation. To practically apply these theories, comparisons
will be drawn between actual results of USAID projects, and the assumed outcomes of the
relevant theories. This will eventually help to answer the questions of success or failures
of the efforts of USAID fashioned in Afghanistan for modernization, as evident in the
spheres of infrastructure development and education.
Modernization Theory
There are a variety of different ways to define modernization linked to the
transformation of societies within social, political, or economic parameters. Earlier
definitions saw a linear progression of modernization. Rostow (1960, 4) described
modernization as a part of the economic continuum through which most societies progress,
moving from traditional conditions to those sparked by the move to mass consumption. He
outlined the processes or steps to accomplish modernization and eventually result in a
modern society. Rostow (1960, 4) explained that, “It is possible to identify all societies, in
their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society,
the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high massconsumption.” According to Huntington (1968, 52), modernization is “a multifaceted
process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity.” Chaudhary (2013,
34) also asserted that modernization is a process of socio-cultural change involving values,
norms, culture, institutions and structures.
Since WWII, critical debates over the conceptualization of modernization have
taken place, influencing perspectives on this theory. Modernization theory may be traced
to the response of Americans to the international setting of the post-Second World War era
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(Tipps 1973, 200). The theory emerged from the economic and political conditions of the
post-war era, specifically the rise of the US as a superpower, the growth of global
communism, and the decolonization of Africa and Asia, leading to the identification of
LDCs (Rahman 2017, 2). This viewpoint reflects the relationship between modernization
as a theoretical construct and its application to a number of areas influencing the
development of LDCs, including political, social, and economic areas. The Cold War
climate occurring between 1947 and 1991 placed value on modernization that had not
previously been realized on such a large scale. Suddenly, the least-developed world
societies were becoming a part of the economic landscape with greater significance. This
turned attention to the impact of modernization and its value in creating political stability,
economic development and social/cultural change in these countries (Tipps 1973, 100).
Western Europe is an example of the successes related to modernization and its
potential for impacting democratic political development in independent nations.
Democratic ideals are frequently linked to the process of modernization. Some scholars
believe that modernization can favor democracy and eventually result in a freer society,
because it enhances the masses’ abilities and motivation toward self-rule that applies
pressures to the elite (Rostow 1960; Eisenstadt, 1966; Gonzalez et al., 2008; Inglehart and
Welzel, 2009). Thus, self-expression or freedom of speech and assembly, rule by law, plus
educational attainment can influence the levels of democracy. “The greater the selfexpression ability then the more flow toward a stable democracy” (Inglehart and Welzel
2010, 552).

“In the decades before 1990, mass emphasis on democracy became

increasingly widespread in many authoritarian and agricultural societies, and this
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contributed to a subsequent downfall for rule by force” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 554).
However, researchers, including the later work of Inglehart and Welzel (2010), do not
assert that modernization efforts always bring about Westernization ideals of democracy,
capitalism or Western democratic-socialism. “The most recent wave of democratization [in
agrarian nations] does not seem to have been motivated by a desire for greater income
equality, as their model holds [a Western model]; it was driven by the fact that a large share
of the population gave high priority to freedom itself” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 552).
A key aspect of modernization identified by Inglehart and Welzel (2009, 36), as
well as Fukuyama (2011, 1), is the belief that modernization creates a cycle of continued
cultural transformation that has a self-reinforcing mechanism with clear social and political
ramifications. This transformation leads more to nationalism, i.e. a sense of belonging to
the larger collective of the nation, and less to traditional allegiances such as tribal or
familial connections. This seems to showcase and illustrate a perceived dichotomy between
traditional allegiances and nationalism. Western modernization ideals reflect the
connection between economic opportunity and participation in mechanisms that support
economic growth, including political institutions that can drive the process of
democratization (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 36). Fukuyama (2011, 1) recognized that this
view is the commonly held Americanized version of modernization theory that links
economic growth, social mobility, political process, and cultural values, but it translates
somewhat differently in other countries. The belief that this kind of transformation is selfsupporting and occurs as a natural progression of the modernization processes is an overly
optimistic assessment generally challenged when assessing its implications for LDCs.
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Fukuyama (2011, 1) argued that a belief in modernization naturally supporting a
distinct political order in changing societies does not recognize the complex mechanisms
at work. Increasing social and economic change can correspond with significant disorder,
“characterized by coups, civil wars, upheavals, and political instability” (Fukuyama 2011,
1). He warned to expect resistance to nationalization when trying to modernize societies.
Subsequently, modernization, for some including the concept as it was introduced by
Huntington (1971, 283) is linked to the concept of dramatic social change. He linked the
concept of modernization to social change, a necessary leap in order to address the variety
of elements that influence the progression of change within industrializing nations.
According to Huntington (1971, 52), modernization is “a multifaceted process involving
changes in all areas of human thought and activity.” Therefore, it is critical to understand
the history, logic, and presence of a society’s existing cultural norms before any assistance
or change can be introduced.
However, the reasoning that modernization leads to democratic political systems is
clearly not a given. While many in modernized nations assume that modernization naturally
leads to a freer and more prosperous society, Inglehart and Welzel (2010) clarified that
many outcomes are possible. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 552)
“Industrialization can lead to fascism, communism, theocracy, or democracy.” However,
they still insisted that modernization can favor democracy and eventually flow into a freer
society. Therefore, they found that modernization benefits the trends toward democratic
tendencies through greater personal freedoms and justice. However, while modernization
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can lead to democracy, they are not precisely linked as history demonstrated in the rise of
communism and fascism (Inglehart and Welzel 2010).
The theoretical view of modernization as a Western ideal is only partially
supported by the findings in the existing literature. In the 1960s, scholars saw
modernization as a Western concept that became a dichotomy between traditional and
industrialized societies. Early on, Eisenstadt (1966, 4) defined the term modernization as a
process of societal change that traditional societies adopted to develop their nations to
imitate the Western model. However, this viewpoint influenced the scope of modernization
processes and aided imperialistic models of colonization to change societies from
traditional to industrial. The theory and the reality did not match because different
traditional societies require different kinds of modernization. Modernization needs to be
culturally sensitive and allow developing nations to develop with their own styles and
models. Some parts of traditions need to be a part of the foundation of the future. Colonial
empires espoused bringing modern ways of life to the underdeveloped world, but instead
created more stringent societal divisions and less hope for future democracies.
A cultural issue surrounding modernization theory hinged on debates concerning
whether it promoted modern economic stability, or destroyed traditional cultures while
promoting Western cultures (Rostow 1960, 4). It became clear that the either/or and polar
arguments did not apply across the board. “Modernization theory needed to be revised due
to fact that the evolution of societies is not linear and modernization can be reversed due
to economic downfall, such as in the Great Depressions in Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Spain, and during the 1990s in most Soviet successor states” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010,
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553). Therefore, societies individually have external and internal pressures that develop
their own time line of change within their cultural norms, which varies greatly between
societies. Therefore, these elements can create many different results from the same
modernization applications. This conclusion does not dismiss modernization theory as a
whole, but examines each instance in consideration of other variables. The factors must be
examined one by one and this sets the precedent for evaluating measures of the progression
of modernization for different countries.
At the same time, modernization outside the scope of a Western model was
examined by other scholars too. Tilak (2002, 23) also concluded that it was location
specific or a case-by-case topic. There was no way to stereotype one nation as very similar
to another, even among the modern or the LDC nations. He examined the Chinese concept
of modernization and concluded that while China industrialized after the rise of
communism, it lacked a model of what most deem democratic principles, including
freedoms and improvements in living conditions. He related this in terms of the post-WWII
successes experienced by Japan, as well as with other Asian nations, including Taiwan and
South Korea. These other Asian nations have been viewed as paradigmatic examples of
the success of modernization within non-Western cultures. Tilak (2002, 23) used the labels
of the Asian Tigers for his case studies, applying strategic approaches to support
modernization in these countries versus industrialized change in China.
Many scholars see modernization as an ongoing debate or view it as a feasible plan
simply in need of new definitions and understandings. Chaudhary (2013, 35) stated that
though in the beginning “modernization referred to a model of an evolutionary transition
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from a 'premodern' or 'traditional' to a 'modern' society”, this concept is no longer
widespread. Many scholars have dismissed the modernization concept of a progression
from premodern to modern for many reasons, including its discounting of the inherent
values of traditional ways of life. The word traditional is used in this context as meaning
the use of long-standing practices that emphasize the common identity within small groups
and/or tribal people (Tilak, 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 2010; Fukuyama, 2011;
Chaudhary, 2013). They saw no problem in placing traditional values within modernization
practices as basic values vary more between societies than within them. As a result, these
scholars argued that the dichotomy that emerged from suggestions that modernization
could only occur in industrial societies external from traditional values and ideals appears
less relevant today. Therefore, groups do not always have to be modern to have democracy.
Many people in traditional societies want personal freedoms, medical care, education, and
economic prosperity. Yet, they also need the communal security and the values of their
traditional societies.
Here, it is essential to note the literature shows that variances in modes of
economics may focus either toward a traditional society or a modern society with the
differences found in an agrarian versus an industrial economy. Another dichotomy between
traditional and modern societies may be found within their interactions with nature.
Agrarian societies are seen as those where people work in nature through harvesting food
by land cultivation and the raising and care of animals, while economically modernization
is usually associated with urban and industrial development, which impacts the
environment. It has been upheld that some reflections should be made about whether or not
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modernization does in fact degrade the environment (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 553).
“Indeed, the… market has created a new class of “green” human rights abuses, [for]
peasants and indigenous peoples… in their traditional territories.” Klein (2015, 222) sees
capitalism as a relentless growth machine wreaking havoc on the planet, as capitalism's
prime directive is economic profit, not human improvement. Due to this, people in more
traditional societies must breathe toxic air and suffer from deforestation and land and water
deprivation.

Natural resources such as wood, water and oil are often processed in

modernized societies, and skyscrapers and factories begin to transform the landscape.
Environmental problems, such as climate change, are believed to be the result of industrial
development and production. However, just because modernization may have negatively
impacted the environmental conditions and depleted resources in the past, this does not
mean that has to be is a feature of modernization. Redirecting the focus to sustainable
modern practices is not only achievable, it also can create new trends for investments.
There are no exact formulas for modern economies (Klein, 2015, 222).
Rahman (2017, 1) summarized some modernization methods by saying: “The basic
notions and objections attached to the modernization approach are highly debatable.” It is
noteworthy that some scholars are in favor of modernization, but believe in totalitarian or
fascist political control of the people. Therefore, they see that modernization could be a
tool for the regulation of populations (Rahman, 2017; Eisenstadt, 1966). In this case, except
for vocational education, a highly educated population would not be optimal in a
totalitarian society, as Rahman (2017, 1) purports. Highly educated populations have better
critical analysis and problem solving skills, which aids a democratic model. The political
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and economic use of modernization can be a dichotomy of motivations based on core
beliefs of whether personal freedoms or totalitarian control as being better for the masses.
Chaudhary (2013) cited a negative aspect, that modernization may destroy culture by
leading to globalization. In this case modern cultural norms and ideas would spread
throughout the world via contact and media. Here we can envision a sort of universal
culture that serves as a baseline for all, which may not be a good scenario.
Other views on modernization show it may lead to the betterment of conditions and
standards of living, and that it allows for the possibility of rule by law instead of rule by
force, the former of which leads to more personal freedoms. This is linked to the belief
that education is a key component of both modernization and the expansion of
opportunities that shape the standard of living. This becomes relevant when researching
education projects in Afghanistan, as the Taliban is not in favor of modernization or
Western education models.
Most scholars agree that designs of modernization are not so easily administered
and prescribed political paths are not that clear-cut for either economics or politics within
societies. For instance, if socialism is paired with democracy, there are still personal
freedoms, security, and rule by law. Socialist democracy allows for a broader distribution
of wealth for the masses, which is more prevalent than within a capitalist democracy. Yet
if socialism is paired with totalitarian rule, the political structures will not be democratic,
no matter the structure of the economy. Furthermore, under totalitarian rule, even if an
external security exists, an internal fear of persecution from rule by force or perhaps a sense
of paranoia against other nations may be part of the political climate. North Korea exhibits
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this fear of other nations, and so did Al Qaida in Afghanistan, a non-state actor, resulting
in the 9/11 attacks. The many possibilities support Tilak’s (2002) argues that each case
must be evaluated on an individual basis, in the context of the political, cultural, and
economic conditions of each society plus their domestic and international influences. At
the core of the stated Government of Afghanistan’s position on aid in the country were
modernization efforts leading to the care for the masses and their security, while
encouraging self-improvement resulting in modern democratic policies. Fukuyama (2006,
4) asserts: “the American focus rests on concerns for long-term security to promote
American democracy and Western culture, and apply control in regards to nation building
and an American-centric free market economy.”
Within modernization processes, cultural differences do exist, but they are not
overriding within politics or economies. When security is at risk, concepts of
modernization are not in the forefront for leaders in their allocation of funds and human
resources. “Agrarian societies emphasize religion, national pride, obedience and respect
for authority, while industrial societies emphasize secularism, cosmopolitanism,
autonomy, and rationality... [Yet] When survival is insecure, it tends to dominate people's
life strategies” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 554). This is particularly relevant for the
research on aid in Afghanistan by underlining what is important to investigate concerning
security and the development of modernization efforts and the subsequent impacts on
politics, traditional culture, and industry. This begs the question: “Can traditional cultures
and modern cultures co-exist with respect and mutual benefit?” We may look for the
answers to this debate in such nations as Canada and New Zealand, which are quite modern,
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educated, industrialized, and are still multicultural nations. They are not perfect societies,
of course, and some still have discrimination within the society, but their standards of living
and freedoms for the masses far exceed those, for instance, for individuals who live in
China.
Upon closer investigation, there have been practical modernization projects that
were culturally successful outside of a political debate (Chaudhary 2013, 38). Chaudhary
states that modernization, though a prevalent concept, has not radically changed cultures
or destroyed values. By focusing on two major USAID projects in Afghanistan: the TPP
plant and the higher education project, this dissertation is able to analyze the dynamics
involved. It must be clear within this study what the Government of Afghanistan sought in
order to evaluate failures or successes for modernization in education and the building of
infrastructure such as the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP). In order to do this, it is important
to provide an understanding of Afghan’s expectations compared to the theoretical
background of modernization and human capital as an element of defining measures of
modernization.
Human Capital Theory
Human capital theory is based on the premise that there are economic gains secured
through investment in people (Sweetland 1996, 341). A great deal of literature emphasizes
the rebuilding of a suitable infrastructure to support economic development, but less
emphasis has been placed on human capital as a necessary force in that process. Human
capital theory is a segment of modernization theory. It seeks to theorize about how to build
better societies by infusing investment in the education of people within a nation to create
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a strong future for all. Human capital refers to the resources humans have to offer their
nation, such as knowledge, skills, experience, abilities, intelligence, and talent (Benhabib
and Speigel 1994, 143). More precisely, investing in methods to enhance the skills and
knowledge of people has a variety of positive impacts, including improvement of human
health and wellness. These investments pay off through increased contributory ability of
more people within the social and economic framework of a nation. Subsequently,
researchers have evaluated a number of ways in which knowledge and skills are enhanced
and have viewed education as a significant measure of investment in human capital
(Sweetland 1996, 341).
The theoretical foundations of human capital principles, though, reflect the belief
that education can be derived in a number of environments and can include different
instructional modalities. Yet for society in general, Chaudhary (2013) revealed that secular
and scientific education is critical for modernization, if it is to lead to democracy. The
scope and purpose of education becomes important, which includes the place of theocratic
education, informal education, and vocational education prevalent in many traditional
societies. Sweetland (1996) argued, for example, that education can include formalized
instruction through investment in public primary, secondary and post-secondary
instruction; informal education that can occur in the home or environment; and on-the-job
training. Education is perceived as a positive measure of investment in human capital
because it is measurable. Whether discussing a country’s investment in public education
or a company’s investment in their in-house training programs, there is a dollar amount

51

invested in the process that can be weighed against tangible performance outcomes
(Sweetland 1996, 341).
The general finding from this theoretical perspective is that human capital
investment increases the economic capabilities of people (Sweetland 1996, 341). Skills and
knowledge are measurable but somewhat intangible assets, which are argued to have an
aggregate impact on the economic status of communities and nations. Tilak (2002, 7)
asserts that investments in the education sector creates a higher return than investments in
infrastructure for the purpose of modernization of nations. Furthermore, growth in the
education sector is correlated directly to growth in a nation’s GDP. The existence of human
capital in a nation implicitly or explicitly influences the economic conditions of that nation
(Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 144).
Son (2010, 2) argues that human capital plays a critical role in methods to reduce
poverty and improve economic conditions in developing nations. On a smaller scale,
investment in human capital improves the opportunities for individuals in the labor market,
improves earning potential, and improves labor productivity. From a larger societal
perspective, human capital improves the accumulation of effective labor, increases
opportunities for large-scale technological innovations, and provides a foundation for
sustainable growth.

All of these elements are connected to the progression of

modernization and reductions in poverty for developing nations (Son 2010, 2).
Bowen (1964) argued that investment in human capital is frequently based on a
national productivity perspective, one that deems value in the creation of educational
opportunities to expand productivity. Correspondingly, he recognized that “in a market
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economy, differences in earnings reflect differences in productivity” (Bowen, 1964, 14).
In accordance with this view, Bowen argued the importance of creating a societal impetus
for investment in human capital aligned with the desire for social improvements. Once
again, this reflects the early bias that modernization and investments in human capital will
lead to democracy (Rostow 1960; Eisenstadt 1966; Gonzalez et. al. 2008; Inglehart and
Welzel 2009).
How are human capital outcomes measured? We can build schools and administer
education, but does it lead to practical social betterment over the long term? In the context
of human capital development, the examination of human capital is different from physical
investments (Horowitz et al., 2009). This is due to knowledge attained as people pass
through primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of education. This is an important
differentiation from physical capital, as value is created in the intermediate stages of
education. For example, a partially built road goes nowhere, and an unfinished factory does
not generate economic growth. Therefore, the process of human capital development may
take longer than infrastructure development. For individuals to attain higher skills, it is
necessary to ensure they have the prerequisites as a result of the sequential nature of
education (Horowitz et al., 2009).
When assessing the measurability of human capital investment, there are two
methods: 1) to identify the monetary expenditures that are allocated for human capital
education; or 2) to measure the outcomes related to worker productivity. Measures utilized
in developing countries to assess human capital investment include the level of literacy
demonstrated within the workforce or the years of schooling that individuals have obtained.

53

The measure of schooling is an especially important evaluative tool in determining
investment in human capital. In Afghanistan, for example, there are considerable
differences in the average levels of schooling based on human biases. In Afghanistan,
females have about a quarter of the years of schooling that males do, a factor that many
believe will continue to hinder that country’s capacity for modernization (Son 2010, 2-4).
Facilitation of the correct skills and knowledge is needed by each economy to
compete in the global environment (Horowitz et al., 2009). Global knowledge of
international market economies is invaluable to lead. This aspect of the sequential
development may be particularly problematic when an area is not within a timeline of
sustained economic growth. Tilak (2002, 3) noted that sustained the economic growth in
East Asia facilitated ongoing investment in education. In Afghanistan, with a heavy
reliance on aid, it appears that long-term benefits may be gained from increasing the level
of support for tertiary education. These skills would facilitate further economic
development by enhancing the resources, which are available and needed for
modernization. Furthermore, knowledge attained by higher-level academic degrees creates
educated leaders, who can think critically and respond productively in times of stress or
crises. Such leaders also attain understanding and concern for the welfare of the people
through comparative studies of other global systems.
Human capital investment in education is addressed by human capital theory and
the belief that understanding the connection between investment in education and the
outcomes related to educational attributes can help foster modernization (Chaudhary 2013,
34). The connection between aid delivery strategies and modernization is shaped by the
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human capital theory view that investment related to education is essential (Chaudhary
2013, 34).
In this section, human capital theory has been discussed as an idealized form of
modernization that requires education, community development, civic organizations,
developing individual human assets and investments in the future. However, societies
steeped in centuries’ old beliefs and traditions may not embrace changes they see as radical
when it comes to gender roles, caste systems, and tribal economics and politics. A question
develops if the people want change to modern ways or if modernization is being forced?
To know these answers researchers must examine the adherence to cultural traditions in a
society from its leaders to all levels of their population. Furthermore, the motivations of
those introducing modernization efforts must be examined for pre-existing biases.
Impact of Cultural Traditions
Cultural beliefs and traditions play a role in how people within a developing country
assess the impacts of modernization. Researchers have realized that significant variations
in culture and traditions can influence the progression of modernization and the subsequent
development of human capital. Even in societies in which significant differences can be
identified in comparison to modernized societies, it is important to recognize the impacts
of traditions on the approaches to facilitating a transition to modernity. Traditionalism can
be defined as the more extremist, negative reactions to forces of modernity, while tradition
is the general reservoir of behavior and symbols of a society. In LDCs, older, “traditional
modes or models of politics assert themselves, which impact modernization movements
(Eisenstadt 1973, 101-102).
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Rostow (1960) identified a significant difference between the development of
traditional societies and the embracing of traditionalism. The structure of a traditional
society is developed within limited production, based on pre-Newtonian science and
technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world. Agrarian societies
are functional traditional societies that are not stationary, but they lack an integration of
technical innovations. Many cultures are rooted in traditional ideals and methods, while
also seeking ways to progress in relation to modern cultures. Conversely, traditionalism is
the principle by which individuals commit to a kind of ideological perspective, which does
not place implicit value in modernism as an approach to cultural and social development
(Rostow 1960, 4). Subsequently, research indicates that there is a connection between a
culture’s relation to progress and its capacity to develop or modernize.
This aligns with the general view that culture has a large impact on motivation
found within a society for developing assets and supporting movements to ensure human
capital is available to preserve modernization. For example, Confucianism and Buddhism
practiced in East Asia emphasize education and instilling a work ethic and self-discipline,
which becomes consistent with building human capital. Caring about the welfare of the
population, while encouraging self- improvement are key factors. Furthermore, educational
planning is critical, as well as the research and planning to match educational opportunities
with job markets (Tilak 2002, 1-3). This is currently lacking in many nations, even in
Western ones. To build democratic cultures, education investments must be egalitarian,
meaning for all ethnicities and both genders. Class structures, divisive religions, and gender
inequalities are prohibitive to building human capital; the latter contributes to a stronger
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national democratic identity. In other words, concern for all the people in a nation needs to
be present to build human capital (Tilak 2002, 1-3).
Indeed, cultural heritage is important for modernization and human capital theories,
because as education arises out of the needs of the society, it has a common purpose with
modernization. Chaudhary argues that the main function of education is to transmit cultural
heritage to the new generations. But in changing society through modernization processes,
those in positions of control must use education to also aid in preparing the young for
adjustment to future changes. Modernization has been both criticized and celebrated for its
capacity to introduce foundational concepts like equality, freedom and humanism, and
many other elements that drive social and economic change (Chaudhary 2013, 37). In
countries like Afghanistan, lack of public infrastructure or educated individuals capable of
supporting technological advancements have led to continued failures in sustaining
modernization and supporting market development (Latham 2011, 206). Many believe
that this is the result of cultural factors that have influenced the views of modernization
and Western ideals. Yet foreign aid to the Government of Afghanistan originating from the
Western world continues to focus on instilling principles through the building of security
and infrastructure, without examination of cultural values or the need for educational
support.
Cultural variables inevitably impact both modernization and the development of
human capital necessary for modernization. Even at a very basic level, it is possible to
identify significant factors that reduce the capacity for human capital development that are
culturally defined (Schultz 1995, 4). One specific factor is the way in which men and
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women are valued differently within a culture. Schultz argued that assessing the productive
capacity of men and women within an economy can be distorted by cultural perspectives
on gender. LDCs may often strive to become knowledgeable societies, while also creating
disparities within their population that minimize the contributions that women could make
to the knowledge workforce (Gonzalez et al., 2008, xvii).
The female talent pool in many growth markets is increasing, but there continue to
be divisions related to the employment of women in positions to improve the capacity of
countries to meet critical infrastructure needs. “Deeply entrenched stereotypes make it
difficult for Western employers to have a clear view of this new tranche of talent” (Hewlett
and Rashid 2011, 8). Well-educated women seeking to create new opportunities for
themselves are challenging cultural stereotypes in emerging markets. At the same time,
this continues to be an area where developing countries can make strides and develop
methods of utilizing their human capital to its fullest potential (Hewlett and Rashid 2011,
33 and 42; Jonsson 2003, 17).
Other cultural factors influence political, social, and cultural change in countries
like Afghanistan, especially when discussing the application of approaches to
modernization.

“A given society's institutional and cultural heritage is remarkably

enduring,” according to Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 555). Roy (1990) argued that divisions
in the culture between those seeking modernization and the traditionalists have created
significant conflict and opposition to Western ideals. Reform measures often focus on
methods to break down cultural barriers that negatively impact a country’s capacity for
modernization (Gonzalez et al. 2008, xxiv).
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It is not modernization (the introduction of technology) that appears to be the
oppositional pivotal point in Afghanistan, but the challenges to cultural values. Because
modernization brings with it a paradigmatic shift in cultural and social perspectives, the
adoption of modernization is continually challenged by the distinct traditionalist
perspectives of Afghan culture (Roy 1990, 16).

Modernization for LDCs, such as

Afghanistan, focuses on economic improvement to lift the people out of poverty. This
requires large amounts of resources to direct individuals into skilled jobs, innovation,
technology, and enterprise. Energy improvement is considered vital for neighborhoods,
governments, and businesses to succeed.
Education is thought of the most valuable method of skill building and training for
new technologies and innovation. Although basic education or literacy is important,
modernization, especially for Afghanistan, has prioritized tertiary (higher) education.
Many colleges and universities already exist in some parts of Afghanistan requiring more
of revitalization and restructuring than constructing. Though this assertion is generally
accepted when related to the progression of change in countries like Afghanistan, there
have been challenges to this premise based on the argument that modernization is linked
to Western ideals in culture, technology, education and capitalism. The one mitigating
factor that surfaced frequently while I was stationed in Afghanistan is that the cultural
differences between Afghans and Americans are vast and sometimes unyielding. This
factor is recognized by the US Army, hence the creation of HTS, but acknowledgement of
the fact that Western culture and Afghan culture are different is much easier than changing
the dynamics to serve both the US and the Afghan objectives in modernization.
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Much of Afghan culture is traditional and tribal. The Government of Afghanistan’s
(GoA) leadership is under the Pashtun ethnicity, which follows Pashtunwali Codes,14
ancient social, political, and economic codes. These codes are not exclusive to
modernization efforts in infrastructure, but may be exclusive for social dynamics within
education, due to the status of women under Pashtunwali. Western ideals for modernization
include women’s role in society according to the human capital theory discussed above.
Only 40% of the Afghan population are Pashtun, therefore, there is room for Western
modernization in education. However, with the government under Pashtun rule, the GoA
may not endorse or enforce educational modernization projects.
Eisenstadt (1966, 4) and Rahman (2017, 2) argue against using the Western models
of theory and culture completely. Pre-disposition can be seen in the beliefs of these authors,
such as Rahman (2017, 4) who stated he favors a more authoritarian model of
modernization found “in the case of China developing their own style of modernity,
[which] should be thought of for the betterment of the world as a whole.” Rahman argued
that Western modernization theories tied modernization and human capital theory to a
capitalist class structure. These political and economic theories were generally responsible

14 Pashtunwali is an ancient honor code for Pastuns, who make up about 40% of the Afghan ethnic
population. It is an influential, informal justice system set up by Codes that are defined by its emphasis on
community consensus and local decision-making. By privileging village, tribe, and even family over the
state, the Codes depend on active local participation. These rules are based on the honor of men and define
the fundamentals of social conduct and conflict resolution. Known as the Pashtunwali Codes, they
authorize the community to resolve its own conflicts. The Codes can be complex and cover most areas of
life. Found in both rural and urban settings, it is a common Pastun cultural reality. The Taliban are ethnic
Pastuns. See Deering, Marissa "The Rules of Pastunwali" 12/22/2011. http://tyglobalist.org/in-themagazine/features/the-rules-of-pashtunwali/ Retrieved January 11, 2018
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for causing failures in the nations of India, Iraq, and Afghanistan, although he does not
provide specifics of when or how. Without careful scholarship, it is easy to conclude that
specific political situations influenced outcomes, rather allowing for other possible factors
that diminished modernization efforts in the three nations. Eisenstadt and Rahman’s
attribution of failures of modernization in India, Afghanistan, and Iraq does not include
evaluation of other cultural and traditional conditions in these countries. It is this lack of
research and cultural understanding that provides a gap in the existing literature, which is
needed to address the factors influencing attempts at modernization and change in
Afghanistan.
On the other hand, Tilak (2002, 4) examined non-western successes of
modernization and human capital building in select Eastern Asian nations. Modernization
and specifically human capital building in the East Asian Tiger nations of Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong were compared with Japan and China (Tilak, 2002, 3). He
examined the Asian cultural components of hard work, education, and motivation to
succeed that supported modernization variables. This perspective contradicts Rahman’s
(2017) arguments that Western modernization theories tied modernization and human
capital theory with a Western capitalist class structure.
Tilak (2002, 3) researched the growth of the East Asian economic developments.
He surmised that education was already valued in the Asian nations due to the practice of
Confucianism, which demanded education as a goal for the population. Therefore large
investments in people to attain education naturally led to economic growth and
modernization. Thus, the growth of Asian economies in the nations he studied was tied to
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human capital variables, and termed the “East Asian economic miracle". The education
attained was not based on Western education models. However, it was investment in
education sectors that also made the difference. The results were an interdependency
between the governmental support of education, the rise of human capital, and an increase
in economic growth for these governments (Tilak (2002). As noted by Tilak, it is important
that the East Asian Tiger nations of South Korea and Taiwan had a 75% increase in
economic growth due to human capital investments. In comparison to Africa and the
Middle East, their 39% increase for human capital expenditures directly related to their
economic growth as well (Tilak, 2002, 1-4).
The commitment of national leaders to support education and its role in
socioeconomic and political development is an important determinant of human capital
growth. Government investments in human capital are a cornerstone of nation-building and
a key factor of economic development. This realization is critically important (Tilak, 2002,
4). Human capital theories link to modernization theories and national development
through educational provisions and attainment (Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 144). Due to
previously stated Asian cultural variables toward education appreciation to build human
capital, this dissertation will consider the Afghan culture to ascertain the viability of the
USAID policy approaches toward modernization and investment in education.
Lacuna in the Literature on Modernization in Afghanistan
According to Rostow (1960, 4), modernization theory often reflects the challenges
of modernization and its economic impact on traditional societies. Though modernization
may be viewed as a natural extension of the expansion of cultures and societies,
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modernization requires an understanding of how thoughts, culture, and social values
influence perceptions of change. Chaudhary (2013, 34) maintained that though a seemingly
natural progression, modernization involves shifts in a number of different areas, including
socio-cultural and institutional changes, among others. Whether modernization works or
not is linked to education. Questions arise if Western education is always needed to create
modernization. This is important because traditional societies may challenge Western
modernization, due to a fear education will deplete traditional values (Tilak 2012, 23).
Therefore, cultural perceptions impact education sectors and thus modernization. Tilak
(2012) insists that other cultural education systems, such as in the successful Asian nations,
may also be congruent with modernization. Aid agencies need to recognize multiple
models of education to implement the rise of needed human capital.
Modernization for developing nations outside Western cultures has been difficult
at best. Good intentions do not necessarily translate into success. Rostow and others have
focused on the Western industrialized nation model of modernization. Rostow’s (1960)
stages of development have proven to be problematic when applied to non-Western
nations. Research, policies, and aid projects have been ethnocentric (focused on the
Western ideals or bias) in their attempts at modernization. For nations such as Afghanistan,
with large heterogeneous traditional cultural beliefs, the ethnocentric approach of USAID
and the US military has been a cause of misunderstandings at best and of conflict at worst.
The existing literature relates a kind of economic and social dilemma: can Afghan
society both accept aid from entities like USAID and other foreign aid agencies for
modernization and still maintain their traditional cultural perspective, while supporting
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human capital development? This goes back to the belief that there are several factors that
hinder the effectiveness of aid in Afghanistan, including the presence of cultural norms and
values that shape how individuals perceive education for different segments of the
population. This dissertation will examine multiple aid reports and gather data from
respondents to understand these issues and use the modernization theory literature,
discussed above, to explain the results. When assessing capital investment driven by
Western aid, it is essential to recognize that there are factors that shape receptivity to
external financial influences.
In addition, modernization reflects an impact on economics, political structures,
infrastructure, and social values; therefore, the gap that emerges from the existing literature
reflects questions about the connection between the delivery of aid, the effectiveness of aid
that is delivered, and the cultural and social barriers to the delivery getting to its intended
recipients application of aid across populations. Modernization for Afghanistan means an
end to extreme poverty and a jump ahead in the economic sectors of energy and education,
the two sectors under study here. Modernization would mean Afghans have access to
energy for households, neighborhoods, villages, merchant stores, businesses, services, and
civil offices. Modernization means the Afghan people would have access to education,
technology, and resources for literacy, jobs, innovation, and businesses.
The central focus of the dissertation identifies the goals of the aid given to
Afghanistan as a starting point for this research. The overarching questions are: What have
been the barriers to modernization? What were the specific sources and amounts of USAID
to Afghanistan with regard to education, and energy development? Were cultural and
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religious differences considered throughout the planning and implementation processes?
What were the outcomes of the specific projects, including the Tarakhil Power Plant, after
multiple years and large amounts of dollars spent? In the remaining chapters, I identify
information related to these areas primarily reflecting what factors inhibited or enhanced
the delivery and application of funding to support educational advancement and energy
modernization in Afghanistan.
The belief that educational aid in the form of funding and materials has the potential
to contribute significantly to infrastructure improvements supporting modernization for
developing nations is rarely disputed. Though Eisenstadt (1966, 4) and Rahman (2017, 2)
have opposed Western models applied to countries like Afghanistan, India, and Iran with
regard to modernization, Tilak (2012, 7) argues in favor of the importance of integrating
educational initiatives to support modernization, maintaining that education provides a
foundation for modernization (2012, 23).

In developing a strategic approach to the

modernization of Afghanistan, it is necessary to determine the specific barriers that exist
in the delivery and implementation of aid from USAID. Additionally, the role of the
Afghan government must be considered for improving efficacy in the delivery and
maintenance of aid projects, such as those earmarked for the energy infrastructure and for
the establishment of educational venues. Energy acquisition is a crucial marker for
modernization and education is needed for the continuation in building a modern society.
Rahman (2017, 3) recognized that cultural and social factors can contribute to
delivery failures or a lack of receptivity to Western aid. In pursuing this focus, it is essential
to determine the barriers that exist to the effective delivery of USAID aid in Afghanistan
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to the education sector, which leads the impacts of application of aid as a component of the
study.
Conclusions
While research supports the assertion of the benefits of investment in human capital
as a foundation for modernization (Chaudhary 2013, 34; Rahman 2017, 3), there appears
to be a gap in the existing research about the connection between the delivery of aid, and
the effectiveness of aid that is successfully delivered. This relates to the need to explore
the actual attainment of education that builds human capital and supports modernization.
Tilak (2002, 7) argued that educational investments that expand human capital demonstrate
a significant return on investment. More specifically, researchers have argued that
expansion of educational programming has a direct link with improvements in GDP for
developing countries (Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 144; Tilak 2002, 7). When effective,
researchers maintain that investments of foreign aid in developing countries [like
Afghanistan] can serve as foundational support for improvements in economic conditions.
Son (2010, 2) argued, for example, that developing countries that effectively invest in
human capital with the aim of improving literacy are supporting modernization. This
speaks specifically to the connection between educational aid and cultural challenges that
emerge for Afghanistan.
In summary, this dissertation research utilizes data on USAID’s funding of
education and a large power plant in Kabul to examine problems with aid delivery in two
sectors of the Afghan economy: education and energy. The dissertation places those
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findings in the broader theoretical framework of the modernization and human capital
theories discussed above.

CHAPTER 4 DATA COLLECTION
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Questionnaire Methods of Data Collection
With large amount of money and 16 years invested in Afghanistan by the US, there
have been multitudes of publications, both scholarly and through the media with attention
given to the issue of waste in USAID’s work in Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains
impoverished and struggling, and my months in Helmand province brought me face-toface with these conditions.
To make this study manageable, the focus is on two USAID aid funded sectors
only: energy and education. This qualitative research study drew on the perceptions of
experts and stakeholders that worked in those sectors in Afghanistan. Their perceptions
were juxtaposed with those of official reports, including internal and external USAID
evaluations, SIGAR audits and investigations, and media and scholarly reports. Three main
sources of data inform this dissertation, utilizing the so-called “triangulation approach.”15
The triangulation sources are 1) questionnaires answered by expert respondents and by
conducting a Shura or focus group, 2) Official reports from USAID and other related
entities, and 3) media reports and my own eyewitness observations of USAID results.
The first part of this chapter examines respondent data from 20 questionnaires and
a focus group interview with eight recent Afghan immigrants to add depth to the data. The
questionnaire was distributed, with open-ended questions for short answers about energy

15

Triangulation means using more than one method to collect data on the same topic. This is a way of
assuring the validity of research in qualitative studies through the use of a variety of methods to collect
data on the same topic, which involves different types of samples as well as methods of data collection.
Retrieved August 28, 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/triangulation_of_data_in_qualitative_research
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and education aid in Afghanistan. This data collection followed IRB procedures and ethical
guidelines as outlined in the respondent informed consent form. (Appendix D)
As one can imagine, it is complex task to carry out interviews for a project such as
this dissertation. The questionnaire distribution combined convenience sampling and a
"snowballing" method, including the following:
✓ Through my Afghan acquaintances and others whom I worked with in
Afghanistan, I networked with the target population areas to reach a pool of
respondents, with respondent criteria being Afghans or those who have
lived and worked in Afghanistan.
✓ Over 75 questionnaires were mailed or hand delivered, and in three months
20 were returned.
✓ I also created one focus group of recent Afghan immigrants was included,
with older males from different backgrounds and locations within
Afghanistan.
✓ Data were represented in Excel and with descriptive narratives and graphs
The questionnaires (Appendix E) were not surveys that could be measured with
quantitative parameters, but rather open-ended questions that allowed each respondent to
relay their interpretation. Qualitative research lends itself to descriptive detail, which can
be intimidating for those who want to keep their affiliations and experiences hidden.
Analysis of the data from this source was organized through the establishment of themes
and categories, and with tables to show patterns and trends for clarification (Creswell,
2006, 59; Sangasubana, 2011, 570).

Descriptions of Respondents
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The employment profile of the respondents was varied, but all 20 respondents had
relevant data concerning the research questions. Furthermore, the data gathered from the
questionnaires added context to the data from the organizational reports. Categories of
respondents were comprised of different stakeholders and were in three categories. 1)
Experts working in the aid industry, who were American-born and worked with the US
military, HTS personnel, USAID, contractors, or SIGAR; 2) Respondents who were
Afghan-born individuals, who worked as contractors, HTS personnel, cultural experts, and
interpreters; and 3) Respondents who were Afghans, who had recently immigrated to the
United States that answered questionnaires in a focus group setting. These eight older
respondents were farmers, teachers and US military cooks.
Among the respondents were seven people with work affiliations with the Human
Terrain Service that were American born and were the largest affiliation of all. The other
affiliations included three Americans and two Afghans with the US Military, three Afghans
and one American from USAID, one Afghan and one American from UN/NATO, one
Afghan with SIGAR, two Afghan engineers, and one Afghan educational administrator.
All those questioned would be considered experts in their field. Most worked either directly
or indirectly with aid projects. Most had familiarity with TPP and the education sector in
Afghanistan. A few individuals had many years of experience and most had at least several
years of working and living in Afghanistan. Most had had food, water, heating, clothing,
and transportation provided by either the US Military or indirectly through USAID. Most
did not suffer directly from lack of energy or food. No one reported any injuries or suffering
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from violence directly from the war beginning in 2001. Although the majority were experts
in their fields and some had decades of experience, generally the respondents in this
research were not famous or high ranking in their respective fields.
The 20 respondents mostly agreed that their views of Afghanistan had changed after
working there and seeing the problems first hand. Most did not have a consistent presence
there from 2001 – 2017, but had spent one to three-year periods of living and working in
Afghanistan, and then returned to the US. The Afghan born respondents were mostly
already living and working in the US at the time of this study or had immigrated to the US
years before. Some had repeated trips to Afghanistan, and a few were involved in aid
development in other countries. Some, especially the Afghan born respondents, had
expertise in multiple languages.
Figure 4.1: Respondent’s Work Affiliation in Afghanistan

71

Methods for obtaining data from official aid reports and investigations included
data mining specific to USAID’s involvement in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Some
reports available by USAID focused on the successes without a critique. Reports published
from auditors and evaluators in recent years identified problems with the delivery and
distribution of aid. Data mining included a thorough and rigorous attempt to find details
that illustrated what was proposed or projected to happen versus what was accomplished
by USAID funding. Henry et al. (2017, 24) described how qualitative data mining through
report findings can help map out a process of determination, such as if A happens then
either B or C could happen depending on the conditions.
This data collection chapter consists of several sections. The first section has
original qualitative data collected from the target respondents by a questionnaire with 15
questions, plus a focus group meeting. Some of the respondents did not answer all the
questions as they felt they had no direct knowledge. The second section focuses on data
from USAID and SIGAR reports or reports about USAID by media and scholars revealing
methods, spending, and consequences of aid projects. The third section reveals the social
science research eyewitness account by the author of this dissertation through working with
projects in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
Questionnaire Format
The contribution of the questionnaire data is central to this study by offering
primary data. It is original in its content and application to education and energy
development in Afghanistan. This original qualitative research study depends on
anonymous questionnaires that were completed by experts knowledgeable about the
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political and economic impact of American foreign aid in Afghanistan. Each respondent
had either professional or personal experience with one or both sectors. The Human Terrain
System, although not a foreign aid agency, integrated with USAID’s modernization efforts
through missions to gain cultural knowledge of local populations and projects that
impacted them. Social scientists, such as myself, conducted interviews with Afghan local
officials and reconstruction agents, which often include discussions about USAID-funded
projects.
The questionnaires were created to answer the research questions through
anonymous and relatively quick responses requiring short answers from the respondents.
The 75 prospective participants were given three months to return questionnaires. Twenty
persons, both male and female, agreed to fill out the questionnaire and return completed
questionnaires. The respondents were assigned numbers from one to twenty. Their
complete responses are listed in an arbitrary numerical order in Appendix G. Additionally,
a focus group was conducted in Michigan with eight recent Afghan immigrants in
attendance. The focus group is addressed separately after the questionnaires.
All participants were assured of their anonymity. They were informed of their rights
and informed consent forms were signed and collected. Participants were assured that all
data that connects them to the study will be destroyed. Questionnaires were collected
through postal mail or in person. The study followed all IRB ethical codes for research.
The respondents were presented with the purpose of the study, and were informed that
questionnaires will be identified with code numbers, not their real names. Participation was
voluntary, which allowed a participant to withdraw at any time. It was also explained that
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the keys for the codes will be kept in a safety deposit box, and no one except the chief
investigator will have access to that data.
The questionnaire was constructed with a series of questions related to specific
sectors: education and energy (Appendix E). The first questions focused on the success or
failure of the Afghan energy sector in general, and targets one major infrastructure project:
the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP), which was constructed in Kabul and funded by USAID
assistance to provide higher levels of electricity regionally. The next series of questions
addressed aid for education, provided by USAID. Both sections included the binary
questions: was the project successful or not, and whether it was beneficial or not for the
nation? The use of binary questions and answers provided insight into individuals’
perceptions.
Raw Data from the Questionnaires
This section includes the raw data from the questionnaires to offer first hand
insights on the topics of USAID education and energy aid funding in Afghanistan. The
complete respondent narratives are located in Appendix G. The following part of the
chapter is divided into topics with quotes from the respondents.
Education:
Many respondents acknowledged that education was critical to improving the
conditions in Afghanistan and that USAID contributed heavily to building numerous
schools. One spoke of the delight of the parents, students, and teachers when their school
was first opened. However, their statements were usually interspersed with despair about
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school closings. Some respondents had nothing good to say about the efforts or aid spent
on education in Afghanistan.
Respondent # One:
[Education] “will remain weak without foreign intervention and long-term
strategies. US and USAID were the main players in building and supplying schools
over the last 15 years. They still need school supplies, plus training for
administrators and for Afghan officials concerning educational needs.
I helped USAID set up schools and provided assessments for their evaluations. I
know that USAID asked the Afghan government for recommendations for
provinces that needed schools and learning centers. However, USAID never trusted
the Afghans with their information, and they ignored reports and advice. This was
a negative and unhealthy relationship that impacted the projects. Teacher salaries
were very low, and there was no medical care for sick students. Parents kept
students home to work because school was not mandatory. Girl’s schools were
implemented for a while, but now they are all empty and ghost schools. Foreign aid
for education had a bigger impact in cities than in rural areas, where security was
not available.”
“Government officials used their power to get educational aid in their favorite areas.
Local people complained about officials that took humanitarian aid, whether it was
for education or food for poor people. Even in safer areas, school supplies and
building materials were stolen.
The US military and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) should have
been more involved to deliver and monitor foreign aid and provide security for aid
projects as many aid workers left due to insurgency. Donors and NGOs should have
trusted local reports and feedback. Media needed to be improved to provide
information for citizens about officials and what was going on in the country.
Foreign governments needed to send money to operate the schools as there was
none from the Afghan government.”
Respondent #Two:
“In the Arghandab River Valley area, the Taliban used intimidation tactics to close
schools. They threatened and carried out harm to children, especially girls. There
were two or three Quranic schools for boys in the area. Hundreds of children
roamed the streets with nothing to do.
The evaluation of the Adult Literacy program showed that it was a top down
solution. The US military decided to distribute the books by enlisting a local branch
of the Afghan army… but the books were stored in a local building without any
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plans for distribution. There was no coordination between the US military and the
Afghans. I worked on an evaluation of the Adult Literacy project for HTS and
received pushback from the military. They would not receive a formal written
report, but only oral feedback. They said our goal was to provide feedback to
improve the program, not to criticize it. The US military provided a tent for a
school, and the Government of Afghanistan GIRoA, (Government Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan) provided teachers, which was a sustainable solution”.
Respondent # Three:
“I provided briefs and sessions to help Afghan teachers (both males and females)
in multiple languages. Foreign aid helped education a little at first. This built a lot
of schools, especially for females to leave their homes and pursue different types
of degrees. USAID especially built schools for females and orphans, but the schools
are closed now. Afghanistan still needs educated people so they can better serve
their country. I was hopeful when first working there, but after a time that hope
decreased by 2016. I witnessed a lot of tragedy and waste… Gender equality and
female education could have increased productivity, but it had to come with
government support.”
Respondent #Four:
“Foreign aid helped raise the economic and educational level of the average
Afghan. The work in Afghanistan was important, but the internal conflicts (tribal
and cultural) hampered Western efforts…corruption kept funds from going to
intended purposes. Only a few saw impact, and the majority were not impacted. I
worked with USAID and they had good intentions and tried to assist Afghan people.
Some of their schools appeared to work in large cities, but not in rural
communities.”
Respondent #Five:
“I visited the girl’s school in Kabul. Overall, it advanced development and human
rights… From visiting the girl’s school in Hazra, I could see there was overall
development and human rights were benefited. I am less optimistic than when I
started. There were inefficiencies, corruption, and poor data knowledge
management… I recommend audits… and investigations.”
Respondent #Six:
“Sustainable benefits of educational aid in Afghanistan were that we helped
women learn entrepreneurship skills such as chicken farming and bee keeping… I
have conducted research all over the world and the same issues rise on many
continents. Corruption from the national government restricted aid trickling down
to the local government, and resulted in mistrust by the people… Key Leaders were
only interested in their own families.
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However, our information on aid was not put into use. Nobody studied the lessons
learned from aid work. No one incorporated good practices of how to administer
aid. Money was wasted, specifically, in Afghanistan, because: Schools were built
with no teachers or staff in the area, and there was a brain drain to Kabul outside of
Afghanistan.”
Respondent #Seven:
“USAID built the schools in many villages across the country, but most of the
schools closed. Local customs and traditions played a role in stopping children from
attending school, especially girls. The Taliban enforced these traditions by threats
and even killing people. Negatives of cultural practices, customs, Taliban,
corruption from many directions, and the inability of aid agencies to develop longterm educational plans discouraged parents from allowing children to go to school.”
“Education is good for governance and brings prosperity to a country. Education
opens horizons for people and brings acceptance of differences and tolerance of
others. Good education will bridge the gaps of gender inequality.”
Respondent #Nine:
“I remain quite pessimistic with regards to the future of Afghanistan. The
deteriorating security situation, lawlessness and corruption remained at the
forefront of many issues.
I discovered that foreign aid did help the education sector in some areas in
Afghanistan. The schools in Kabul were more modernized and better equipped to
teach students. I had the chance to visit a school that was located next to my work
place in Kabul in 2016. The school was in much better condition than the one in
Helmand. The classrooms were full of students. I met the principal who explained
to me that the USAID made it possible for his school to buy furniture and other
essentials required to run the school. The school had a built a food court and play
ground. The school was co-ed and males and female students were seen studying
together...I would say that foreign aid proved beneficial for most of the major cities
in Afghanistan such as the capital, Kabul.
I was invited for the opening of a new school in Mazar-e-Sharif in 2012, which is
considered the second largest city of Afghanistan. It was a good experience to
witness the completion of a large school and the joy was apparent on the faces of
all the teachers and students. The school was built by an American aid agency and
it took them several years to build the school. It was closed due to insurgency.
Education in Afghanistan was improved by pouring millions of dollars into
projects. The USAID mainly helped Afghanistan in building hundreds of schools
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and other educational institutions, even though most were shut down later. It was
not unusual to hear about the closing of schools in Afghanistan for several reasons.
In 2015, I visited a school in Nawzad district in Helmand and witnessed that the
school was hardly operational with only a few students and teachers present. I was
told that the school had been targeted and partially destroyed by insurgents. This
“ghost school” as described by an Afghan interpreter was abandoned and remained
closed for many years due to the lack of funding. This school was built by an
American contractor. The locals were scared to send their children to this school
because the abandoned building was housing criminals and homeless people. The
roads leading to the school were also considered quite unsafe.”
Respondent #Eleven:
“I provided security in rural areas near schools. Education was weak and not
available before 2001, but foreign aid helped to improve the education sector in
Afghanistan.
People complained about the outcome. Some parents were not satisfied with the
levels of learning.
Schools were built by individuals that came to Afghanistan for one year to leave a
mark. Often times, schools were built without proper planning and understanding
or appreciation for the political and socio-cultural nuances of the areas. Hence
schools were built without meeting the needs of the people. Perhaps if USAID had
included Afghan experts to help understand the issues of the projects?
I heard that schools were empty because they were built in the wrong area or too
far with bad roads. During the winter, there was no heat or the roads and schools
were flooded. I saw many abandoned schools. I reported this to the US Army that
schools were closed and teachers never came. Locals complained that teachers were
still paid, but would not come because of security. Many schools closed, even if
USAID spent millions and millions in some areas. We never trained locals to take
over the schools and learn how to do things for themselves.”
Respondent #Twelve:
“I investigated poisonings in a local girl’s school, which NATO also worked on
findings. The education outreach appeared to be modest and many schools sat
empty. The USAID and the State Department were very involved in assessing
education, and efforts for women’s groups. When I worked for HTS, we were
integrated with analyzing local impacts on education attendance. The education
advances where I worked was served by international troops.
I visited a site for a midwifery program that was funded in part by USAID. It was
threatened with broken windows to scare the young students. The other funding
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was by the Afghan government and their department of education. The Koreans
also funded some educational medical programs. My most vivid memories were at
the midwifery school. There were 20 young women undergoing the training. The
training material was very good and provided by USAID. Those administering the
school were medically trained and we did HTS research regarding the curriculum.
I heard the Afghans involved had to leave and are now trying to get to the US
The need for education in Afghanistan was profound and important. Young people
have few opportunities and are lost in a modern era. The educated live in central
cities and rural areas had no ability to improve or have social progress.”
Respondent #Thirteen:
“Designing aid for energy infrastructure and education was unsustainable because
there were no teachers or engineers to maintain the structures and systems. Often,
we created programs that looked good on paper, but had no effect or negative
effects due to a lack of understanding the systems and culture. Funds did not go
where they were supposed to. Determining program objectives was difficult as
there were competing narratives from the military, aid agencies, the state, and
NGOs.
Many schools were built, but are now abandoned due to lack of security, teachers,
and parents’ concerns. Still there were some schools that were still functional. It
was my hope that girls in school will become part of the culture.
Training did work for men and women as long as they were separate and respected
the culture. There was a radio education program and even a prison literacy
program. HTS would gather information from the locals and report to the military.
The military would report to USAID, but it was USAID that made final decisions.
One program start seemed hopeful that provided women to build solar power panels
at home, but I do not know the fate of that one.”
Respondent #Fourteen:
“Ultimately, the aid projects were a waste and time consuming. Locals said that
projects only benefited western contractors who received big salaries. All I knew
was that schools did not have energy infrastructure. They had no heat in winter, and
students did not show up for school because it was too cold. I was involved in
building heating systems in some schools, but there was no fuel. Eventually,
security was so bad for schools that the weather was not the main concern.”
Respondent #Sixteen:
“Rebuilding Afghanistan was more challenging that earlier expectations. USAID
should have built rapport with all parties in Afghanistan to coordinate donations
and resources. USAID projects built credibility for the US for many in Afghanistan.
The lack of infrastructure in impoverished areas made it difficult to deliver
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education. USAID had helped to elevate the standard of living for millions of
Afghan citizens, and especially for girls was a big achievement of USAID. If there
was heavy Afghan government presence, people flourished with the influx of
foreign aid and foreign investments. More Afghan children were going to school
than ever before.
However, areas that were infected with heavy insurgents still suffered from lack of
education. Children often failed to show up to schools due to lack of security and
poverty and the schools built by aid sat empty and created ghost schools. There
was a social stigma for women’s education. Language was a barrier when
curriculum and supplies were in a language from another region. In my opinion,
aid should have been given to local villagers to modernize their standards of living
and strengthen education efforts and projects, rather than building school buildings
that turned into ghost schools.”
Respondent #Seventeen:
“Afghans were pessimistic about their future. They were a failed state due to lack
of education. International donors tried, but their focus was wrong and they did not
understand the culture. There was no training of locals to continue any project
funded by international donors. This was true worldwide. Money was not the only
consideration. Careful planning and accountability was the only way that aid would
have worked and we had those lessons from decades of aid implementation. Audits
and monitoring were needed for any nation building project.
Understanding the culture and religion was the key to any progress in Afghanistan.
It took generations to create slow changes and consistent efforts in education.
USAID built many schools that were closed. I had visited the ghost schools to
confirm this. The Afghan government did not get involved in education, and there
was no money to run the schools, no teachers, insecurity, and no supplies. There
were no administrators to coordinate the school efforts. International donors and
the Government of Afghanistan should be blamed for not completing the job. There
was not enough funds or long-term strategies. Coordination was needed. Locals had
zero knowledge about the outside world. If there was a good education system, the
nation could have developed. I was responsible for evaluation and assessing
projects for educational resources. I issued reports back to my office in Virginia
about what needed to be developed and what was suggested.”
Respondent #Eighteen
“I thought the situation would be better, especially with USAID and other agencies
working so hard and saying they would rebuild Afghanistan. It is really a failed
state. They could not win this war that has been fought for years and years. They
more they tried, the more the people suffered. When the Taliban controlled areas,

80

it was horrible. There were no schools, good food, no clean water, and women could
not leave their homes.
International donors should have built a skilled and educated new generation if they
wanted to help Afghanistan. Many people tried to help, but it was all uncoordinated
and inefficient. I heard a Canadian company sent a team to Afghanistan to
investigate education aid projects to help women and children. They reported on
corruption by the Government of Afghanistan, and their lack of commitment to
education.
USAID built schools that were not used and I heard of the ghost schools. I spoke to
the locals and they talked about they needed food, medicine, and water. Local
women would ask me for powdered milk for their infants. This broke my heart.
They wanted protection from the Taliban, while we were in the area. They said
there would be repercussions. I found there were contradictions between what I had
been told by USAID and what the locals said concerning projects. USAID said
locals stole supplies and locals said the contractors never delivered them.”
Respondent #Nineteen:
“The ways of culture and religion were enforced by Taliban. Each member of the
Taliban was easily replaced by anyone practicing the laws of their religion. Their
numbers would always be the same. Someone said you cannot get rid of the
Taliban; they are our culture. This meant that they were like a Religious Police. It
was Afghan cultural laws that conflicted with Western ideals. Educating the young
would change this, but that was not understood by aid agencies or the US either.
Educational aid was not in line with the environment, cultural background,
religious preferences, and local needs. The idea was that if given a chance with
good security, people would change and want Western ways. This may have been
true for a few, but not for many others.
Due to corruption and lack of input by the locals, the schools built were placed to
satisfy official’s needs, and not the population. Some schools only had a few
students within distance, and many areas had few schools, but large numbers of
students. Aid agencies wasted a lot of money on opening ceremonies and
decorations. Money went for personal uses, and during construction, there was a
feeling of…we can buy expensive tools even for a one-time use.”
Energy:
This section addresses aid money spent on energy infrastructure in Afghanistan
with a focus on the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) built with USAID money. There is across
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the board negativity about the Power Plant, but there are some positive results with solar
power units and suggestions for hydro energy sources.
Respondent #One:
“I lived in the area of the TPP. It cost a lot, but did not benefit the local people, due
to poor management. Also, the firm who built the TPP did not designate local
authorities or teach anyone local how to maintain it. The plant remained closed for
months and months, and Afghans joked about the 300 million dollars it cost to build
it. Fuel was bought by energy aid from Uzbekistan and Pakistan. But the Taliban
controlled the roads, especially at the border, so the fuel could not get through.
There was some productive energy aid for Afghans though installation of small
solar power units in urban areas. US firms built these. My family suffered from lack
of electricity or fuel to heat and cook. Fuel was expensive even when it was
available, which was rare. I could not get gas for a car. People who risked their lives
to bring it in from other countries charged double prices. We did not drive for
months and we used wood for heating our homes.”
Respondent #Two:
“I was very familiar with the Shorandam Industrial Park between the airport and
Kandahar. The main problem was sustainability as the plant required diesel fuel,
which the US military provided. It was a short-term remedy for a military solution
for energy in a conflict area. It was not a long-term or economically viable solution.
The concepts of accountability, evaluation, and long-term sustainability were
regulated to a lesser importance as this was a war zone, first and foremost.
Generally, the US military was well intentioned and not corrupt, yet poorly
informed, untrained for the culture, and the tasks at hand.
There were many other negative examples from aid agencies of which I was aware.
Project evaluations and accountability were seldom pursued. This was also true of
the USAID projects when I worked for SIGAR.”
Respondent #Three:
“Taking information from people where I worked and locals, all sides agreed that
the TPP project was wasteful for not only Afghanistan, but for the American
taxpayers. I helped plan energy grids for remote areas, but did not work with the
TPP project. Neither foreign aid nor energy production was well planned.
Afghanistan is a huge country, and there was no training or skills for administration
or services to provide energy.
Energy aid was critical for Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Locals did not have energy
for heating or cooking or fuel for their vehicles. There has never been an energy
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grid in the nation. Poor people suffered from the government’s lack of services. If
the government had put in an energy grid, they could have collected money for the
electricity or fuel provided to homes for heating or cooking. More energy would
have provided jobs and markets in the nation. Many tried to help, including the US
and other western agencies, plus Asian efforts from Japan, India, the Gulf States,
and Pakistan.
The Afghan government did build some pipelines to schools, and I assisted with
that project. We also installed solar powered street lights in Kabul. It took months
and months to do as we lacked materials and not enough security. Major problems
were lack of security, because corrupt officials, bribes, and shadow governments
control many areas.
Other problem with aid was that international donors did not coordinate their
efforts. It was a waste of time and money. There was much failure due to this lack
of coordination and communication. Also, the locals were not consulted on many
projects, and they had good information about issues of sustainability and local
needs. Roads built across land should have had permissions of those on the land
first, and locals could have been hired for labor, but often they were not. Education
for the people about immediate projects would have been helpful. In fact, if there
was media to teach people to change certain ways and for improvement, it would
have helped.”
“My suggestions are these:
*Powerful countries should have clear objectives in stopping the fighting.
* Hydro power plants would be most productive.
* Safe roads would create an economic boom.
* All donors should work together to build power grids for cities.”
Respondent #Four: “There was primarily corruption and inefficiency in delivering energy.
Western methods may not work in Afghanistan.”
Respondent #Seven:
“The TPP project was an example of poor work. Corruption resulted in the project
costing 300 million dollars. However, in Kabul there was lighting added after
USAID installed hydraulic power on dams. This type of energy should have been
for all provinces across the country. Energy was important as it leads to economic
development. Currently, people use wood heat their homes and cook.
Afghanistan needed long term strategies and plans. Three dynamics affected all
education and energy aid in Afghanistan: 1) Taliban, 2) Waste 3) Corruption from
Afghan and US agencies. Unless the people of Afghanistan rejected the Taliban in
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their role of reinforcing old ways, and corruption of others, things will not improve.
US and other major stakeholders should have played a role for improvement
through accountability for illegal and corrupt activities. But leaders of Afghanistan
became wealthy and did not heed the suffering of the people. Their close relatives
all became wealthy, which hampered the aid programs. Problems are:
● Transit routes for Afghan goods and materials for energy projects do not get
through.
● Afghan government officials steal the resources for their personal benefit.
● Security was too bad to administer aid.”
Respondent # Eight:
“The TPP was completed and handed over to the Ministry of Energy and Water of
Afghanistan in June of 2010. Afghanistan imported 80% of its energy from
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The power lines that supplied the 5
million people of Kabul passes through Salang Pass, which was rough and
[inaccessible] terrain. This is not sufficient in winter and the TPP should have filled
the gap. It generated electricity on both crude oil and diesel fuel. At a cost of 335
million US dollars, the capacity was 150 megawatts of electricity.
Otherwise, propane fuel could have been imported from Pakistan or Turkmenistan,
and cow dung used for heating fuel and cooking. There was some electric power
coming from the Naghlow and Sorobi water dams. However, at times there was not
enough water to generate electricity from these dams. The war lords, (Mujahedeen)
and other factions would cut off electricity to punish other groups.
My personal opinion is that donor counties who gave aid money should have had a
system of checks and balances in place and held those people responsible. Aid was
channeled through contractors to subcontractors, and the results reduced material
and durability tenfold.”
Respondent #Nine:
“My research work covered various sectors including but not limited to health,
education, stability, governance and local infrastructure. The aid given to
Afghanistan by the western countries did not produce the desired results. The
majority of the population was without basic necessities such as electricity and
clean water. My first-hand experience led me to believe that the foreseeable future
in Afghanistan is quite bleak.
I was able to determine that funding the projects was not the main concern; instead,
issues such as waste management and corruption were more widespread. When it
came to TPP, it wouldn’t be fair to blame the Afghan officials for not using this
costly project and keeping it maintained. Afghans never received the proper
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training, nor did they hold the basic skills to run and maintain the TPP. According
to the locals, the blame should have been shifted towards the Afghan authorities for
being involved in corruption and stealing the TPP supplies. But they shouldn’t have
been held solely responsible for not running a 330 million dollars project
effectively. One of the major challenges was to purchase diesel fuel in order to run
the TPP. As I know, it was unsafe and costly to transfer diesel from neighboring
countries. Most of the roads being controlled by the insurgents made it nearly
impossible to transport fuel.
The foreign aid failed to help Afghanistan improve its energy infrastructure…I
witnessed that people and businesses struggled due to the shortage of electricity in
most of the neighborhoods. Those who were receiving electricity without any
shortage were the rich and elite of the society as well as the foreign officials, but
not the common people.
I witnessed some progress in regards to the Afghanistan’s energy infrastructure in
Kabul. When I arrived in Afghanistan in 2009, the load shedding was apparent
during the evenings and nights. The situation appeared to improve in Kabul by
2016. According to the locals, the [USAID] foreign contractors helped Afghan
utility departments improve the infrastructure of residential and commercial solar
power in several cities in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the locals said that the
rural areas did not see any changes and the improvements were limited to the capital
and other major cities.
In Helmand during the winter of 2015, I witnessed that most homes including the
government offices had no basic heating resources. I also witnessed that several
medical centers in Kabul had to operate without any heat due to the shortage of
fuel.
It is true that insecurity hindered the effective use of aid in improving Afghan
energy sector, because the foreign contractors would not jeopardize their lives in
conducting projects due to the security issues. The foreign aid agencies needed to
effectively cooperate with each other and communicate closely with the Afghan
authorities in achieving long term projects.
The Afghan energy sector was also struggling to find skilled technicians in order to
effectively execute energy projects. Minister of Labor and Social Affairs urged
international donors to provide training workshops for Afghan officials, and he
repeatedly reiterated the importance of training before a project can be executed.”
Respondent #Ten:
“At first, I thought the war and reconstruction effort was necessary, but now I view
it as a waste of time and money. Basically the US never trained local Afghans to
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maintain and operate infrastructure. The gap in understanding their religion and
culture and negotiating the differences was contentious. We were creating
dependence on Western aid and assistance. At the end of the day, Afghans needed
to decide what they want. The best outcome I could see was to allow the Taliban to
have an autonomous state in the south.”
Respondent #Eleven:
“My confidence in helping to solve problems with the tactics used by the military,
foreign aid, the Afghan government, and the private sector decreased. HTS teams
provided socio-cultural information, but it went to the army. We needed research
to bring in solutions that would work.
Foreign aid benefited the contractors and other private western firms, but not as
much for Afghanistan. The Taliban took control of many foreign aid projects after
the western agencies left the areas. The Afghan government did not know how to
build any education or energy infrastructure and we did not train them.
The TPP was costly and helpless for all sides. Locals talked bad about the project.
Some new dams were built using hydraulic power to control water. But the energy
sector was ineffective in most areas and locals never talked good about it. They had
difficulty in heating their homes or getting cooking fuel. I made reports about
energy projects that had been damaged by insurgents.”
Respondent #Thirteen:
“The US State Department built several dams that were never functional, and I
imagined other programs had similar fates. If the right people ran the country after
the initial round up of the Taliban and not funding the war lords, this country would
have been very different. People preferred the Taliban to the war lords.”
Respondent #Fourteen:
“Ultimately, the aid projects were a waste and time consuming. Locals said that
projects only benefited western contractors who received big salaries. My company
was in charge of TPP. I also worked on several small projects relating to energy,
such as installing new energy systems in government buildings. For energy
projects, aid was not enough and was wasted because Afghans had no skills or
knowledge on how to run energy infrastructure. They had zero knowledge of energy
installation and the US firms provided no training due to lack of security, money,
and time. Language was an issue when locals were hired to work on menial jobs.
I provided maintenance for TPP for two years. My assessment was that it was a
wasted project that cost a lot of money and did not benefit the Afghan people. On
my job, security was the main problem most of the time. For months we had to stay
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on military bases due to insurgent activities. Getting fuel to the plant was time
consuming and costly. Roads were very bad in all areas. “
Respondent #Fifteen:
“We experienced lack of supplies and materials, trained or skilled workers, and
insecure areas…the TPP was given as an example of an expensive, but failed
project in a speech by an American expert on energy infrastructure… Afghan
officials said it was harmed by corruption from many parties. Zero tolerance for
corruption and good management should have been the rule.
The US should not have tried to do this without more commitment from other
nations. We failed and it made us look bad. It seemed there were no clear strategies
or central planning for success. Fragmentation hurt aid efforts. Corruption by local
regional officials did more to harm projects than other factors. Locals were very
appreciative for anything that helped the villages.”
Respondent #Sixteen:
“The energy sector suffered due to sabotage, corruption, and inefficiencies for
power plants and pipelines. USAID invested valuable resources to build the TPP.
The primary fuel for operation was diesel fuels, which was often unavailable due
to border closings and insurgent attacks. The TPP was unable to provide power for
Afghanistan grids. It was to provide backup for emergencies. The US Senate
committee on foreign aid has launched multiple investigations into USAID work in
Afghanistan.
Foreign aid helped to subsidize fuel for local consumption, and to establish
hydropower dams across the country. Building cooperation with local elders and
procuring security from tribal leaders increased the success rate of delivering fuel
and providing education in the remote areas of Afghanistan. Eighteen percent of
Afghanistan had access to uninterrupted supplies as compared to 1% in the year
2000. More funding should have gone towards building more hydro power plants
and small-scale dams on rivers for Afghanistan. Foreign aid should have been used
to harness the tremendous potential for solar and wind energy in Afghanistan.
Most aid was wasted in providing security for the infrastructure. This was because
power plants in Afghanistan relied on expensive fuels for operations. Interruptions
in supply chains caused power plants to operate inefficiently, and they sustained
costly damages. Pipelines suffered with sabotage and vandalism. Lack of roads and
threats of insurgency decreased efficiency too. The biggest challenges were
violence and the interruption of supplies at the border with Pakistan, plus lack of
roads, railroads, and the absence of a dry port. In winter, some passes were
completely cut off for months.”

87

Respondent #Seventeen:
“I have worked with USAID since 2002 in many nations. I was an aid expert in
Afghanistan for 8 years. It was tough to deal with different military and diplomatic
personnel with different stakes and backgrounds. Energy was an area that was
critical to the nation’s development. The TPP was a failed project, with no
sustainability. People were not happy from the beginning because the locals were
not consulted, but only the corrupt officials. USAID and SIGAR conducted
investigations and produced reports and I helped. The people said they had wanted
small generators. They used animal dung for heat and cooking and the children got
sick.
Pakistan built a similar plant to the TPP. It did not cost as much and was working
well. The people benefited from it. But Pakistan had a strong government system,
and the Government of Afghanistan was incapable of running any project.
Corruption and bribes blocked the way. People were ignorant of the value of nation
building projects and they stole what they could.”
Respondent #Eighteen:
“I attended a Shura where the KLE said that the TPP only helped American
companies. Now Afghan people were blamed that it is shut down. The TPP project
did not benefit the people, but was built based on American concepts of what to do.
How could Afghans maintain something like that with no training? One Afghan
official said the USAID never talked about the TPP, because it would hurt the
reputation of American contractors.
But the American firms only stuck to their plans and never coordinated with locals.
It was dangerous work and some people were afraid to work with me. HTS was
there to talk to locals about their perspectives and report back to military
commanders. My team evaluated projects completed by USAID and other
American companies. I also worked as a coordinator between Americans and
Afghans.”
Respondent #Twenty:
“I knew the energy sector in Afghanistan was very weak for years. USAID and
other agencies tried hard to help a huge country to improve, but it would take time
before Afghanistan could become independent in that area. There were some
benefits as hydro power systems were built, along with energy lines placed, and
low-cost grid systems in some areas.
The failures in aid delivery for energy infrastructure was first to not coordinate with
locals. Western countries lacked knowledge about Afghanistan’s culture, religion,
and necessary information that only the locals knew. Instead USAID and their
contracted companies dealt with officials only who were corrupt. Most projects
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were built within locations of the official’s personal areas with low occupation,
while thousands went without any needed energy. Westerners did not understand
the system of corruption and hierarchies. Officials did not care about those under
their care and no communication occurred so they did not know situations.
There was no training for maintenance on installations either, so that when USAID
pulled out, the energy infrastructure became useless. I helped to evaluate the TPP
as was required by USAID program manager in Afghanistan, regarding its function.
When asked during investigations, the contractors or USAID said there was not
time or money for this. Afghan locals were out of the picture. USAID funded the
TPP, and contracted with Westerners to build and implement the power plant.
The contractors had no contact with locals and no knowledge of the local terrain or
seasonal conditions. There should have also been relationships built with energy
providers in other connecting nations. They knew what was needed to work with
the terrain regarding transition lines and installing new hydro power.
I remember one incident during a bitter winter in Afghanistan with no heat. A man
burst into our office and shouted that his family needed heat. We let him in to see
that we had no heat in our office either with no blankets to keep warm, and we were
part of the energy team. I felt that I contributed to some energy increase as I knew
how to maintain equipment and small generators. I helped some coordination
between the US contractors and Afghan utilities department. I was also part of a
team that implemented hydraulic power generators in towns in the southern and
northern parts of Afghanistan. I saw an increase in street lights in Kabul with power
from solar panels. What is needed most is training to create skilled technicians.
The Shura Focus Group
This section examined the “Shura” or focus group of eight Afghan males. This
“Shura” (consultation) for recent Afghan immigrants at the local community center was
held in Detroit, Michigan on Friday, July 28th, 2017 from 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm. A summary
of the focus group discussion is included below.
As participants arrived, they were given a name badge and asked to seat themselves.
There were eight Afghan males present. No names were used in this research and the
participants were referenced by their professions in Afghanistan. Their ages ranged from
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45 to 58. All participants have wives and children, who were born in Afghanistan. Before
they started working with the US Army in Afghanistan, four of these participants had
worked on farms and one, a retired sergeant from the military, had worked as a security
guard for the TPP. Another administrator was an Afghan employee, who had worked
within the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in an official capacity. Two of the men were
teachers.
These participants came from six Afghan provinces: Farmer One (southern region);
Farmer Two (southern region); Teacher One (northern region); Teacher Two (southwestern
region); Farmer Three (northern region); Farmer Four (southern region); plus one security
guard and one administrator (from central Afghanistan).
All of these Afghan citizens worked for US Army or American companies in
Afghanistan, so the US government granted them and their family’s immigrant visas for
security reasons. Farmer One and Four worked in US military facilities in cafeterias.
Farmer Two and Three worked as interpreters with International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). Teacher One and Two helped the US Army and worked with USAID teams. A
security guard worked as a guard for TPP. The Administrator worked at the Afghan
Ministry of Education (MoE). According to these participants, most of them were still in
contact with their relatives and family members in Afghanistan on a daily basis. Some of
them still have brothers and sisters or married sons or daughters there.
All ethical considerations were carefully read. Participants were told that they did
not have to participate if they did not wish to do so . If they did choose to participate, they
did not have to answer any questions they did not feel comfortable answering, and they
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could stop the participation at any time. Participants’ identities and their locations, ages,
genders, occupations, or status of any sort would be protected. The information they gave
would be used in a report, but their identities would be protected through using
pseudonyms, coding, and positions to identify participants.
General Conditions in Afghanistan
In relating about the living conditions and the situation in general, in Afghanistan,
these participants relayed many stories and pointed out that the situation was getting worse
and living conditions were unbearable in Afghanistan for many reasons. The Afghan
Administrator indicated that the living conditions had been better in the past few years, but
not now. He stated that people couldn’t afford to buy enough food or drinks because
everything was becoming expensive.
Farmer Two mentioned that his family suffered in the winter and he couldn’t afford
to buy fuel to keep their homes warm. When he had been in Afghanistan, he had three sons
and one daughter and all of them had been sick because of the severe winter weather in
2016. Farmer One said that he had to sleep on the American base, because the security
situation was dangerous. He added that Taliban militants tracked locals who worked with
Americans.
The security guard was also pessimistic about the dangerous situation in
Afghanistan. He stated that he and his family had survived an assassination attempt, when
he was shopping in a local market in Kabul. He added that insurgents followed him
everywhere, and they had tried to lure him with money to work with them and carry out
terrorist attacks on foreigners.
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Teachers One and Two mentioned that foreign aid agencies were afraid of
conducting any projects in remote areas because of Taliban and other terrorist groups. In
October 2013, Teacher Two witnessed the killing of a foreign aid manager, who was
murdered while he was holding a “Shura” with locals. “Unfortunately, some locals had
disclosed the meeting time to insurgents, who killed the informant along with other three
Afghan key leaders,” said Teacher Two.
Education in Afghanistan
The school administrator explained that schools opened were often soon closed due
to violence and lack of security. Foreign aid money for education was distributed unevenly
between major cities and rural areas. In most of the rural areas with high risk, where schools
were built, “There is nothing but ghost schools now”, the administrator added.
Teacher Two said that the education sector in Afghanistan was still suffering and
that foreign aid had not been effective in improving the Afghan educational infrastructure.
As he pointed out, he had taught for almost 17 years in different schools and other
educational institutions throughout Afghanistan. According to his experience, Teacher
Two stated that foreign aid had helped Afghan education sector a little, but it still needed
a great deal of work and funds. He mentioned that he worked in different Afghan provinces,
where some schools had no infrastructure components such as classrooms, computer labs,
food courts, playing fields, or medical centers. In September 2013, Teacher Two taught
students in tents for nine months in Helmand. He added that the US Army and Afghan
National Army opened these tents and provided him and his colleagues with limited
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schooling supplies. “Most of the students were absent, plus a few of the teachers.” Teacher
Two said.
Teacher One added that foreign aid was not beneficial for Afghans, because most
of the schools never had any effective tracking system to monitor the performance of
teachers and students. “The schooling system was more efficient in the 1960s, and Afghan
universities had welcomed German and French scholars at that time,” Teacher One said.
He mentioned there had been other challenges that the Afghan education sector faced.
“There were not enough schools in remote villages, and there was not any reliable
transportation. This made it difficult for Afghan families to send their children to schools,
because it was not safe and it was time consuming for both parents and students,” Teacher
One said. Other challenges were that most elementary school-aged students did not have
access to schools, ineffective communication between local government and provincial
government, a shortage of female teachers, and students had to study out of date curricula.
The Administrator, who had worked with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education,
pointed out he observed over the years various conditions with regard to the education
sector in Afghanistan. He stated that Afghans had suffered thirty years of violence and
wars, and education in Afghanistan would remain weak without foreign help and long-term
strategies. The Administrator added that the Afghan education system was very old and
needed to be updated with new technology and other global educational standards. The
Afghan government would have to do a better job to implement a tracking system for
students and staff and protect aid that is earmarked for education. Teacher One commented
that some Afghan government officials and teachers stole school supplies and the aid
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allocated to education. He added that teachers received small salaries and most of them had
more than one job.
Farmer Three stated that education was better than before, but will remain weak
without constant foreign funds and better educational policies. Farmer Two added that one
of his sons was over 20 years old, and he barely knew how to read or write. He said that
schools lacked good teachers, and most of the teachers had never trained or had college
degrees. Farmer Four mentioned that the Afghan education sector suffered because there
were corrupt Afghan officials and key leaders, who accepted bribes publicly. He said that
locals talked negatively about how these powerful Afghan figures built schools in their
favorite areas. “There were some teachers who got paid on a monthly basis without
working because of the nepotism,” Farmer Four added.
The security guard agreed with that point, and mentioned that the Afghan school
system was outdated and that teachers were not capable of teaching, because most of them
were working more than one job. His daughter complained to him that insurgents’ activities
prevented students from walking back and forth to schools.
Energy in Afghanistan
With regard to the subject of energy, conversations during this Shura demonstrated
that the energy sector was also still suffering and not improving, according to the members
present. The security guard who lived in Kabul and worked in guarding the TPP mentioned
that this project had not been in operation for years and years. He had witnessed Afghan
officials involved in stealing some of the plant’s supplies and materials. The Administrator
added that TPP was a wasteful project and a big example of how Afghan officials and
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American contractors are corrupt. He said that TPP was not worth the money and effort,
and he never believed that such a project could cost over 300 million US dollars.
The Administrator lived in Kabul for a long time, and was familiar with the
investigations run by SIGAR. He added that Afghan officials had never been honest in
talking to Afghan citizens about how USAID was corrupt. “Afghan officials hesitated to
tell the truth, because that would hurt the reputation of USAID and could cause the potential
loss of projects in the future,” the Administrator stated.
Farmer One indicated that TPP was a completely failed project, and the money
would be better used to build small hydraulic power systems. He added that the energy
infrastructure is not great as Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS or the Afghan utility
agency) had talked about in the news. He said that his son had worked as a interpreter
helping the utility company with communications with USAID. His son said that Afghan
officials had been forced by USAID not to talk about any negative news publicly, otherwise
they would eventually lose the funds.
Teacher Two said that the energy sector was not improving in his town. He
indicated that his family spent several years without any electricity or fuel resources.
“Afghan officials were corrupt and informal leaders, called the shadow government 16,
played a major role in who was getting public services or not,” he stated. He added that
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Informal leaders are usually the war lords (the Mujahedeen) or Taliban, and are called the Shadow
Government by local Afghans. It has been used for holy men (Imams) or can be local mayors (Mukhtars).
They all influence the people in some manner.
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people used dry animal dung to heat their homes in the cold weather and that the smoke
was unhealthy to breathe.
Teacher One said that the energy sector was struggling with many technical and
operational problems such as no regular maintenance for energy plants, interrupted
electricity, and unskilled technicians. He added that Afghan locals were still facing other
energy related challenges or a lack of funding, theft of materials from power plants, dark
streets, unreliable power for pumping water from dams, expensive fuel, and a scarcity of
energy resources.
Data from Official Reports: USAID
This section contains information from numerous reports from USAID, the media,
scholars, and SIGAR concerning both education aid and energy with a focus on the
Tarakhil Power Plant.
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Figure 4.2: USAID spending per sector in Afghanistan, 2014-2016

USAID “Dollars to Results Report”.
https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan
For the three years documented in the table above, energy is by far the highest
funded of the three, the other two being basic education and post-secondary education.
Basic education funding decreased over the three-year period between 2014 and 2016,
while post-secondary education funding increased, according to the “Dollars to Results”
information from USAID.
As explained in the “Notes to Data” file, these are the only years for which such
data is available. It is considered a snapshot and represents only what was spent in a fiscal
year in different sectors, but the figures showing the numbers of people served by that
funding is unavailable. Therefore, information on the outcomes and success of the funding
is not available from USAID. In other words, for the purposes of this dissertation study it
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cannot be known exactly how the money was spent or the specific results. USAID spending
in Afghanistan, especially in the highest category of “Government and Civil Society,”
remains secret as much of it is classified.
This quote from the data notes explains it further:
“Due to the nature of foreign assistance programs, it can be difficult to link FY
disbursements directly to FY results. There is often a time lag between the
disbursement of a dollar and when a result is achieved from that investment. For
example, if USAID builds a school, most of the spending takes place in the first
several years of the project as construction begins. However, results may not be
achieved until years later when the school opens and classes begin. The results
shown for each mission are not comprehensive of all achievements through foreign
assistance in any given country. Results shown on the website give a snapshot of
the type of results achieved by USAID. The website is not a comprehensive
reporting tool and should not be considered as such.” 17
This dissertation study covers from 2001 to 2017. It was not until 2014 that
transparency and accountability became part of USAID’s dialogue. USAID’s commitment
to transparency is evident in the following statement: “USAID is committed to upholding
the values of transparency, open government, participation, and collaboration in tangible
ways that benefit the American people.” 18 However, transparency is not easy. Macdonald
(2014) states that “One of the common deficiencies of many initial open data portal efforts
is that they might provide extensive data files and tools for filtering and visualization, but
they don’t necessarily go the “extra mile” by ensuring that data and data context are useful,
available, and meaningful.” 19 The data chosen to illustrate education efforts here meant to
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Part of USAID’s open data policy. USAID Data Notes https://results.usaid.gov/NotesforDataUser.pdf.
https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/progress-data/transparency.
19
https://dennis-mcdonald-58qa.squarespace.com/managing-technology/usaids-evolving-open-dataculture.html
18
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make meaning out of what was available through raw data. It is not possible at this time to
put a dollar amount or cost per individual in any one project, which may be the subject of
future studies. .
Education aid funding is a large part of USAID funding efforts. The following are
the definitions used by USAID for the agency’s general funding education missions for
education:
Basic Education:
“Improve early childhood education, primary education, and secondary education,
delivered in formal or non-formal settings. It includes literacy, numeracy, and other
basic skills programs for youth and adults.”
Post-Secondary Education or Higher Education:
“Improve the quality, contributions and accessibility of higher education. Higher
education includes but is not limited to: teaching; training; curricula; degree
programs; pedagogy; research; policy analysis and participation in policy
development; workforce development; second chance learning opportunities; skills
certification programs; community service; extension; applied technology;
professional development; exchange programs; institutional linkages; program
linkages; institutional governance; financial planning; administration;
management; and policy that is developed, conducted, and/or implemented by
universities, colleges, community colleges, upper secondary schools, public and
private technical and vocational training institutions, public and privately led skills
development programs, teacher training colleges and institutes, research institutes,
and/or relevant ministries. This program area places a special emphasis on ensuring
equitable access to tertiary education and workforce development programs,
especially for youth from lower income and marginalized groups including girls
and young women and students with disabilities.” 20
The information displayed graphically here demonstrates that USAID spends
different amounts each year and serves different numbers of individuals each year.

20

From USAID’s online database in the “Notes for Data User” section. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2017.
https://results.usaid.gov/NotesforDataUser.pdf
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Although a grand total of dollars allocated for Basic Education 112 category is obtainable
each year (2014 to 2016) the numbers of programs funded through that dollar amount is
not stated.
Figure 4.3: USAID Training numbers in Education 2014-2016

USAID “Dollars to Results Report”. https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan
The above table illustrates the numbers of individuals trained in basic education by
USAID funding for the years 2014-2016. This category is called Basic Education 112. It
includes primary learners who attend schools where books and materials were provided by
USAID. The disbursement amounts listed for Basic Education in Afghanistan for 2015
were US dollars $71,770,663 and US dollars $49,047,817 in 2016.
There were no school administrators and officials trained in 2016. There were more
teachers trained in 2015 than either 2014 or 2015. Yet the education sector funding for
USAID was the most for Basic Education in 2014. USAID numbers for training teachers,
and school administrators for the years 2014-2016 show variances. In 2014, 10,354
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administrators and officials and 72,211 teachers were trained. In 2015, with the largest
numbers of the three years, 17,880 administrators and 156,179 teachers were trained. In
2016, there were zero administrators trained and 81,635 teachers. 21 As will be
demonstrated in other parts of this dissertation as well by analysis of the reports, education
projects tend to be disproportionately focused on administrators, consultants, and officials
involved who earn high salaries, whereas the Afghan teachers and school administrators
are often given far fewer benefits and compensations. The number of higher education
partnerships between the US and Afghanistan’s higher education institutions that addressed
development needs were five in 2015 and 14 in 2016, respectively. The workforce training
program was part of an effort to train adults in public finance management and anticorruption classes, and was implemented through Afghanistan’s Higher Education system.

21

https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan?fiscalYear=2016.. Data for all the
nations served by USAID are included.
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Figure 4.4: Individuals trained by USAID in workforce development

USAID “Dollars to Results Report”. https://results.usaid.gov/results/country/afghanistan
The number of individuals in workforce development programs influences human
capital in Afghanistan. However, the overall numbers are quite low. For the preparation
of government officials, USAID data indicated that the number of government officials
trained in public financial management in 2016 was 150, and the number of government
officials that received anti-corruption training in 2014 was 287. This does indicate an
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awareness by USAID of corruption and mismanagement. Another part of this program was
to develop civil service employees to be more civic minded in their jobs through training
funded by USAID. The number of Afghan people who completed assisted civic education
programs in 2014 was 302,548. This data is an indicator of human capital development
funded by USAID.
The following USAID reports have been selected because they directly apply to the
analysis in this dissertation study. Most of the evaluation reports are publicly available via
USAID’s Development Clearinghouse. 22 Two reports are on education.
Education – Basic Education and Teacher Training
This report is a mid-term evaluation of a large-scale teacher training USAID funded
mission called BESST (Building Education Support Systems for Teachers) in Afghanistan.
This report reflects on the problems in the implementation of this teacher training program
due to many factors, some of which include poor communication with Afghan officials,
delays in completing materials, and the existence of materials that do not match the needs
of the teachers and students.
Education - Higher Education and the Academy for Education Development
The document examined herein is the “Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's higher education
project, USAID OIG Audit Report, USAID.” 23

22

https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx.
Office of the Inspector General, Regional Inspector General for Audit. Manila (December 4, 2008,
Document ID: PD-ACS-007).

23
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This audit finds serious deficiencies in the implementation of this higher education
mission to train faculty in Afghanistan. Problems found within the report include poor
communication with Afghan officials and with university officials, delays in programming,
and the misreporting of activities. Additionally, this press release relates directly to this
mission: “USAID Suspends Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New
US Government Awards” issued in December 2010. 24 All aid deliveries were carried out
by contractors or third parties. For the BESST education project the mid-term evaluation
was carried out by Cheechi Consulting, Inc., who did not conduct the project and was not
affiliated with the BESST project. Cheechi is contracted for evaluating and monitoring
almost every USAID program associated with the government and/or judicial system, but
typically not for projects involving education. Sayara Strategies, also known as Sayara
Research and Sayara Media conducts numerous contracts throughout Afghanistan and the
world and is affiliated with dozens of donor agencies and governments, including the
Afghan government, military, and police.
In the sphere of education, the Academy for Educational Development (AED), a
non-profit organization headquartered in Washington D.C., was shut down in 2011 because
in part of the $38-million-dollar Higher Education Project (HEP) shown in this report. The
Inspector General’s Final Audit Report found egregious oversights in AED’s
administration, including a lack of evaluation, poor planning, poor communication, lack of

24

USAID Press Office, December 8, 2010. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaidsuspends-academy-educational-development-receiving-new-us.
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sustainability, lack of stability in staffing, mismanagement of funds, not meeting of the
criteria for programming, dissatisfied faculty, and overall lack of integrity.
In December 2010, USAID issued the press release “USAID Suspends Academy
for Educational Development from Receiving New US Government Awards” for findings
from the Inspector General that “reveal evidence of serious corporate misconduct,
mismanagement, and a lack of internal controls, and raise serious concerns of corporate
integrity.” 25 By June 2011 AED no longer existed and was forced to pay millions in
settlements to the US government for mismanagement of funds in projects in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
Other USAID Data Reports
The following USAID reports have been selected because they directly apply to the
analysis in this dissertation study. Most of the evaluation reports are publicly available via
USAID’s Development Clearinghouse. 26 Two reports are on energy and two are on
education. There is a table (4.1) following the reports revealing the investigation of these
four projects and the outcomes.
1) Energy – Tarakhil Power Plant
The Tarakhil power plant is important as a case study of the aid directed at the
energy infrastructure sector in Afghanistan. The first report examined is the “Final report
from the Office of Inspector General, June 19, 2014,” which includes a memorandum to

25

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-suspends-academy-educationaldevelopment-receiving-new-us.
26
https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx.
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the USAID/Afghanistan Mission Director, William Hammink, from the Afghanistan
Acting Country Office Director, Randall Ase. Its central focus is “Review of Sustainability
of Operations at Afghanistan’s Tarakhil Power Plant.” 27 This report finds Da Afghanistan
Breshna Sherkat (DABS - the Afghan government’s utility agency) as being at fault for not
maintaining the power plant and not using expensive equipment. Also, DABS is cited for
not making an inventory of supplies. There are many packed containers with equipment
and supplies, but no inventory, according to the report.
2) Energy - DABS
The second report examined is “Public campaign evaluation: Da Afghanistan
Breshna Sherkat : post campaign survey report, Special Evaluation, Sayara Research,”
issued by USAID Mission to Afghanistan.

28

The survey data contained in the report is

useful in understanding the importance of electricity in the lives of the urban and rural
people of Afghanistan. For many years they have been promised electricity and they still
do not have it consistently, even in the large cities. The data indicates that many Afghans
need information in order to understand what electricity options could be available in the
future. 3) Education – Basic Education and Teacher Training
This report is a mid-term evaluation of a large-scale teacher training USAID funded
mission called BESST (Building Education Support Systems for Teachers) in Afghanistan.

27
28

Report No. F-306-14-002-S.
USAID Mission to Afghanistan on 27 January 2015. Document ID: PA-00K-BDG
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This report reflects on the problems in the implementation of this teacher training program
due to many factors, some of which include poor communication with Afghan officials,
delays in completing materials, and the existence of materials that do not match the needs
of the teachers and students.
4) Education - Higher Education and the Academy for Education Development
The document examined herein is the “Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's higher
education project, USAID OIG Audit Report, USAID,” issued by the Office of the
Inspector General, Regional Inspector General for Audit, Manila. 29 This audit is finds
serious deficiencies in the implementation of this higher education mission to train faculty
in Afghanistan. Problems that the report found include poor communication with Afghan
officials and with university officials, delays in programming, and the misreporting of
activities. Additionally, this press release relates directly to this mission: USAID Suspends
Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New US Government Awards
issued in December 2010. 30
Below is a table with the details from the four reports examined below. All four of
the projects were funded by USAID. The figures are for monetary amounts in US dollars.
(m=millions.)

29

December 4, 2008, Document ID: PD-ACS-007.
December 8, 2010, USAID Press Office, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaidsuspends-academy-educational-development-receiving-new-us
30
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Table 4.1 Investigative Data from the four projects listed above
Reporting

Type/Da

Title

Sector/Target

Agency

te

OIG/Afghanis

Final

Review of

tan

Review

DABS

June 19,

TPP

Keywords

Recommendati

Population

Cost

ons

Energy/Kabul

&

Failure

Re-training

TPP

No outputs

Alternative

355 m

Lack

2014

of

fuels

maintenance,

Revised

inventory

planning

Sayara

Post-

DABS

Energy/Nation

Lack

Strategies

Campaig

Survey

Random

Cooperative

n Survey

Selection

Agreement

of

More radio, cell

Surve

awareness

phone,

y

Stealing

outreach

Report

electricity

More education

January

Little

about

20, 2015

improvement

of

rural

1.8m

dangers
illegal

electricity
Cheechi

Mid-

BESST

Education/Basi

Too

Consulting

Term

Building

c

Evaluati

Education

on

More

BESS

organization

communication

T

Education/Teac

s

with teachers

100m

Support

her Training

Lack of fair

More

May 25,

Systems

Largely

pay

treatment

2009

for

population

Top-heavy

teachers

Textbooks

Caution

unfinished

overpaying

Teachers

rural

many

consultants

fair
of

with

108

Dissatisfacti
on

OIG/USAID

Audit

Academy

Education/High

Failure

Need

Final

for

er

No

staff

Report

Education

Education/Facu

sustainability

Need

Decemb

Developme

lty Training at 4

No

evaluations

er

nt

year

planning

2008

4,

(AED)

colleges

proper

38m

internal
&

reporting

Higher

throughout

Lack

Education

nation

communicati

after

on

ends

Program

stable

of

Need plan for
project

(HEP)

USAID Office of Investigator General, Washington D.C.,
https://oig.usaid.gov/auditandspecialbyyear
SIGAR Audit Conclusions
Education: The Office of the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted many audits and investigations concerning USAID’s
education and energy funding projects. Audit results for education funding showed that
USAID had complied with all rules and regulations concerning goals of expended money
on projects and the employment of for-profit contractors to accomplish the projects. Any
subsequent failures were not due to faulty construction or within parameters of goals for
the funding agency. Due diligence was exercised in the pre-construction reports on the
number and locations of schools needed. Other considerations of security, weather, roads,
and local corruption were out of the scope of control for USAID. For the liability of any
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corruption by contractors, SIGAR found several incidents and prosecution followed.
Further allegations continued and a response to the SIGAR Inquire letter31, from USAID
to SIGAR dated June 30, 2015 stated: “the Afghan media reports …are not accurate,” and
“there is no specific evidence or allegation … that US assistance funds have been
misappropriated, and we remain confident that education programs are among our most
successful programs in Afghanistan.”
Energy: A June 2014 USAID OIG review of the Tarakhil Power Plant found the
plant to be severely underused, operating at just 2.2% of installed capacity, which USAID
OIG attributed in part to the plant’s high operating cost—particularly the high cost of diesel
fuel. In response to the OIG report and the accompanying recommendations, USAID stated
that it had either already initiated, or would initiate, remedial measures to help the Afghan
government and DABS (the national power utility) operate the plant on a more regular
basis. USAID stated that all corrective measures would be implemented no later than
December 31, 2014.
SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-65-SP: Tarakhil Power Plant
SIGAR wrote to USAID to inquire about the Afghan government’s willingness and
ability to operate the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) and to better understand actions
undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the plant’s operation and maintenance. USAID
replied that TPP was operating, provided energy output figures, and said the plant proved

31

SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-62-SP to USAID: Afghanistan Education Data.
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to be a vital component of Afghanistan’s northern energy grid. SIGAR’s analysis is
ongoing.
Allegations concerning the TPP led to initial investigations 32 and audits. The
quoted response from USAID states on June 26, 2015, “The agency has, “no indication
that the Afghan power utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), failed to operate
Tarakhil as was alleged in your letter.” SIGAR replied that “SIGAR will continue to
monitor developments at the Tarakhil Power Plant to see if over time the Afghan
government is able to better utilize this significant expenditure of US taxpayer funds.”
SIGAR issued a report letter 33 on August 7, 2015, from Donald L. “Larry” Sampler,
Assistant Administrator for Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs to USAID, containing the
following:
“This letter provides the results of our analysis of the information provided by your
office in response to our questions. Unfortunately, despite apparently being a “vital
component” of the electrical grid serving Kabul, it appears that that this $335
million power plant continues to be severely underutilized. In particular, data
provided by your office and by Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) show that
the Tarakhil Power Plant continues to operate at only a fraction of its power
production capacity. As you recall, the USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG)
found previously that between July 2010 and December 2013, the plant only
produced about 63,000 megawatt hours of power, just 2.2 percent of its production
capacity during that period.2 Our analysis of the more recent data provided by your
office shows that the rate of power production has actually declined over time.
Specifically, from February 2014 through April 2015, the plant exported just 8,846
megawatt hours of power to the Kabul grid, which is less than one percent of
Tarakhil’s production capacity during that period…….
In addition to running far below its full capacity, the plant contributes a
relatively small amount of electricity to the power grid serving Kabul. From
February 2014 through April 2015, the Tarakhil Power Plant produced only 0.34
percent of the total power on the Kabul grid. Figure 1 shows the percentage of
32
33

SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-65-SP to USAID, concerning TPP efficiency.
SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-80-65=SP.
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power on the Kabul grid derived from the Tarakhil power plant compared to the
total amount of power on the grid from all sources.
Your response characterized the plant as a “means of providing insurance
against disruption of power supplies from Central Asia and as backup during peak
demand.” However, that characterization is contradicted by other information
obtained by my office. For instance, the USAID contractor hired to evaluate
alternative fuel supplies for the power plant stated that, “the TPP (Tarakhil Power
Plant) was designed as a base load plant, operating 24 hours/day. 7 days/week, but
was being operated to support peak loading only.” USAID OIG also noted that “the
plant was also not used regularly… and therefore was not increasing Kabul’s power
supply to help reduce its energy deficit… as intended.” and , “the plant is not
regularly contributing additional electricity to increase the power supply in the
Kabul area as envisioned.” These statements strongly suggest that, rather than
“providing insurance against disruption”, the Tarakhil Power Plant was originally
intended to provide electrical power to Kabul on a continuous basis.
In fact, according to the USAID, OIG, the use of the Tarakhil Power Plant
only on an intermittent basis caused damage to the plant. USAID OIG observed
that “operating on an intermittent- rather than a continuous- basis has resulted in
more frequent starts and stops- which place greater wear and tear on the engines
and electrical components.” This underutilization of the plant has apparently
already resulted in the premature failure of equipment, which is expected to raise
already high operation and maintenance costs, and could result in a “catastrophic”
failure. This information also supports the conclusion that the Tarakhil Power Plant
was intended to operate on a continuous basis.”
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Figure 4.5: SIGAR’s findings on TPP output, 8/7/15

SIGAR Inquiry Letter 15-80-65
Other Research on USAID Aid to Afghanistan:
O’Brien (2017) outlines the progress of contracting with other aid agencies to do
work in Afghanistan, thus distancing USAID from on the ground involvement and
accountability. O’Brien states that while the main purpose of the Afghanistan
reconstruction aid had been to stabilize the war-torn nation, the Bush administration had
also sought to utilize USAID to advance US security and political objectives. This had
presented significant challenges for the Agency, O’Brien argues, and had forced USAID
to look to NGOs, such as AED and IRD, in order to implement major programs by
awarding cooperative agreements. However, as O’Brien has posited, what is very
important is that after awarding these cooperative agreements, USAID failed to participate
substantially in the programs.
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USAID's consistent disregard for its "operational policy," which is contained in the
ADS, contributed to the projects' failure to meet critical objectives and the mismanagement
of millions of dollars, the report states. In response to growing pressure from the OIG,
SIGAR, Congress, and the media calling for "accountability," USAID had suspended two
of its largest implementing partners, in an improper fashion. To prevent these problems in
the future, agencies would need to be held to government-wide regulations with the force
and effect of law, according to O’Brien’s analysis (2017: 23).
In order to find a solution, the O’Brien’s work makes a recommendation, which
includes amending Title 2 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, in order to better define
what it means to be “substantially involved” and to created binding legal requirements on
agencies to remain involved during performance. The ultimate goal is to ensure the proper
utilization of cooperative agreements by all federal agencies (2017:11).
Corneille (2001)’s work addresses accountability for aid agencies to stakeholders,
especially when they are a top down organization. She defines the usages of accountable:
“The concept of accountability must be introduced and then described within the context
of development.” Corneille goes on to explain there are different types of accountability.
Professional accountability is a low degree of control and high degrees of discretion. It is
a horizontal relationship, because individuals are empowered by the administrator to make
decisions. (Corneille, 2001, 2)
Hierarchal relationships are closed and the dynamics create high degrees of control
and scrutiny. Performance is based on obedience to expectations of persons or the
organization. Finally political accountability comes from external sources with low levels
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of direct control. (Corneille 2001, 2) USAID as a government agency is held accountable
to the government and citizens. Other multilateral organizations, like the World Bank,
answer to their member countries that own and govern them. Other distinctions between
national development agencies and multilateral banks is that development agencies follow
a direct linkage between governmental foreign policy goals and foreign aid. The
multilateral banks do not reflect any government policy in their programs. (Corneille, 2001,
3)
Historical USAID accountability in the past was to its government and the
American taxpayers to promote US national interests. (Corneille, 2001, 12) These past
criteria guided USAID operations in Afghanistan. However, this narrow connection for
accountability was not always viewed by the US Government or USAID as being in
compliance with government standards and regulations.
Traditionally, development agencies or aid agencies were top-down and involved
strict control and thus were closed systems. However, it should be understood that placing
American systems in other societies won’t work. “What will work is to address local
problems and develop indigenous systems.” (Corneille, 2001, 13)) Now agency directives
require that aid beneficiaries must be “actively consulted in developing, updating, and
monitoring strategic plans, and involved in monitoring performance.” Thus there are two
major types of stakeholders, or the sponsoring government and the indigenous beneficiaries
of the aid. Sustainability of projects depend on both stakeholders, and so all must
participate in the process. Participation in projects by indigenous stakeholders will
strengthening their commitment, due to involvement also creates new opportunities for
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developing nations or LDCs to express their views and influence the programs that affect
their lives. Therefore aid programs delivery become accountable to both stakeholders.
(Corneille, 2001, 3)
Yet it is unclear on how policy is to proceed. Diane La Voy, former Senior Policy
Advisor for Participatory Development at USAID, described the relationship with
stakeholders as a statistical Venn diagrams in which USAID tries to “find the biggest
amount of overlap – the most honorable and feasible space” between the goals of the
agency and its counterparts. (Corneille, 2001, 14) Also how are successes measured?
USAID’s operating units were required to prepare a Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP),
a management technique of the private sector. (Corneille, 2001, 15)
Problems arise when performance indicators to measure results do not always
capture qualitative values such as empowerment, learning, inclusion, partnership, and
ownership.

Furthermore, when priorities clash between aid agencies and their

stakeholders, it is the agency and their own government they will consider first. Trying to
maintain some kind of balance in working with government controls is “almost more
challenging than working with the Congress.” (Corneille, 2001, 15)
The indigenous stakeholders must be considered as paramount because the
sustainability of the project depends on them. They are the touted reason for the efforts in
the first place. Ownership of projects creates change that occurs from the bottom up, and
it is these indigenous stakeholders that will benefit or suffer. Their future beliefs may derive
from the results of their relationships with USAID as a representative of the US
government politically, socially, and economically.
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For USAID, the most important stakeholder through accountability is the US
government as they have the power to cut funding, and so USAID has to comply with
broader agency goals. Therefore, new indigenous partners formally may have less power
to influence development programming. (Corneille, 2001, 15)
Individual Reports on Failures of USAID Projects
To accomplish education goals in Afghanistan, USAID funded the Academy for
Educational Development (AED) in Afghanistan under a cooperative agreement, which
was essentially for-profit contractors. The Academy for Educational Development (AED),
once a non-profit global development agency with hundreds of millions of dollars in
funding, mostly from the US government, was audited in 2009 for its work in education
and shortly thereafter controversy ensued (O’Brien 2017). AED had overpaid its
executives, did not complete or even implement projects or programs, overcharged
USAID, and generally mismanaged funds, and it was dismantled in 2011. In O’Brien’s
(2017) article the focus is on the culpability of USAID in allegations of fraud, waste, and
failure, and AED’s mismanagement of over $ 38 million US dollars is addressed. O’Brien,
a lawyer, investigated USAID’s responsibility for such waste, fraud, and failure in
Afghanistan. Cooperative agreements ask contractors and consultants to follow the
protocols of reporting and assessment. When they do not follow procedures, it is difficult
to hold them accountable. However in some cases, such as with AED, they can be shut
down.
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Pratap Chatterjee, a journalist for CorpWatch 34 wrote the following in an article
entitled “Black and Veatch's Tarakhil Power Plant: White Elephant in Kabul” (2009):
“Two weeks before the August 20 vote, at an opening ceremony for the unfinished plant,
Karzai stood beside Karl Eikenberry, the current US ambassador, who told the assembled
media: ‘I would ask the citizens of Kabul when you turn on your lights at night, remember
that the United States of America stands with you – optimistic of our combined prospects
for success, and confident in you and our mission.’ But not much went according to plan.
The $280 million-a-year cost to run the power plant at full capacity was more than a third
of total tax revenues for the entire country; the plant would supply electricity to less than
two percent of the population; and the plant's cost – already more than $300 million – was
roughly three times that of any similar plant in the region” (Chatterjee, 2009).
Media Reports of USAID Projects
This dissertation examines the details of U.S .government spending in the
Afghanistan reconstruction process, and media reports are an important part of that
analysis. The media plays a major role in reporting on aid projects, and thus has watchdog
status when it comes to government spending. The money spent by USAID in Afghanistan
is US taxpayer money. The public has a right to know why there has been so much waste.
Anne Simmons in her article in the Los Angeles Times, entitled: “US foreign aid:
A waste of money or a boost to world stability? Here are the facts” (May 10, 2017) quotes
from the 2014 SIGAR report. Afghanistan is a fragile state, she argues, maybe even a failed

34

CorpWatch is a global nonprofit promoter of human rights based in San Francisco.
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one. “Perhaps the largest reason is corruption,” James M. Roberts, a research fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that has called for a scaling back of USAID
funding, wrote in 2014 “It’s the ‘pre-existing condition’ that keeps many aid recipients
from ever recovering. It’s a major obstacle to economic growth” (as quoted in Simmons
2017). Another often quoted statement is the 2014 report from the office of special
inspector general, John Sopko, for Afghanistan reconstruction is: “evidence strongly
suggests that Afghanistan lacks the capacity — financial, technical, managerial or
otherwise — to maintain, support and execute much of what has been built or established
during more than a decade of international assistance" (Ibid). How could so much money
be spent with so little progress? The media asks this question for the American taxpayer,
but it is also the lived experience of myself as an HTS social scientist and the people of
Afghanistan.
Aikens in an article in The New Yorker, “The Bidding War How a young Afghan
military contractor became spectacularly rich” (March 7, 2016) calls the US government’s
spending in Afghanistan self-defeating. Self-defeating, but also, it can be added,
devastating for the Afghan people. Aikens quotes General Petraeus, who wrote in 2008:
“Employ money as a weapons system. Money can be ‘ammunition.” Aikens continues:
“The result was a war waged as much by for-profit companies as by the military. Political
debate in Washington has focused on the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan and
the losses that they have sustained. To minimize casualties, the military outsourced any
task that it could: maintenance, cooking and laundry, overland logistics, even security.
Since 2007, there have regularly been more contractors than US forces in Afghanistan;
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today, they outnumber them three to one” (Aikens, 2016). From the multiple official audits,
investigations and the scholarly and media reports, it becomes clear that the TPP is a failed
project. However, the liability for its failure will be addressed in the next chapter through
data analysis.
All aid deliveries were carried out by contractors or third-parties and in the case of
the DABS energy survey35, the survey and the post-survey analysis were carried out by the
same contractor. The cost column in the above table indicates the cost of the project itself.
In the case of TPP/DABS, the cost of the construction of TPP was $355 million USD, but
reports of $245 million a year just to purchase diesel fuel to run at capacity exist. TPP has
not been operating at capacity. Although DABS took over TPP in 2010, USAID continued
to provide aid. DABS has failed to operate the plant above 3% capacity, therefore leaving
97% of its capacity unused.
Eyewitness Account by Abdullah Bataineh from HTS Research
The impact of three decades of conflict have devastated Afghanistan’s physical
infrastructures, institutions, and people bringing hardships and traumas to many locals. As
the impetus for this dissertation research study, my first-hand experiences working in
Helmand Province, Afghanistan for the US Army reveal insights into the people’s
experiences.

35

“Public campaign evaluation: Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat : post campaign survey report, Special
Evaluation, Sayara Research,” (2015) issued by USAID Mission to Afghanistan.
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As a Social Scientist, I interviewed dozens of Afghan officials and held several
Shuras with locals and their key leaders. During these interviews and meetings, I
documented the experiences of those with education and energy aid delivery problems first
hand. I saw what a LCD nation like Afghanistan experiences when aid delivery was
insufficient. I saw a school built by USAID that was damaged from conflict. There were
only a few students, who still continued to come, but I realized that despite the possible
danger, the dire look of the building, and the lack of supplies that the students braved all
of this for any benefit of education they could receive.
I experienced discomforts from the lack of available energy, while on missions in
Afghanistan. I took statements from those who lived with the reality of no available energy,
and their descriptions of cold, isolation, and no cooking fuel. I learned that aid delivery
from USAID was diverted to the large projects, specifically the TPP, rather than helping
with smaller beneficial projects. In Kabul, I heard official statements at a USAID
conference addressing questions about the validity of USAID aid on the workings of TPP
and the exaggerated benefits of schools built.
From a political science viewpoint, the locals and their leaders often were
politically powerless because of the Taliban’s stronghold. The Taliban run what is called a
shadow government, where they control certain areas and use violence and threats of
violence to limit the power of the legitimate government agents.
As part of my duties as a social scientist with the US Army’s Human Terrain
System, I had the opportunity to interview local Afghans, their key leaders, officials, aid
workers, experts, and other military personnel from both US and the Government of
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Afghanistan. Below I describe a Shura council meeting (a key leader meeting) at a
compound, a visit to a medical clinic, and then I focus on my account of USAID’s
involvement.
My months in Helmand province, an area of Taliban stronghold, gave me the
chance to witness the poverty and injustice first hand. Basic needs were lacking: there was
little or no fuel for lighting, cooking, and heating, and limited or no access to education.
There was limited food sometimes, and a lack of basic medical supplies. In February 2012,
I conducted a 10-day mission in a semi-permissive area of Nowzad district in Helmand
province. Face-face field interviews were conducted with a few national government
officials. I also held a meeting with a Shura council, consisting of 18 members, to help my
team members identify the perception of key tribal leaders about many important social
and cultural issues, and to improve relations between locals and the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF).
This ten-day mission was designated in support of II MEF (Marines Expeditionary
Forces) and ISAF’s efforts to improve their understanding of the population’s needs,
concerns, and aspirations in Nowzad District. During my documented interviews with key
leaders in the Shura meeting, everyone agreed about the top four major issues: lack of
security, a poor educational system, no fuel for cooking and heating, and limited or no
access to health care.
Most complained about how the Taliban and other insurgents made it difficult for
the locals to travel or take their children to school. Many of the key leaders stated that lack
of security forced many locals to leave the district of Nowzad for other villages or other

122

provinces. An older man in his late 60s indicated that the Taliban prevented him and his
family from traveling outside the district to bring in food and other necessities. He further
explained that many people had become dependent on the aid organizations and the US
military to provide basic needs. Another local leader, who worked as a security guard in
several provinces, revealed the story of an Afghan local soldier and his son, who had been
abducted and killed by the Taliban. The insurgents killed them for no reason other than to
send a message to military personnel and other government officials to not support or work
for the government of Afghanistan, otherwise they would face the same fate as this local
soldier and his son. The shadow government influences every aspect of life for the Afghan
people in Helmand province, including education.
“A poor educational system” was a common complaint in most of the interviews I
conducted with Afghan locals. In Nowzad, an Imam (Holy man) who spoke good Arabic
and served for almost 20 years in the province of Helmand, insisted that the Afghan
educational system was not only traditional, but also suffered from major challenges. When
I asked him about these challenges, the Imam complained that the lack of furnished schools
didn’t matter because there was a scarcity of teachers to teach. Most teachers had
abandoned the district of Nowzad years previous because of the deteriorating security
situation and low wages. The Imam explained that they only had two teachers who can
teach all subjects and when they are absent for any reason, the school shuts down. Students
lack reading and writing skills and are unmotivated to learn. He said, “We keep sending
complaints to the provincial government about the lack of staff, but we rarely get any
response.”
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I personally had the opportunity to visit a school in Nowzad district during the
winter season. The visit was arranged by US marines, who provided a safety guard for the
Imam, one interpreter, and me. As we entered the school compound, I thought the school
had been shut down because of the quiet and rubbish all over the place. I noticed a big hole
in the wall of the main office and most of the windows were broken or without any frames.
I asked the Imam about the reasons for such damage. He explained that this school
experienced big clashes between the insurgents and the Afghan National Army (ANA) a
few months prior. “Unfortunately, the school is only open for a few days during the week,
but not that many students attend”, the Imam stated. Besides going against education, the
shadow government also controlled the roads and fuel supplies.
A major issue addressed during the Shura meeting was the scarcity of fuel for
cooking and heating. According to the majority of the Shura council members the lack of
fuel is a major challenge in the Nowzad district, which caused continuous suffering for all
residents. The Makhtar (local leader) an influential figure in the district, started his speech
by asking for forgiveness because of the cold room, where we were holding a large key
leader meeting, while draping a blanket over his shoulder. He directed his speech to my
team and apologized for meeting us in such a cold room, but “unfortunately, all rooms in
this governmental compound have no type of heat,” he said. The Makhtar added that it took
him at least 45 minutes to walk to this meeting, because of the unavailability of
transportation throughout the district.
During the meeting, I asked others about their mode of transportation. One key
leader who had worked as a policeman explained that a local police captain brought him
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and another Shura council member there because they were afraid of walking in the district.
This retired policeman said that “if insurgents or anyone affiliated with the Taliban
observed him walking outside his neighborhood, he would be killed right away.” He added
“I served in Helmand for years and I know all bad guys and they know me. These insurgents
tried to kidnap my daughter on more than one occasion. They destroyed my shop and killed
two of my workmates in the past. I cannot send my kids to school anymore.”
I remember it was about that time that the Chef entered the room and said loudly
that the food was ready. Eating Afghan food is a fond memory, one I will never forget
because I found it delicious. Everyone seemed to enjoy the rice and lamb meat. “Refusing
to eat local food is viewed as an insult,” exclaimed the Makhtar. Afghans are big-hearted
people and often invite guests to their homes to share food and smiles. I asked the Pashtu
interpreter about the way the food was cooked for this meeting. He explained that Chef
cooked the meal in a wood-fired oven. Using the primus stove that uses kerosene can
prepare the food quickly for the whole compound, but the chef used the wood oven that
day because kerosene was unavailable throughout the district due to the dangerous security
situation. The interpreter added that some key leaders were complaining to the US military
personnel about the unavailability of fuel for cooking and heating their homes during the
harsh cold weather. These key leaders also complained about how some of the government
officials were corrupt and were stealing people’s humanitarian aid.
The lack of fuel for heating was also noticeable during our visits to a medical center
that was almost empty during noon time on a Wednesday. All rooms were cold except a
room for the medical staff, where I noticed two nurses heating their hands around a dusty
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kerosene heater. With the help from the interpreter, I asked one of the nurses about her
daily activities in the medical center. She revealed very sad stories about the unavailability
of medicine and lack of qualified physicians to serve sick people. “I witnessed many kids
who died because of the pneumonia and we couldn’t help them due to lack of antibiotics,”
she said.
Work with USAID
Three weeks after I arrived in Helmand province, I was called to travel to Kabul to
attend a military conference and workshop concerning counterinsurgency and courses
related to the new District Stability Framework. During my three-week mission in Kabul,
I had the opportunity to attend workshops focused on a variety of topics including USAID’s
development projects.
This was my first opportunity to meet with representatives from USAID. The oneweek workshop was presented by USAID aimed to educate ISAF military personnel and
other contractors about the aid agency’s projects in Afghanistan. USAID’s lecturers were
very organized and talked a lot about what the aid agency had achieved during the last ten
years. They presented statistics about the number of schools they had built, the millions of
students (including girls) attending schools, the number of development projects they had
achieved throughout 32 Afghan provinces, and the improvements of public services in
different towns and villages.
Questions were allowed throughout the lectures. An Afghan administrator, who
worked for the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE), asked USAID’s representative if he
had ever visited any school in Afghanistan. The answer was negative. The Afghan
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administrator replied by saying that he worked for MoE for almost ten years and worked
before as a teacher in different schools for another ten years. His views differed from
USAID’s. This administrator said that it is true that USAID has built hundreds of schools
in all provinces in Afghanistan, but most of these schools were not functioning for different
reasons. Some of these schools were abandoned by students and teachers because of
security threats from insurgents or lack of funding from the government. The unhealthy
economy negatively impacted on the attendance of students and the performance of
teachers. Students left the schools to help their family on their farms and teachers worked
extra jobs because of the living conditions, which were deplorable. The worst thing was
most of the students that were enrolled in schools did not show up, and teachers were taking
salaries but not coming to work, he added. He called them ghost schools and ghost teachers.
Another officer with the rank of major in the Afghan Army criticized USAID and
its aid projects. He stated that USAID had done a great deal in Afghanistan but,
unfortunately, not all projects were functioning anymore because of the unavailability of
the funds, or lack of qualified staff to keep maintain them. The major gave an example of
how USAID had spent millions of dollars on Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) and left it to the
Afghan government, which had no experience in keeping it working or maintaining it. It
was so sad that these millions of dollars had not been spent on other small projects that
could benefit residents of Kabul. He added. “I am living in Kabul and I am struggling with
heating my home in this severe cold weather. Yesterday, my daughter was sick, and I spent
four hours to find anyone to take her to the hospital because I don’t have a car, and it is
difficult to find a cheap taxi during the night. After I arrived in the hospital, it was over
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crowded. Patients and their families were sitting on the cold floors. After I spent five hours
waiting, the physician told me that I had to wait longer because they were out of medicine
and were waiting for a nonprofit health organization to deliver it.
As he directed his speech to the USAID representative, the major said “Please don’t
take me the wrong way, but USAID is selling propaganda and exaggerating a lot when you
are saying that you spent billions of dollars on successful development projects. People
don’t see that and I am one of them. Our schools are shut down or poorly performing,
streets are dangerous to walk on during the day because of the explosions and during night
because there are not enough lights. Prices of basic supplies are skyrocketing, hospitals are
lacking in staff and medicine, and we do not see things getting better because of USAID.
Please go to the hospital and see how families and physicians are struggling to cure their
sick people.”
USAID does not typically send officials out into the field. I had the opportunity as
an HTS team member to be in the field and participated in about 100 missions in 300 days,
where I talked, observed, documented, and disseminated information about the conditions
and concerns of the local people, including Afghan government officials at all levels. I
think that the problems may stem from a lack of integration of power and control between
the shadow government and the legitimate government. Most of the key leaders I met
during my ten months in Afghanistan were deeply frustrated and unaware of how to resolve
the problems they and their people were facing. And they still face those same problems
today. In my opinion, until the shadow government leaders are included in diplomatic
meetings with legitimate leaders, Afghanistan will remain devastated.
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Conclusions

The data from the questionnaires, focus group, official reports, and the selfreflections from the experiences of the writer of this dissertation were gathered to reveal
the answer to the original research questions about the barriers to funding for Afghanistan’s
Tarakhil Power Plant and projects to enhance education for modernization in Afghanistan.
Other information revealed will be the perceptions of those impacted by the projects, and
what strategies could improve aid delivery and efficacy to Afghanistan. These questions
are addressed in the next chapter though data analysis, descriptive statistics, and eyewitness
accounts. The findings will be informed by the theoretical frameworks of modernization
theory and human capital theory.

In summary to reiterate, the exact research questions guiding this study are:
1. What are the barriers or factors preventing the effective delivery of USAID
funding
in Afghanistan for the project of the Tarakhil Power Plant and in the sphere
of
education?
2. How are project factors perceived by individual stakeholders, government
agencies, government watchdogs, the media, and scholars?
3. If needed, what are some strategies that could improve aid delivery and
address any lack of efficiency and efficacy of aid in Afghanistan?

CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS
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“Unfortunately, in the nearly five years I’ve been traveling to Afghanistan, I first
witnessed the United States put in way too much, way too fast. More recently, I’ve
watched the US remove way too much, way too fast. Policy makers both in Congress
and the new Trump Administration should take note of this.”
—Inspector General John Sopko, SIGAR
Respondent Coding, Themes, and Descriptive Statistics
Data analysis categories defined respondent data from the twenty questionnaires,
the Shura focus group, the HTS Eyewitness Account, and the USAID Reports and Related
Reports. Analyses found meaning in the qualitative data through patterns, frequencies,
magnitudes, processes, causes, and consequences (Creswell, 2006, 29). The first measures
were coding of the concepts and themes emphasized by the respondents. Then word counts
of respondent word choices were accomplished from their narratives to access any crosscultural subconscious concerns, which were revealed and compared with coded themes.
The coding interpretive technique provided ways to organize and interpret the data.
Coding for this research began with transcribing and reading each questionnaire and all the
notes made from the focus group. The next step was to organize key concepts into two
categories: Energy and Education. Then clusters of themes were derived within each
category and common comments linked to those theme clusters. The data sorting from the
qualitative research included theme building, as outlined below, based on this clustering.
This process was modified from several sources, including exercises in how to write a
research paper, and adapted from conceptual mapping found in Ryan Gery and Bernard
(2017) and Denzin (1997). The themes were derived from the original data collected for
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this dissertation and presented in Chapter 4. The charts of systematic thematic data counts
and word counts are located in Appendix F.
These themes demonstrated related concepts, categories, and key words found in
the data. This organization helped to signify what was important in the perceptions of those
questioned. First the thematic concepts were sorted as purposeful thoughts shared by
respondents. Then a word count for relevant and multiple occurrences were counted to
understand underlying thought paradigms (Johnson and Waterfield, 2004, 21). These two
types of analyses were important in shaping the analysis for an interpretive approach. The
open-ended questionnaire questions allowed respondents to convey their own concepts and
make their own interpretations. Some of the respondents answered with more lengthy
responses, while others kept answers shorter. Some added information and others did not
answer some questions. The majority had familiarity with TPP and had an opinion about
aid for education, even if their work did not involve education directly.
Table 5.1: Thematic Conditions Concerning Energy Projects, and specifically the
TPP. Data Obtained through 20 Questionnaires and the Focus Group
Interviews. There were no positive themes to record.
Themes and

Comments

Conditions
Insufficiency

● Not enough workers, locals not used enough
● Lack of understanding for locals and their culture
● Poor quality of materials
● Unreasonable time tables
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● Poor safety measures on project
● Poor security
● No trust between Afghans and non-Afghans
● Lack of access to water supply
● Low energy production upon completion of project
● Not enough fuel for plant, due to cost and security issues
● Not enough electrical grid systems
● No replacement parts
● No waste management or oversight
● No system in place for sustainable operations, postfunding and post-construction
Lack of Training

● Little or no training for Operational, Mechanical, and
Technical Problems with locals during construction
● No regular maintenance training
● No training in place for sustainable operations postfunding and post-construction
● No accountability mechanisms or training for Afghans

Poor

● Top down implementation of project

Communication

● Lack of language skills between contractors and workers
and locals
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● Lack of coordination, communication, and cooperation
(USAID, Afghan officials, and local people)
● Shadow government (unofficial leaders) not consulted
● Hydraulic power more beneficial, plenty of rivers
● No Emergency Plan
● No communication or coordination with international
donors
● No media coverage for locals to understand project
● NGOs, who could have helped, were left out of
communications and partnerships
Corruption and

● Corrupt Afghan officials and contractors

Theft

● No tracking, audit, or accountability system
● Shadow government (informal leaders) intrusions
● Nepotism
● High costs for materials used only one time
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Figure 5.1: Descriptive Statistical Graph of Energy Themes

Original Descriptive Statistics from Respondent Data
Discussion on Energy Themes:
A common consensus was a lack of energy infrastructure in the rural areas, and
except for the wealthy and elite, consistent energy accessibility was not complete in urban
areas. Most respondents complained about the lack of fuel for heating and cooking, and
about transportation issues as there was no gas available for cars. The TPP project was not
operational, or was barely functioning for years. Most respondents simply perceived the
335 million US dollars spent as ineffective and a shameful waste of money and time.
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Table 5.2: Thematic Conditions Concerning Education Funding Efforts. Obtained
through 20 Questionnaires and the Focus Group Interviews.
Positive themes are in italics.
Condition
Aid Efficacy

Comments
●

Education is better with aid, even if results are minimal

●

Education aid focused on female education

●

Vo-tech education highly valuable. Several programs for
women to support themselves or help others.

●

Some higher education and training offered in anticorruption and civil duties. Only a few attended.

●

Other International Donors of Educational Aid was
available if coordinated

●

Many schools were built

● Education aid was not enough nor sustainable
● Education is outdated
● Education is still sub-standard
● NGOs, who could have helped, were left out of
communications and partnerships
Urban Bias

●

Education is better in large cities

● Rural areas suffer high illiteracy rates, which contributes to
an insurgency
Challenges

●

Support and desire for education by locals was documented
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● Not enough or poor training for administrators
● Not enough or poor training for teachers
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from
GIRoA
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from
religious leaders
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from
local officials
● Lack of financial, organizational, or public support from
local unofficial leaders
● Corruption of contractors and Afghans at all levels
● Poor management and planning for logistics
● Some girls were not allowed to attend by their parents
●

Lack of

No training options for aged youth

● Due to lack of heat, transportation, and teachers, school
buildings created by aid funding are empty or used for other

Resources

purposes. (Ghost schools)
● Not enough supplies, textbooks, technology, health care, or
food for lunches.
● No sports programs or equipment
●

Teachers were not qualified

Communication

●
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HTS did a good job of cultural integration reports

● HTS either failed to make reports, or their reports were not
accepted. Therefore, HTS was not effective for cultural
understandings.
● Due to lack of communication and information, parents
would not send their children to school
● Needed media information, support, and education about
education aid projects. Public unaware.
● Language barriers with text books
● No understanding of the cultural needs in education.
● Top down approach is impractical
Security

●

Locals are not happy about the lack of security and they
want the US to help

● Due to lack of security, school buildings created from aid
are empty or used for other purposes. (Ghost schools)
● Taliban and insurgents are threats to roads and schools
● Girls were targeted and harmed
● Insurgents most active in rural areas
●

No training options for aged youth, which contributes to
insurgency

137

Figure 5.2: Descriptive Statistical Graph of Education Themes

Education Issues
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Original Descriptive Statistics from Respondent Data Themes
Discussion on Education Themes
Overall, there is a consensus among the respondents that although many schools
have been built, most in rural areas no longer function as schools. Some are shut down or
destroyed; others are used by Afghan military or security, or by insurgents for outposts.
Three respondents mentioned ghost schools. Ghost schools were defined by respondents
as school building no longer in use. Some continued to get funding for the local province
for teachers and supplies, but few or none of these schools actually operated for the
intended purpose. This was a form of corruption and criminality that has been hard to
control, especially when the local officials were involved. The respondents said that
education improved over the last 16 years for many Afghans, but access to schooling for
elementary aged students in rural areas remained very difficult, especially as the Taliban
increased their strongholds.
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Planning and implementation for different types of education program had
shortcomings as well. Aged youth had no education to obtain jobs, and the insurgents
offered to pay youth a living and support for their families. To combat this, vocational
education would have been paramount to building human capital, but the funding went into
school buildings that became inoperable instead.
Cultural differences were cited as a problem within education. Female’s or girl’s inability
to attend school, because of the insurgent influences, was viewed as a problem by 50% of
the American respondents, but only by 10% of the Afghan respondents. This difference
could be attributed to the fact that girl’s education is a very divisive issue in Afghanistan,
and one that many Americans cannot fully understand within the Afghan cultural context.
The respondents were not opposed to female education, but separate educational facilities
was suggested as being optimal for their culture.
Discussion on Specific Themes: Communication, Security, and Corruption
Lack of Communication: Poor communication and cultural misunderstandings prevented
modernization in Afghanistan. This was a common observation claimed by the
questionnaire experts. A top down approach to any large-scale development project is
vulnerable to criticisms. The lack of cultural understanding created tension among locals
and the aid workers. Absence of communication prevented successful projects, and
presented negative consequences instead. Most local Afghans were perceived as not liking
outsiders coming into their villages and telling them what to do, even if the outsiders
brought resources and money. Some respondents heard negative comments by contractors
about the Afghan people and their ways. The results were impressions developed by locals

139

that contractors, particularly those working on the TPP project, did not respect the Afghan
people. The respondents noted that it was evident that workers for the US Army and
USAID usually do not suffer while in Afghanistan, since their comfort is ensured by the
US government.
The USAID project of the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) was a failed effort. In a
nation so poor that food, medical care, heat, transportation, and electricity are lacking, the
large sum to build the TPP seemed an insult. The project itself was plagued with a
misguided attempt to work within a foreign country without communication with the
people in that country. Language barriers prevented communications and training to
operate TPP once the USAID project was complete. This top down approach from USAID
for the large-scale development project created a plethora of missteps, plus corruption and
ultimately failure.

Discussion of Security Issues: The lack of security, or a war zone that was not
stable, furthered hastened the TPP’s ultimate failure. The majority of respondents cited
issues related to the Taliban or insurgents as paramount to the failure of both energy and
educational aid projects. Most questionnaire respondents viewed security as a major
obstacle to development, which hindered the implementation of aid projects. In
Afghanistan nothing can take place without consideration of the war and violence. The
Taliban have increased their strongholds, where the media can barely keep up with the
changes since the withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2014. Kabul, once considered safe
as the most urban city in the nation, now is the most dangerous. Whole provinces are
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becoming under Taliban control. HTS and foreign aid workers complain they cannot go
“outside the wire” because of the dangers. The majority viewed insurgent threats to roads,
schools, and fuel deliveries as major obstacles to modernization. Most areas surrounding
the insurgent controlled roads were unable to have deliveries of supplies or allow children
to attend schools.
Figure 5.3: Descriptive Statistical Graph of Security Themes

Original Descriptive Statistics from Respondent Data Themes
Discussion of Corruption: Most respondents saw the corruption of Afghan officials
and USAID contractors as a problem for development, stating that much of the money
designated for development never reached the intended recipients. Corruption included
theft, bribery, stealing, and other criminal acts. During the planning stages of TPP too many
corrupt individuals – on both sides – were motivated by greed and during the different
stages of construction and development, some stole fuel and parts and others never got
paid.
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There were no accountability tools or measures implemented before or during
projects. Checks and balances for both sides were not addressed in the planning stages.
Transparency-seeking and audit measures were implemented by SIGAR and the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG), but after the fact. The failure of schools, the failed TPP
project, and the lack of buy-in by the government at all levels created inroads for
insurgency activities. Corruption and lack of security go hand and hand.
Other Data Analyses
Cross-Cultural Analysis, Word Count Method: A Word count of the narratives from
the 20 respondents and the focus group was accomplished to support the thematic results.
This method counts the number of times one or more words in a phrase are used within the
narratives and considers them as important or relevant within the reality of the respondents.
It provides cross-cultural understanding for sub-conscious meanings. This word count
method was used extensively in the field of research in Iraq by HTS researchers for military
reports to understand cross-cultural meanings (Kautz, 2017, personal interview). Added to
the thematic analysis of the respondent narratives, the word count results can reveal both
supporting and conflicting evidence and new realizations.
The word count method is a tool of research within qualitative methods and is
explained by Johnson and Waterfield (2004, 21):
“Qualitative research methods are able to explore the complexity of human
behavior and generate deeper understanding… Theme identification is one of the
most fundamental tasks in qualitative research. Techniques are shared among small
groups of social scientists and are often impeded by disciplinary or epistemological
boundaries. [There are] a dozen techniques that social scientists have used to
discover themes in texts. They range from quick word counts to laborious, in-depth,
line-by-line scrutiny.”
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Table 5.3: Word Counts from Respondents: 20 Questionnaires and Eight Focus
Group Members. Categories: General Phrases, Remarks about TPP, and
Remarks about Education
General Phrases Overall Occurrences
USAID Positive remarks

19

USAID Negative Remarks

21

Afghanistan is a Failed State

14

Word Count concerning respondents remarks about TPP
Word or Phrases Counted

Number of counted occurrences for all
respondents

Failed TPP

18

Hydraulic plants were not used

5

Poor Management

5

Locals Still Need energy

24

Lack of Security

21

Corruption

14

Cultural Misunderstandings

6

Poor Afghan Leadership

12

Poor Afghan/US Contractor

12

Coordination
Costs too high

11

No media or public awareness

3
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No Trust between cultures

3

NGOs Left out

6

No Water

2

Wasteful

13

No fuel to run TPP

12

No Accountability

5

Other International Donors Ignored

8

Word Count concerning respondent remarks about Education
School

51

Education

64

Ghost schools

8

Shadow Government (Informal Leaders) 3
Training

needed

for

Afghans 8

(Vocational)
Corruption/nepotism/stealing

31

Language Barrier

4

Need school supplies

15

Teacher issues, training, absent, not 46
qualified
Administrator concerns

3
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Indications of the Word Count: The overall remarks about USAID seemed
consistent among the respondents, or they were appreciative of USAID and recognized
their efforts to provide schools and train teachers. Many respondents had positive things to
say about USAID and their attempts for education projects. They were impressed that
USAID had tried and that the agency had good intentions. Respondents recognized the
bureaucratic nature of the organization and lamented that the outcome had not been better.
With their insider perceptions, the respondents knew what went wrong, but insisted that ‘if
only’ there had been no corruption, good security, and better communications and
organization, then the education projects would have been worthwhile. There was a general
consensus that Afghanistan needed education for all ages. The negatives comments
outnumbered the positive ones about USAID by only a few words, and therefore, it seemed
the respondents wanted to say that USAID had at least tried, but failed. Overall, half of the
28 stated firmly that Afghanistan is a failed state. Their concept of a good state of living
measured up to the indicators of infrastructure and educational characteristic of a modern
state.
Analysis of the Shura Focus Group Responses: The focus group represented further
qualitative research by supporting the questionnaire respondent’s analysis and adding
narratives of specific experiences. Lack of security, lack of communication, and lack of
education plus corruption affected the respondent’s families and themselves. There was an
overarching fear of speaking the truth about the problems with aid delivery. This was a
common theme throughout this research for fear that USAID could lose funding, if too
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many problems were brought forth as the US Congress monitors what is going on,
especially in Afghanistan. However, some aid is better than none.
Points made by the focus group concerned issues of corruption were deeply
intertwined in the implementation of aid, and they said that both the Afghan and American
sides were guilty of some form of corruption. Why and how the corruption existed and
continued to exist was difficult to explain as the relationships differed depending on the
project and individuals involved. However, the lack of accountability continued to allow
corruption to endure.
It cannot be overlooked that the Americans and USAID were viewed as wealthy from
the Afghan perspective. There was a common theme among the respondents that
Americans and USAID can afford to lose money through overcharging, theft, or other
forms of corruption. Furthermore, there was fear that Afghan officials may have alliances
to groups that are anti-American, or they may choose to undermine the aid process for their
own political reasons. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)
leaders were more likely to promote the alliance with the US, which brought funding and
power to their own political position. Whereas local officials at the provincial levels were
more likely to have ethnic ties and be wary of large-scale top-down development
approaches. Without regulation and monitoring, officials were often free to commit acts of
bribery and corruption without being held accountable.
The respondents pointed out that the typical Afghan worker does not make enough
money in many situations to make ends meet. If teachers, utility workers, farmers, truck
drivers, and health care workers, for example, were paid higher wages then there would be
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less of an incentive to become involved in corrupt practices. The Afghan men in the focus
group all sought positions with the United States military, even though most of them had
other occupations. Instead of becoming corrupt or aligned with the Taliban or other militant
forces, they chose to help the Americans. That choice led to sometimes serious
ramifications in terms of their security, and some became targets of the Taliban. Eventually
this led, at least in part, to their leaving Afghanistan. Many Afghans have left Afghanistan
and some of them will never live there again, while others became refugees or displaced.
The respondents felt that with such a long, rather unsuccessful presence that the
United States needs to carefully reconsider their strategies. The tension created by wanting
to modernize Afghanistan through infrastructure and education projects stands in contrast
to what the Taliban want for their people, which is for all foreigners to leave the country. 36
What is happening in Afghanistan today is complex politically, and the Taliban do not want
Western influences in their educational and social systems. They are willing to negate all
infrastructure and modern amenities if it means they would have more control over all
cultural and social lives.
The Shura participants indicated a dislike for corruption and an extreme fear of the
Taliban. Yet, each of them benefited directly from higher wages and even eventually a
chance at citizenship in America, which only a few Afghans can experience. The majority
of Afghans try to live in their homeland despite the contradictions and struggles. Pouring

Also, the Taliban are ethnically and linguistically connected to parts of the Pashtun population as they
are Pashtun. The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan and the second largest in Pakistan.
Pashtuns speak the Pashto language.
36
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money into Afghanistan was not a sound policy approach, which should lead to evaluation
for better disbursements of that aid in the future.
Summary of Respondent Themes
Major concerns for aid funding efficacy in Afghanistan were poor communications
with local people and a lack of media for public awareness, leading to corruption on many
sides. A lack of security during and after funding projects were implemented was prevalent
in comments with suggestions hinting of a lack of understanding the insurgent genre in the
first place. With a top down planning modal for aid projects, there was a lack of support
from Afghan officials. This was implemented with a lack of planning for sustainability
through training or future funding of projects after the funding agencies left. Furthermore,
there was a lack of supporting resources, whether they be parts for the TPP project or
school supplies and language appropriate textbooks. Finally, the cultural gap was
considerable, for which any productive efforts by HTS were negated or inefficiently
managed at the hiring and implementation stages. The number of times this paragraph uses
the word ‘lack’ is six, but there was not a concern for a lack of money for funding before
or during projects. Overall, the United States Agency for Development (USAID) allocated
over 100 billion US dollars since 2001 to the development of Afghanistan and the United
States invested over 700 billion US dollars.
Analysis of the Eyewitness Account of the HTS Social Scientist: The 2012
eyewitness account from the HTS social scientist, who is writing this dissertation, gives an
autobiographical account in line with the method of phenomenology. The definition of
phenomenology as a method of research is from the Stanford Philosophical
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Encyclopedia. 37 “Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as
experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is
its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about
some object.” This first-person account data is considered in the data for the observations
and experiences and application of adding to the research data, and therefore adds to the
triangulation of the data.
This eyewitness account revealed data supporting the data already given to enhance
the reliability and validity of the study. In a Shura meeting in Afghanistan, my documented
interviews with key leaders showed everyone agreed about the top four major issues: “lack
of security, poor educational system, no fuel for cooking and heating, and limited or no
access to health care.”
Furthermore, my months in Helmand province, an area of Taliban stronghold, gave
me the chance to witness the poverty and injustice first hand. Basic needs are lacking:
“there is little or no fuel for lighting, cooking, and heating, and limited or no access to
education.” I personally had the opportunity to visit a school in Nowzad district during the
winter season. “Poor education system” was a common complaint from most of
respondents from the interviews I conducted with Afghan locals. Those experiences are
discussed in depth in Chapter 4.
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Conclusions of the Respondent Data Analysis
In this analysis, it was demonstrated that the 20 respondents and the eight Afghan
Shura members rarely disagreed about the problems or issues involved. Security and
corruption were huge barriers to aid delivery. Lack of energy and education for the Afghan
people put them in dire situations that affected their health and ability to survive. USAID
had many barriers to effective aid delivery in Afghanistan and the presence of ongoing
conflict was the top variable. It was almost impossible to build schools, for example, in the
middle of a war when the very act of building schools was viewed as an act of war against
the Taliban. That is why many of the American-built schools no longer operate as schools
or have been destroyed.
According to their mission statement, the aim of USAID is to alleviate poverty. In
the next section first-hand reports from USAID, SIGAR, academia, and the media will
illustrate how USAID planning and goals were implemented, money spent, and subsequent
investigations on their aid funding. It is important to know where the barriers to efficacy
in aid delivery exist from the funding agency points of view.
USAID Report Data Analysis on Education and Energy
The US Congress appropriated taxpayer funding for USAID, which was created by
President Kennedy in 1962 as part of the US executive branch. Its mission included
primarily administering US civilian foreign aid. The gist of the following reports explain
the relationship USAID had with contracting out the work, the money spent, and why their
narrow goals were accomplished, while the larger projects failed.
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USAID began to contract out projects from the start of the Afghanistan
reconstruction. As early as 2001, Corneille’s report called for accountability on aid
funding. In 2012, SIGAR began to make inquiries due to complaints and lack of
productivity of the aid projects. By 2014, it was apparent that transparency, accountability,
and checks and balances were not in place. USAID still maintained the TPP was working
as late as 2015.
However, there really was not a model in place for accountability in past aid efforts
with USAID or other national aid funding according to several of the questionnaire
respondents. Transparency Internationale’s website reports that the development of aid
projects in African nations and other LDCs have not included such measures. This means
that USAID was working within their expected parameters. Their constant statements
claiming goal attainments even when faced with the corruption of the contractors of the
Academy for Educational Development (which was shut down in 2011), did not change
USAID’s modus operandi. The New Yorker reported “All aid deliveries were carried out
by contractors or third-parties and in the case of the DABS energy survey, the survey and
the post-survey analysis [for TPP] were carried out by the same contractor” (Aikens, March
7, 2016).
Theoretical Application of the Data
The first research question, “What are the barriers or factors preventing the
effective delivery of USAID funding in Afghanistan in the projects of Tarakhil Power Plant
and Education?” The barriers are listed from frequencies within the thematic codes and
word counts. They are numerous, yet, careful analysis may reveal certain perspectives..
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Barriers to successful funding for Education in Afghanistan:
● Lack of security and insurgent threats
● Schools were built, but soon shut down
● Corruption/stealing/nepotism/lack of transparency, accountability, and audits
● Lack of teachers and teacher training
● Lack of resources or supplies, heat, and health needs
● Cultural misunderstandings and language barriers
● Lack of coordination with locals, top down model
Barriers to successful funding for energy in Afghanistan, with a focus on TPP:
● Three-way tie for Corruption, Security, and locals not consulted or involved.
● Lack of communication, top down model
● Unbeneficial for the cost, costly to operate
● Lack of training for locals to maintain and run post-construction
● Insurgent threats for transporting fuel on the roads
●

Fuel, parts, and supplies unavailable

The list of problems were numerous. Much data were analyzed in this chapter, but
application of theories to inform the data within the research questions was needed.
Modernization and Human Capital Theories Informs the Data: The second research
question was: “How are those factors perceived by individual stakeholders, government
agencies, government watchdogs, the media, and scholars?” Concerning those impacted
directly by the education and energy aid funding, the obvious sentiments were very
negative. However, it was noteworthy that USAID reports and early SIGAR audits stated
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that USAID met their original goals. Taking a step back to examine USAID goals, it is
evident that their perspective was that of accomplishment. Concerning the two sample
projects for energy and education, the USAID goals were to build the TPP and to build
schools and train teachers. From the standpoint of this large funding agency, their goals
reflected that they were not in the business of nation building, but only funded
modernization projects.
The media, academics, and the public were highly critical of the funding agency,
USAID, for not being more productive in their designs for the TPP and their visions for
education. The ideas of coordination with locals and accountability did not reflect USAID
goals until the Transparency Act in 2016
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surfaced due to media criticism.

We can look at the definitions of modernization and human capital theories again
to clarify points within the data. For modernization, there are a variety of different ways to
define projects designed to transform societies within social, political, or economic
parameters. Earlier definitions saw a linear progression of modernization. Rostow (1960,
4) said modernization was part of the economic continuum through which most societies
progress, moving from traditional conditions to those sparked by the move to mass
consumption. This was a “syndrome of social changes” that was inherently linked to the
expanse of industry, including occupational skill development/specialization and urban
development (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). Inglehart and Wetzel also link modernization
less evidently to increases in education, improved life expectancy, and economic expansion
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in LDCs. The link between modernization and human and social capital extended from the
belief that investments in these elements could support progress and benefit change in
underdeveloped nations.
Human capital theory is based on the premise that there are economic gains that
can be secured through investment in people (Sweetland 1996, 341), which is a segment
of modernization theory. It seeks to theorize about how to build better societies by infusing
investment in the education of people within a nation to create a strong future for all.
Human capital refers to the resources that are embodied within humans, such as knowledge,
skills, experience, abilities, intelligence, and talent (Benhabib and Speigel 1994, 143).
Chaudhary (2013, 34) emphasizes the importance of understanding the connection between
modernization and any supporting essential skill development, institutions, curriculum, and
normative values. Therefore, understanding the social and cultural side of the development
of education is essential to create modernization as well as the presence of monetary funds
needed for capital developments. Chaudhary (2013, 38) also states that modernization does
not radically change cultures or destroy values.
Skills and knowledge are measurable assets, which are argued to have an aggregate
impact on the economic status of communities and nations. Tilak (2002,7) asserted that
“investments in education (human capital) created a higher return than investments in
infrastructure or physical capital projects for the purpose of nation building and
modernization.” Son (2010, 2) argues that human capital plays a critical role in methods to
reduce poverty and improve economic conditions in developing nations. When assessing
the measurability of human capital investment, there are two methods: 1) to identify the
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monetary expenditures that are allocated for human capital education; or 2) to measure the
outcomes related to worker productivity (Son 2010, 2-4).
How did the modernization and human capital theories enlighten the funding of
projects? USAID’s goals reflected a partial responsibility to provide funds, which they met.
The larger scheme of modernization and human capital building was beyond their focus,
and indeed had been the norm with other funding agencies in other LDCs. A few of the
respondents voiced that in other LDC locations, the funding of modernization and human
capital building had been no more successful than in Afghanistan. Thus a pattern of
diffused responsibility emerged in regard to successful modernization and human capital
building. It is the US taxpayer that continues to pay for such mismatched aid activities.
Conclusions
The data informed by modernization and human capital theories show that the
USAID project goals addressed modernization and human capital, but not to the fruition of
the theories. They were mainly concerned with the building of structures and the training
of teachers. The first part was accomplished, however, with a top-down model. The
evidence seems to indicate a lack of cultural understanding to create well trained teachers
within their cultural needs or local technicians for running the TPP. Everything from
language barriers to lack of cultural knowledge seemed to prohibit successful teacher and
technician training. These elements were not in the budget at all for TPP. They were in the
budget for teacher and administrator training, but not successful due to lack of cultural
awareness. There were some small successes, for instance with the mid-wife program and
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the solar panel installations, but flexibility to examine what worked and what did not work
was not built into the USAID planning stages.
This chapter examined all the data results through several methods of analysis.
Coding, pile sorting, and word counts were undertaken to find patterns and themes in the
respondent data, including the firsthand experience of the eyewitness account. The
experience of the eyewitness through working in the HTS program highlighted issues of
comprehensive Western model shortcomings for modernization aid delivery. Because the
HTS social science research informed Westerners about Afghanistan’s culture, HTS should
have been in the forefront of strategic planning for Afghanistan reconstruction. However,
the program was placed with the military instead, and even then program was underutilized.
HTS social scientist common complaints were that their work was ignored as not relevant
to military strategies. Many were told to concentrate on tactical military maneuvers only.
The difference was that strategic planning is long-range, and tactical planning is getting
through each day or each mission, thus only for the short-range.
From the perspective of USAID, they too had only minor strategic planning, and
stayed in the realm of tactical planning too. USAID’s mission was only focused on
building, not maintaining post-construction.

USAID expected the remainder of

modernization and human capital issues to be handled by the political, social and economic
sectors within Afghanistan. The fact that there was no firm culture of individualistic
capitalism in Afghanistan was not even considered. I realized that Afghanistan’s culture
resides in the ancient boundaries of Pashtunwali instead, which is a system of social
constraints enveloping the social, political, and economic lives of Afghans.
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Indeed, Western cultural concepts are based on individualistic capitalism found in
attitudes of ‘build it and they will come’ and ‘not my job’. Sack (1997) warns that most
Western or modern projects, scientific research, and business efforts are designed as short
range, instead of being long-range. Projects are compartmentalized so that the larger
picture is never taken into account. This creates fragmentation and diffusion of
responsibility, which is then trundled into a ‘future problems’ category. Modern
bureaucracies, organizations, and institutions concentrate on top down models. These
models and the assumptions on which they are premised are where core problems are found
within Western aid projects, when dealing with LDC issues. Furthermore, cultural
misunderstandings, lack of security, and corruption put a veneer of failure over the majority
of aid projects in LDCs within Robert Sack’s model (1997).
It was important to know where the barriers to efficacy in aid delivery exist and the
perspectives of the stakeholders. It was the perspectives of USAID aid funding efforts and
the for-profit contractors that stand out. Therefore the data analyses have revealed there
was a major issue of fragmentation and diffusion of responsibility in Western aid models.
This will be further explored in the next chapter regarding conclusions and
recommendations.
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion
The reconstruction program created in November 2001 by international consensus
or the Bonn Agreement 39 for Afghanistan was highly ambitious. Along with a variety of
development and modernization for the Government of Afghanistan came tenets of social
change, which have triggered relentless tensions (Suhrke 2007). Winning the hearts and
minds of the Afghan people has proven to be difficult at best. Now, over 16 years later, the
conditions in this landlocked nation remain harsh. Foreign aid made some improvements
in lives, but the pervasive corruption and problems with aid delivery remain.
The United States’ efforts at modernization in Afghanistan are now considered
failures by most (Klinger 2016), perhaps because the social and economic indicators
remain low overall. Or maybe it is because the war has not yet ended. The United States
dollars continued to be disbursed in energy and education sectors in hopes of yielding
success. As success is a relative term, USAID and the World Bank celebrate even the most
incremental signs of what could be considered improvement. For example, USAID refused
to accept that the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP) was an unsuccessful project. Yet, SIGAR
announced in its 2016 report that diesel fuel for the TPP was the wrong choice. It is
inappropriate for the region and prevents the 335-million-US dollar power plant from full
utilization.
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The respondents to the questionnaires distributed for this research, as well as the
Shura participants, often commented on how much they wanted modernization
components of electricity, food and shelter, education, heat, good transportation, and
medical care. Mostly the elite profited from US modernization efforts, and many other
Afghans looked for their own benefits too, but were sorely disappointed. Development is
always political and USAID is an apparatus of the US government (UN 2001). The US
Congress intended for the funding allocated to USAID for the betterment of the Afghan
people to reach them through improved services and resources. They were in a bid to
support the local people, which would help in receiving more support from Afghans in
fighting the Taliban, according to the rationale.
Chaudhary (2013, 34) also asserted that modernization is a process of socio-cultural
change involving values, norms, culture, institutions and structures. The Afghan people,
who live in an Islamic republic, are divided and do not know which way to proceed with
their culture. The very culture of Afghans is tearing. Respondents acknowledged their fear
of the Taliban and told of the atrocities by the Taliban on groups of people and villages.
Yet, their reactions are to hide from them. Historically, the only time the Afghan people
joined together to resist was through the Mujahedeen to defeat the Russians after the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Now, Afghans seem divided on how to deal with the US
and the Taliban.
Today in Afghanistan, USAID has decreased the scale of their projects to ones like
the small solar energy and community-based literacy programs. President Trump
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announced that the future focus of efforts in Afghanistan will now be military40.
Modernization for the nation seems farther away than ever. As a least developed country
and high on the list of failed states, Afghanistan’s people live directly with the economic
and political circumstances that a failed state entails.
Limitations of the Study
To answer the research questions, this study was limited by space and time as
Afghanistan is still in part a war zone. Much first-hand or primary data were available, but
not within an immediate timeframe or in close proximity to the location of Afghanistan.
The results and conclusions apply to foreign aid directed to the energy sector or specifically
the TPP project and funding for education within Afghanistan. Therefore generalizations
cannot be made to other locations or their timeframes due to contextual findings. However,
the findings of this dissertation can be considered in informing future research questions
and studies.
Implications for Future Research
Answering the research questions was fulfilled by research data for this
dissertation. However, the data created more questions and future research implications.
The initial purpose of the US entering Afghanistan were the 9/11 bombings, and the
Taliban’s harboring of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The data found that one of the major
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Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan, Aug. 21, 2017....
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barriers to the success of aid delivery were the Taliban militias and hence the lack of
security in certain areas.
The US assumed that aid given to Afghanistan was necessary to end Taliban control
through modernization efforts. Yet, what are Afghan views of how the Taliban fit into their
religious goals? Afghanistan was a theocracy under the Taliban, but they were overthrown
in 2001. We do know that when the US entered Afghanistan and began to combat the
Taliban, then urban people often sided with the US. However, they were promised
modernization through cash rewards and aid projects. What about the common or rural
Afghan people? The ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ campaign was intended
to reach out to all, but basically only the elite benefited directly as noted by the respondents.
The education projects were to help all, but they failed too.
In rural areas, the Taliban continued to control through violence and fear, and
especially in areas where the US pulled out. A beneficial research study would focus on
Taliban control in tandem with the patterns of Afghan identity. Considering all the Afghan
people had known under the Taliban was a theocracy, what percent of Afghans agree with
the Taliban ideology or their way of thinking? Do the Afghan people have concerns about
whether to oppose them or not? Are there different views according to provinces, urban
versus rural, and among Afghan tribes concerning the power of the Taliban?
Justification for such a study is that the ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’
campaign indicates an agenda to convince the Afghan people to not follow the Taliban.
This agenda is played out through millions of dollars of aid within the US Counter-
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insurgency effort. 41 A concern of the US is also the violation of human rights by the
Taliban. Yet, this is a decision based on US social, economic, and political beliefs. There
are no doubts that the Taliban and other affiliated militias violate human rights. However,
without a total Afghan buy-in, both urban and rural, the War on Terrorism and winning the
hearts and minds of Afghans has not come to fruition. Therefore, future research on topics
addressing cultural beliefs and perspectives should transpire before any ideas are
formulated for aid for modernization in least developed countries (LDCs).
Recommendations
It is paramount that the developmental goals and aid implementation should include
a better understanding of the cultural and political structures of Afghanistan. It is
recommended that the HTS program be reconfigured, renamed, and re-implemented under
USAID or the US State Department for this purpose. US efforts, which use taxpayer’s
contributions, are misguided by ignorance of other cultures, ethnic identities, and views of
life. Social science academic researchers using scientific methods, ethical guidelines,
cultural immersion, and ethnic and cultural relativity methods and procedures can possibly
make effective strategic recommendations for the delivery of foreign aid in any LDC. Other
measures are needed as well concerning the organizational shortcomings of USAID and
any funding agency dealing with LDCs.
Afghanistan urgently needs collaborative efforts amongst stakeholders and not top
down models. All recipient and donor governments, USAID, contractors, and local people
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through Aug. 21, 2017 when President Trump announced new military plans for Afghanistan.
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should work together to understand project goals, and project implementation should be
enhanced by checks and balances. This research found that the top down approach used by
USAID and hiring for-profit contractors are dire drawbacks to aid delivery. Top-down,
large scale projects do not work because there is a lack of coordination and communication,
and there is also a lack of trust. As a least developed country and one of the ten most fragile
states in the world, Afghanistan needs to strengthen its local governance to empower the
people across the nation. This would do more than the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign.
Development requires collaborative efforts among the state, the market, and civil society
both from the top (USAID and the Government of Afghanistan) and the bottom (local
people and key local leaders). With elections slated for July 2018 in Afghanistan, it would
behoove the United States to ensure that fair and equitable elections take place regardless
of the obstacles.
If the country were secure, then realization could only happen if USAID creates a
sustainable modernization model based on the empowerment of the Afghan people.
Strategies for the improvement of development by USAID include more community-based
projects, the integration of local knowledge in the planning and implementation of projects,
follow-through with long-term sustainability, and an increase of transparency, integrity and
ethics. Overall, despite a new law for foreign aid transparency and accountability, USAID
has a long way to go before the Afghan people get the most out of the US taxpayers’
investments. Modernization cannot succeed just by USAID money alone.
To achieve greater aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, all actors involved in
delivering aid should be held accountable. Based on the data from official reports and
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questionnaire respondents, there are large numbers of actors and many challenges,
including corruption, bribing, and other fraudulent practices conducted by all parties
having a vested interest involved in and /or delivering aid to Afghanistan. Checks and
balances are even more critical than transparency. It is understood that secrecy is part of
war operations, but that does not exclude checks and balances to prevent corruption on
both sides.
The presence of war is detrimental to modernization as well. What is the precedent
for trying to modernize a nation in the middle of a war? War attacks and destroys clean
water, food and shelter, electricity, access to education and jobs. Fair and equitable
elections are difficult to administer in wartime. To end the war, diplomacy may be the
answer, if at all possible. It is clear that the Taliban insurgency is becoming increasingly
strong. Until the United States and the Taliban can have diplomatic negotiations, it will be
difficult, if not impossible to move forward peacefully. Lack of security and the high rate
of violence, even in Kabul, prevents modernization from occurring.
To recap, the third research question addressed recommendations, or “What are
some strategies that could improve aid delivery and address the lack of efficiency and
efficacy in Afghanistan?” The recommendations of this study are listed in order of
importance for implementation:
o Understand the physical, political, and security environments, and do a
security risk assessment for possible negative outcomes in the planning
stage. Set up risk assessment guidelines before proceeding with aid
planning to enhance success for aid delivery.
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o Obtain strong academic data concerning local needs and desires. It is
recommended a program such as the HTS be designed, funded, and
implemented in the planning stages of aid.
o Plan for more community-based small-scale projects for a better productive
return on funding.
o Inform and work with locals at all levels on project designs,
implementations, and plans for future sustainability.
o Funding agencies should be involved on the ground for all projects, and
reduce the power and scope of using for-profit contractors.
o Aid agencies should plan follow-through and long-term planning for
supplies, technology, and training of administrators and workers after the
agencies leave.
o Checks and balances and allowable transparency should be implemented
for all stakeholders on all projects at all stages.
Conclusion
This dissertation, which focused on problems with USAID aid delivery in
Afghanistan further sought to understand if USAID was able to impact modernization in
Afghanistan. The data show the answer is overwhelmingly “no” as USAID aid impacts
were either small and/or temporary in Afghanistan. Indicators may point to a failed state,
although that determination is outside of the scope of this dissertation. The
recommendations of this dissertation to facilitate the efficacy and efficiency of aid should,
in the author’s view, be followed if the US Congress, USAID, and the US military, wish
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to continue their agendas and turn around the 16 years of frustrations and suffering by all
stakeholders involved.
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APPENDIX A
Political Map of Afghanistan

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html
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APPENDIX B

Photo of Tarakhil Power Plant

Photo of Tarakhil Power Plant, from SIGAR report, August 7, 2015
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APPENDIX C
Ethnicity in Afghanistan

https://chellaney.net/2013/03/01/afghanistans-partition-might-be-unpreventable/
Brahma Chellaney, “Afghanistan’s partition might be unpreventable” The National,
March 1, 2013.
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APPENDIX D
Informed Consent Form
“Delivery of USAID Aid in Afghanistan, 2001-2017.”
Behavioral Research Informed Consent
Abdullah Bataineh, Political Science Department
(734)680-0415
Purpose
Today Afghanistan continues to be aid dependent for health care, education, civil services,
infrastructure, and economic development. A significant amount of aid to Afghanistan may
have been wasted due to poor governance and corruption on both sides (Afghan
Government and USAID). You are being asked to be in the research study, because you
have knowledge about the delivery of foreign aid or you lived or worked in Afghanistan.
This study is being conducted at Wayne State University. The estimated number of study
participants to be enrolled at Wayne State University and/or the proposed site(s) is about 1
as well as about 30 throughout US
Please read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in
the study.
The aim of this research is to examine what political and social barriers exist that hinder
the effective use of American foreign aid and funding in Afghanistan. The scope of
governance will include Afghan national, regional, provincial, and local governments, and
also the United States federal involvement through USAID, the US Army’s HTS, and the
practice of using contractors in Afghanistan.

Study Procedures
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If you agree to take part in this research study, you may be asked to do one or more of these
study activities:
1. Fill out surveys and answer questions.
2. Surveys will be given in a paper format and they will be disseminated through
mail or hand delivered. They will contain multiple choices, opinions on a scale of
1 to 5 for true/false, and short answer questions, which will require approximately
30 minutes to complete.
3. You do not have to answer any question you prefer not to answer and you may
still remain in the study. Also, you may also choose to opt-out of the study
completely at any time. Survey questions will cover the material for the study and
personal data will not be collected other than related to involvement with
Afghanistan or aid.
4. You will be given a code name or number for the study and no identifying
information will be released. As an example, your location or within an aid
agency, your occupation, tribe or physical age will not be included in the
information. Once the report (dissertation) is accepted, all respondent information
will be destroyed. Until that time, the information will be kept on a disc and not
on a computer, and then stored in a safety deposit box until the completion of the
dissertation.

Benefits
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As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however,
information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future. This research
will be beneficial for scholars, policy makers and different governmental agencies.
Additionally, this research study will propose strategies that could improve government
structures and address the lack of efficiency and efficacy in delivering aid in Afghanistan.
Results may have direct benefit to aid policies and practices in Afghanistan. Results may
also be useful in other areas where aid is supporting state (re)building.
Risks
There are no known risks to participation in this study.
Study Costs
Participation in this study will be of no cost to you.
Compensation
You will not be paid for taking part in this study.
Confidentiality
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential
to the extent permitted by law. You will be identified in the research records by a code
name or number. Information that identifies you personally will not be released without
your written permission. However, the study sponsor, the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at Wayne State University, or federal agencies with appropriate regulatory oversight [e.g.,
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP),
Office of Civil Rights (OCR), etc.) may review your records.

172

When the results of this research are published or discussed in conferences, no information
will be included that would reveal your identity.
I will use nicknames and positions to identify participants such as Afghan-American
living in USA, a former USAID employee, an American expert on aid. Individuals' real
names will not be identified and all information will be kept confidential. No one else will
have access to the data or code keys. The data will be collected, analyzed, and reported in
the aggregated form.
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this
study. If you decide to take part in the study you can later change your mind and withdraw
from the study. You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer. You are
free to withdraw from participation in this study at any time.
Questions
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Abdullah
Bataineh
or one of his research team members at the following phone number, (734) 680-0415. If
you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the
Institutional Review Board can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact
the research staff, or if you want to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may
also call the Wayne State Research Subject Advocate at (313) 577-1628 to discuss
problems, obtain information, or offer input.
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Consent to Participate in a Research Study

If you choose to take part in this study you may withdraw at any time. You will be given a
copy of this consent form.

**Use when participant has had this consent form read to them (i.e., illiterate, legally blind,
translated into foreign language).
The PI, co-investigators, and key personnel of WSU associated with the research project:
o WSU’s Institutional Review Boards (IRB)
o Authorized members of WSU’s workforce who may need to access your
information in the performance of their duties. Department of Political Science at
WSU (My committee members: Prof. Nadejda K. Marinova; Prof. Alisa
Moldavanova; Prof. Sharon Lean; Prof. Vanessa Jill DeGifis.
o

Other collaborating academic research institutions, which include: Not Applicable.

o The study Sponsor or representative, including companies it hires to provide study
related services, which include: Not Applicable.
o Federal agencies with appropriate regulatory oversight (e.g., FDA, OHRP, OCR,
etc.) may review your records.
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This Authorization does not expire. The research team may need to correct it or provide
missing information about you even after the study has ended.
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APPENDIX E
Questionnaire Questions
Energy and Education Development through Aid Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions in as much detail as possible.
1. What kinds of training have you had and what kind of work have you done in
Afghanistan in relation to the energy industry or education development?
2. Over time, how has your opinion changed about your work in Afghanistan?
3. What knowledge do you have of energy infrastructure sources created by foreign aid,
such as the Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP)?
4. What knowledge do you have of the impact of foreign aid on the education system in
Afghanistan?
5. What were some of the benefits of aid delivered for a) energy infrastructure and b) for
education in Afghanistan?
6. What were some of the failures in aid delivery for a) energy infrastructure and b)
education in Afghanistan?
7. How do you think the TPP and other energy sources were funded?
8. What was the role of the USAID, US, or HTS workers with the TPP, energy projects,
and education projects in Afghanistan, if any?
9. Did you have a direct role with the energy infrastructures like the TPP or in the
development of educational sources?
10. Indirectly, did you hear of any evaluations or assessments of energy infrastructure like
the TPP or on the creation of education components (i.e. building of schools, funding for
school curricula, etc.)?
11. What were some challenges you faced while in Afghanistan with the delivery of energy
and the energy infrastructure (in provision of electricity, heat, fuel for cooking)?
12. How did you cope with energy challenges? Can you give examples?
13. What activities did you find most successful in achieving your energy Government of
Afghanistan in Afghanistan? Why?
14. Did you have direct involvement with any USAID or HTS funded project? If so,
describe in detail your most vivid memories.
15. What else would you like to share about economic, energy infrastructure, or education
development and foreign funding in Afghanistan?
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APPENDIX F
Thematic Coding from Respondents
Questionnaire Analysis Findings
For making graphs in Excel based on patterns and repetitions the following was
used by counting who said what in their questionnaire answers (the numbers in parentheses
represents the number of the questionnaire). For example, four respondents stated that
education was outdated.
Education
Education is still suffering: (1) (2) (3) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
=14
Education is outdated: (1) (2) (7) (9) =4
Education is better today (20) =1
US funded educational projects (1) (2) (3) (7) (9) (11) (12) (13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =
13
International donors funded projects (1) (3) (9) (10) (13) (14) (16) (17) =8
Aid helped Education in Afghanistan but it is not enough: (1) (2) (3) (9) (11) (14) (15) (16)
(17)(18)(20) = 11
Not enough training for schooling boards and administrators (1) (2) (9) (16) (17) (18) =6
A lot of schools and buildings were shut down or were not used for the intended purpose:
(1) (7) (9) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) = 11
Schools lack of educational components: (such as buildings, First-aid medical treatment,
Food courts, playing fields, heating and cooling rooms) (1) (2) (9) (11) (15) (17) (18) (20)
=8
Schools’ lack of books and supplies: (1) (9) (17) (18) =4
Schools’ lack of qualified teachers: (1) (9) (15) (17) (18) (20) =6
Schools’ lack of female teachers: (2) =1
No training for teachers: (1) (3) (9) (15) (17) (18) (20) =7
Taliban and insurgents’ threat related to roads and schools: (1) (2) (7) (9) (11) (14) (15)
(16) (17) (18) (20) =11
Females are struggling with attending schools: (1) (2) (7) (9) (13) =5
Big cities are getting more services and projects than rural and remote villages (1) (4) (9)
(15) =4
Teachers are not capable (1) (9) (11) (17) (18) =5
No enough teachers and staff (5) (11) (13) =3

177

Afghan authorities are not capable if run schools and other educational facilities (1) (2) (7)
(9) (17) (18) =6
Aged-kids are not access to education (1) (2) (9) =3
Security was a challenge (1) (2) (3) (7) (9) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =13
Energy:
Energy sector is still suffering: (1) (2) (3) (5) (7) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(20) =15
Weak and outdated energy infrastructure (1) (2) (5) (7) (9) (11) (15) (16) (17) (20) =10
US or USAID/US Army funded TPP (1) (2) (3) (7) (8) (9) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(20) =13
International donors funded projects (1) (3) (9) (10) (13) (15) (16) (17) =8
Knowledge about TPP: (1) (3) (7) (8) (9) (10) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12
TPP was costly (1) (3) (7) (8) (9) (10) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) =11
TPP was not beneficial (1) (3) (7) (8) (9) (10) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) =11
Aid helped energy sector a little: (1) (9) (10) (13) (15) (16) =6
Aid helped the Government of Afghanistan purchasing fuel: (1) =1
Taliban and insurgents’ threat related to control roads (7) (8) (9) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(20) =9
Stealing fuel and planets supplies: (1) (7) (15) (16) (17) =5
Not enough training or no qualified technicians (1) (2) (9) (13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =9
Electricity was a challenge (1) (3) (8) (9) (11) (14) (15) (16) (17) =9
Not enough fuel (1) (2) (3) (8) (9) (11) (13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12
Using woods for cooking or heating homes (1) (3) (8) (9) =4
Expensive fuel for cooking or vehicles (1) (2) (3) (9) (11) (14) (15) (16) (20) =9
Lack of funding (1) (9) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =7
Corrupted Afghan officials (1) (2) (3) (6) (7) (9) (13) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12
Local communities are not happy regarding services (1) (3) (8) (9) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(20) =10
No trust for Afghan officials from contractors (unhealthy relationship) (1) (9) (18) =3
Security was an issue and a challenge (3) (5) (7) (8) (9) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20)
=12
Improving hydro power (3) (7) (8) (9) (15) =5
Aid:
Your opinion changed about your work in Afghanistan Positively =0
Your opinion changed about your work in Afghanistan negatively (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (20) =18
Locals are not happy with security (1) (2) (3) (8) (9) (11) (12) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12
Afghanistan needs accountability tools (7) (8) (10) (15) (17) =5
Aid didn’t provide training for Afghan officials (1) (9) (10) (11) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(20) =10
Afghan authorities failed (1) (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (12) (13) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12
No coordination and cooperation between contractors and Afghans (1) (3) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(13) (14) (16) (17) (18) (20) =12
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US military and ISAF can help (1) (9) =2
US military and ISAF did poor job (2) =1
NGOs was left out and no communication with them (1) (9) (13) =3
HTS did fair job: (2) =1
HTS did poor job (11) =1
Access to water was a challenge (2) =1
No effective media to educate people about projects (1) (2) (3) (9) (17) (18) =6
Corruption in hindering effective delivery of aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (14) (16)
(17) (18)(20) =14
Poor management and planning (5) (7) (9) (10) (11) (16) (17) (18) =8
Cultural factor is a hindrance (2) (4) (7) (10) (17) (18) =6
Logistics was a challenge (5) (14) =2
Foreign contractors involved in corruption and got bribes (7) (9) (15) (17) (18) =5
Language barriers for local Afghans (5 languages) (14) (15) =2

179

APPENDIX G
Raw Data from Questionnaire Respondents
Respondent #1 is a recent Afghan immigrant. He had worked within the
Government of Afghanistan in an official capacity.
Education aid summary: #1 saw years of various conditions within Afghanistan’s
education system. He stated that Afghans had “suffered many years for three decades.”
Education is better than before, but will remain weak without foreign intervention and
long-term strategies. US and USAID were the main players in building and supplying
schools over the last 15 years. They still need school supplies, plus training for
administrators and even for Afghan officials. This respondent stated:
I produced reports on education aid and its effectiveness for the Afghan
government. I helped USAID set up schools and provided assessments for their
evaluations. I know that USAID asked the Afghan government for recommendations for
provinces that needed schools and learning centers. However, USAID never trusted the
Afghans with their information, and they ignored our reports and advice. There was no
cooperation or coordination between USAID and the Afghan government. This was a
negative and unhealthy relationship that impacted the projects. The US military and ISAF
should be more involved to deliver and monitor foreign aid and provide security for aid
projects. Many aid workers left due to insurgency. Donors and NGOs should trust local
reports and feedback. Media needs to be improved to provide information for citizens about
officials and what is going on in the country.
“The education system is old and needs to be updated.” Teacher salaries are very
low. There is no medical care for sick students. Parents keep students home to work
because school is not mandatory. Girl’s schools were implemented for a while, but now
they are all empty and ghost schools. Foreign governments need to send money to operate
the schools as there is none from the Afghan government.
Government officials used their power to get educational aid in their favorite areas.
Local people complained about local officials that took humanitarian aid, whether it was
for education or food for poor people. Even in safer areas, school supplies and building
materials were stolen.
Schools that were built were often closed due to insurgency and lack of security.
Foreign aid for education had a bigger impact in cities than in rural areas where security
was not available. Therefore, education aid was unevenly distributed in Afghanistan
because of security and insurgency. In rural areas, where schools were built, there is
nothing but ghost schools now. Education aid for areas with very high risk was at ‘0’.
Energy aid summary: I lived in the area of the TPP. It cost a lot, but did not benefit
the local people, due to poor management. Also, the firm who built the TPP did not
designate local authorities or teach anyone local how to maintain it. The plant remains
closed for months and months, and Afghans joke about the 300 million dollars it cost to
build it. Fuel was bought by energy aid from Uzbekistan and Pakistan. But the Taliban
control the roads now, especially at the border, so the fuel cannot get through.
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There was some productive energy aid for Afghans though installation of small
solar power units in urban areas. US firms built these. My family suffered from lack of
electricity or fuel to heat and cook. Fuel was expensive even when it was available, which
was rare. I could not get gas for a car. People who risked their lives to bring it in from other
countries charged double prices. We did not drive for months and we used wood for heating
our homes.
Respondent #2: This respondent was a member of the HTS program, or a federal
civilian employee as a social scientist in Afghanistan. The HTS (Human Terrain System)
program developed HTT (Human terrain teams) to work with local populations for
assessment and evaluation of their needs and to understand their culture in order to assist
commanders in their decision-making processes. He had formerly worked as a SIGAR
(Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) inspector.
Education aid summary: Locally, the US military built an adult literacy program
for Afghans, and my team provided assessment for the local area of Argandab, which
recommended a school that was built. I also visited schools around Maar-e-Sharif built by
aid from ISAF forces.
Afghans have a high illiteracy rate among adults. To that end, I helped review,
design, and print textbooks to be used in a radio program for adult literacy. The idea was
the adults would listen to lessons over the radio and follow in their books.
In the Arghandab River Valley area, the Taliban used intimidation tactics to close
schools. They threatened and carried out harm to children, especially girls. There were two
or three Quranic schools for boys in the area. Hundreds of children roamed the streets with
nothing to do. The US military provided a tent for a school, and the Government of
Afghanistan (Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) provided teachers, which was
a sustainable solution.
The evaluation of the Adult Literacy program showed that it was a top down
solution. The US military decided to distribute the books by enlisting a local branch of the
Afghan army, which was unsuccessful. The books were stored in a local building without
any plans for distribution. There was no coordination between the US military and the
Afghans. I worked on an evaluation of the Adult Literacy project for HTS and received
pushback from the military. They would not receive a formal written report, but only oral
feedback. Our goal was to provide feedback to improve the program, not to criticize it.
Energy aid summary: As an HTS social scientist, I was skeptical at first that were
making a difference in Afghanistan. Since then, I believe we did make a difference for the
better in small ways. I sat in on meetings with USAID that planned a sustainable project of
street lighting in Kandahar using solar panels. I worked on CERP evaluation for SIGAR
earlier before I joined HTS.
I was very familiar with the Shorandam Industrial Park between the airport and
Kandahar. It was military funded power plant by CERP (Commander’s Emergency
Response Program) for their operations and also helped the city of Kandahar. This fund
was used at each commander’s discretion. USAID built the infrastructure in the park in
2004, and the military built the power plant in 2010
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The idea was to provide employment for the locals to stimulate the economy. They
hoped that jobs would encourage the farmers to not grow opium. They wanted to grow a
business class that had commercial ties and loyalty to a national government. The main
problem was sustainability as the plant required diesel fuel, which the US military
provided. It was a short-term remedy for a military solution for energy in a conflict area. It
was not a long-term or economically viable solution.
My HTT held a focus group to evaluate local people’s perceptions of the
Shorandam power plant. We also acted as liaisons with tribal people who lived next to the
power plant that had heavy Taliban influence. In 2015, the US military cut funding and
the Government of Afghanistan said they could not afford to provide the diesel to run it. I
found that the US military aid workers were not professional planners for sustainability or
in acquiring local input for a needs assessment or a program’s cultural acceptance. The
concepts of accountability, evaluation, and long-term sustainability were regulated to a
lesser importance as this was a war zone, first and foremost. For instance, the Shorandam
power plant was not sustainable, but it fulfilled its military purpose from 2011 to 2015,
which was an important time in counter-insurgency measures.
My involvement with USAID projects was minimal, but I do remember the failures
such a building a refrigerated warehouse to wrong specification, rendering it useless for
the purpose. Also, there was a road project that was rejected by locals as it did not take into
account the local terrain. There were many other negative examples from all aid agencies
of which I was aware. Generally, the US military was well intentioned and not corrupt, yet
poorly informed, untrained for the culture, and the tasks at hand. Project evaluations and
accountability were seldom pursued. This was also true of the USAID projects when I
worked for SIGAR.
The issue was counter-insurgency was the reason for our presence. "Wars are
wasteful in general, and counterinsurgency warfare is wasteful in its own way.”
Respondent #3: As a USAID researcher, the respondent evaluated and assessed
development projects for various nations, including Afghanistan. Other qualifications were
employment as a liaison between an NGO, American firms, the US military, and the
Afghan government. He is a degreed educated Afghan-American.
Education aid summary: I provided briefs and sessions to help Afghan teachers
(both males and females) in multiple languages. Foreign aid helped education a little at
first. This built a lot of schools, especially for females, who could leave their homes and
pursue different types of degrees. USAID especially built schools for females and orphans,
but now most of them are closed or destroyed. Yet Afghanistan still needs educated people
so they can better serve their country.
I was hopeful when first working there, but after a time that hope decreased by
2016. I witnessed a lot of tragedy and waste. I evaluated and assessed development projects
for school construction and learning centers across Afghanistan.
My suggestions are these:
* Gender equality and female education would increase productivity, but it must
come with government support.
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Energy aid summary: Taking information from people with which I worked and
locals, all sides agreed that the TPP project was wasteful for not only Afghanistan, but for
the American taxpayers. I helped plan energy grids for remote areas, but did not work with
the TPP project. Energy issues are many. Neither foreign aid nor energy production is well
planned. Afghanistan is a huge country, and there is no training or skills for administration
or services to provide energy.
Energy aid is critical for Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Locals do not have energy
for heating or cooking or fuel for their vehicles. There has never been energy grid in the
nation. Poor people suffer from the government’s lack of services. If the government had
put in an energy grid, they could collect money for the electricity or fuel provided to homes
for heating or cooking. More energy would provide jobs and markets in the nation. Many
have tried to help, including the US and other western agencies, plus Asian efforts from
Japan, India, the Gulf states, and Pakistan.
The Afghan government did build some pipelines to schools, and I assisted with
that project. We also installed solar powered street lights I Kabul. It took months and
months to do as we lacked materials and not enough security. Major problems are lack of
security, because corrupt officials, bribes, and shadow governments control many areas.
The HTS teams gathered socio-economic information to support military objectives.
Other problems with aid is that international donors do not coordinate their efforts.
It is a waste of time and money. There was much failure due to this lack of coordination
and communication. Also, the locals were not consulted on many projects. They have good
information about issues of sustainability and local needs. Roads built across land should
have permissions of those on the land first, and locals could be hired for labor, but often
they are not. Education for the people about immediate project would be helpful. In fact, if
there was media to teach people to change certain ways and for improvement, it would
help.
My suggestions are these:
*Powerful countries should have clear objectives in stopping the fighting.
* Hydro power plants would be most productive.
* Safe roads would create an economic boom.
* All donors should work together to build power grids for cities.
Respondent #4: A military-trained person responded to the questionnaire.
Educational aid summary: The work in Afghanistan is important, but the internal
conflicts (tribal and cultural) hampers Western efforts. Foreign aid helps raise the economic
and educational level of the average Afghan. Yet corruption keeps funds from going to
intended purposes. Only a few see impact, and the majority are Not impacted. I worked
with USAID and they had good intentions and tried to assist Afghan people. Some of their
schools appeared to work in large cities, but not in rural communities.
Energy aid summary: There was primarily corruption and inefficiency in delivering
energy. Western methods may not work in Afghanistan.
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Respondent #5: (Female) Many HTS personnel were eye-witness to aid projects.
This respondent comments:
Education aid summary: I have visited the girls school in Kabul. Overall, it
advances development and human rights. I am less optimistic than when I started. There
are inefficiencies, corruption, and poor data knowledge management. I would recommend
a SIGAR investigation. From visiting the girl’s school in Hazra, I could see there was
overall development and human rights were benefited. Yet I also observed inefficiencies,
corruption, poor data and knowledge management, and subpar M & E. SIGAR
investigations should occur.
Respondent #6: (Female) Focusing on issues of female education, this respondent
clarifies education issues.
Education aid summary: Working with Female Engagement Teams (FET), Civic
Affairs Teams (CAT), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PET) (financed by USAID
and the US military) allowed me to understand the needs of teachers and students in
Afghanistan. The information was written in reports to request supplies for students and
teachers. International Women’s day was a very important event. Our goal was to
understand female perspectives or the other 50% of the Afghan population. The sustainable
benefits of educational aid in Afghanistan were that we helped women learn
entrepreneurship skills such as chicken farming and bee keeping.
I have conducted research all over the world and the same issues rise on many
continents. Corruption from the national government restricted aid trickling down to the
local government, and resulted in mistrust by the people. We had Key Leader Engagements
(KLE) where the leaders were only interested in their own families.
Our research in Afghanistan was important because it informed the US military.
However, information on aid was not put into use. Nobody studied the lessons learned from
aid work all over the world. No one incorporated good practices of how to administer aid.
Money was wasted. Specifically, in Afghanistan:
● Schools were built with no teachers or staff in the area.
● There was a brain drain to Kabul or outside of Afghanistan.
Respondent #7: This respondent worked as a cultural expert in Afghanistan. He
states that hopes were decreased over time, as Afghanistan needs long term strategies and
plans. Three dynamics affect all education and energy aid in Afghanistan: 1) Taliban, 2)
Waste, 3) Corruption from Afghan and US agencies. Unless the people of Afghanistan
reject the Taliban in their role of reinforcing old ways, and corruption of others, things will
not improve. US and other major stakeholders have to play a role for improvement by using
accountability for illegal and corrupt activities.
Education aid summary: What I experienced with education aid was far from
improving education in Afghanistan. It is true that 50 years ago Afghanistan had schools,
but they were destroyed in a civil war. USAID built the schools again in many villages
across the country, but most of the schools closed.
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Education is good for governance and brings prosperity to a country. Education opens
horizons for people and brings acceptance of differences and tolerance of others. Good
education will bridge the gaps of gender inequality.
Local customs and traditions play a role in stopping children from attending school,
especially girls. The Taliban enforce these traditions by threats and even killing people.
Negatives of cultural practices, customs, Taliban, corruption from many directions, and the
inability of aid agencies to develop long-term educational plans discourage parents from
allowing children to go to school.
Energy aid summary: The TPP project was an example of poor work. Corruption
resulted in the project costing 300 million dollars. However, in Kabul there was lighting
added after USAID installed hydraulic power on dams. This type of energy should be for
all provinces across the country. Energy is important as it leads to economic development.
Currently people use wood heat their homes and cook.
But leaders of Afghanistan became wealthy and did not heed the suffering of the people.
Their close relative all became wealthy. They hampered the aid programs. Problems are:
● Transit routes bringing Afghan goods and materials for energy projects do not get
through.
● Afghan government officials steal the resources for their personal benefit.
● Security was too bad to administer aid.
Respondent # 8: The information given by this respondent relates specifically to
the TPP and other energy project.
Energy aid summary: The TPP was completed and handed over to the Ministry of
Energy and Water of Afghanistan in June of 2010. Afghanistan imports 80% of its energy
from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The power lines that supply the 5 million
people of Kabul passes through Salang Pass, which is rough and unaccusable terrain. It is
not sufficient in winter and the TPP should fill the gap. It generates electricity on both
crude oil and diesel fuel. At a cost of 335 million US dollars, the capacity is 150 megawatts
of electricity.
Otherwise, propane fuel could be imported from Pakistan or Turkmenistan, and
cow dung is used for heating fuel and cooking. There was some electric power coming
from the Naghlow and Sorobi water dams. However, at times there was not enough water
to generate electricity from these dams. The war lords, (Mujahedeen) and other factions
would cut off electricity to punish other groups.
My personal opinion is that donor counties who give aid money should have a
system of checks and balances in place and hold those people responsible that fail in their
projects. Aid is channeled through contractors to subcontractors, and the results reduces
material and durability tenfold.
Respondent #9: Subject Matter Expert
My experience as a SME included working for a Research and Development Company in
Afghanistan allowed me to assist the US government officials and military decision makers
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on social sciences research methodologies, statistical analysis, and quantitative and
qualitative public opinion research.
During my time in Afghanistan, I planned and designed multiple short and long-term
projects. One of my major responsibilities was to collect primary data through in person
interviews, conduct surveys, and travel to different cities in search of information. I ended
up conducting over 300 interviews with the Afghan officials (civilian and military)
including the local population while traveling throughout all provinces in Afghanistan. My
research work covered various sectors including but not limited to health, education,
stability, governance and local infrastructure.
Unfortunately, the aid given to Afghanistan by the western countries did not produce the
desired results. I remain quite pessimistic with regards to the future of Afghanistan. The
deteriorating security situation, lawlessness and corruption remain at the forefront of many
issues in Afghanistan. Majority of the population is without basic necessities such as
electricity and clean water. My first-hand experience in Afghanistan has led me to believe
that the foreseeable future in Afghanistan looks quite bleak.
Summary of Energy and aid: The overall infrastructure in Afghanistan is extremely
weak. I was able to determine that funding the projects was not the main concern; instead,
issues such as waste management and corruption were more widespread.
When it comes to TPP, it wouldn’t be fair to blame the Afghan officials for not
using this very costly project and keeping it maintained. Afghans never received the proper
training, nor do they hold the basic skills to run and maintain the TPP. According to the
locals, the blame should be shifted towards the Afghan authorities for being involved in
corruption and stealing the TPP supplies. But they shouldn’t be held solely responsible for
not running a 330 million dollars project effectively. One of the major challenges was to
purchase diesel fuel in order to run the TPP. As I know, it was unsafe and costly to transfer
diesel from neighbouring countries. Most of the roads by being controlled by the insurgents
which made it nearly impossible to transport the fuel.
The foreign aid failed to help Afghanistan improve its energy infrastructure. During
my deployments, I lived in Kabul for almost two years, and I witnessed that people and
businesses were struggling due to the shortage of electricity in most of the neighbourhoods.
Those who are receiving electricity without any shortage are the rich and elite of the society
as well as the foreign officials, but not the common people.
The energy infrastructure in Afghanistan is improving slowly and it will take
Afghanistan many years before we can expect to see any major improvements in the energy
sector. I did witness some progress in regards to the Afghanistan’s energy infrastructure in
Kabul. When I arrived in Afghanistan in 2009, the load shedding was apparent during the
evenings and nights. The situation appeared to improve in Kabul by 2016. I think USAID
and other international utility companies played a major role in bringing about
improvement despite the fact it took a lot of time. According to the locals, the foreign
contractors helped Afghan utility departments improve the infrastructure of residential and
commercial solar power in several cities in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the locals said
that the rural areas did not see any changes and the improvements were limited to the capital
and other major cities.
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According to some official reports, more than 70% of afghan citizens rely on selfsupplied energy sources such as wood, animal dung, and biomass for cooking their food
and heating their homes. When I was in Helmand during the winter of 2015, I witnessed
that most homes including the government offices had no basic heating resources. I
interviewed an Afghan official in Feb 2015 in Nowazad district during the winter and
immediately realized that his office did not have heating due to the shortage of fuel. I also
witnessed that several medical centers in Kabul had to operate without any heat due to the
shortage of fuel.
For nearly thirty years, Afghanistan has been facing serious energy crisis due to the
internal conflicts. It is true that insecurity is hindering the effective use of aid in improving
Afghan energy sector because the foreign contractors would not jeopardize their lives in
conducting projects due to the security issues. The foreign aid agencies need to effectively
cooperate with each other and communicate closely with the Afghan authorities in
achieving long term projects. This is easy to say but achieving such things will take a lot
of effort and continuous funding.
The Afghan energy sector is also struggling to find skilled technicians in order to
effectively execute energy projects. During an international conference that was held in
Kabul in 2013, Afghan representative from Minister of labor and Social Affairs urged
international donors to provide training workshops for Afghan officials. He repeatedly
reiterated the importance of training before a project can be executed.
Summary of Education and aid: I visited many schools in Helmand, Kabul, and
Mazar-e--Sharif provinces. In 2015, I visited a school in Nawzad district in Helmand and
witnessed that the school was hardly operational with only a few students and teachers
present. I was told that the school had been targeted and partially destroyed by insurgents.
This “ghost school” as described by an Afghan interpreter was abandoned and remained
closed for many years due to the lack of funding. We held a meeting with KLEs in that
area and discovered that this school was built by an American contractor. The locals were
scared to send their children to this school because the abandoned building as it had
become, was housing criminals and homeless people. The roads leading to the school were
also considered quite unsafe. We were told that this school was also used by the Afghan
security forces for a period of time.
I discovered that foreign aid did help the education sector in some areas in
Afghanistan, but certainly not in all areas. The schools in Kabul were more modernized
and better equipped to teach students throughout the year. I had the chance to visit a school
that was located next to my work place in Kabul in 2016. The school was in much better
condition than the one in Helmand. The classrooms were full of students. I met the principal
who explained to me that the US AID made it possible for his school to buy furniture and
other essentials required to run the school. The school had a built in food court and play
ground. The school was co-ed and males and female students were seen studying together.
I would say that foreign aid proved beneficial for most of the major cities in
Afghanistan such as the capital, Kabul. On the other hand, the foreign aid failed to bring
much improvement to the education sector in rural areas. Aside from uneven distribution
of aid, transportation remained a major challenge for many students and parents, and most
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did not have a vehicle that would transport them to the school that were sometimes located
miles away.
Education in Afghanistan was improved by pouring millions of dollars into
projects. The USAID mainly helped Afghanistan in building hundreds of schools and other
educational institutions, even though most were shut down later. It is not unusual to hear
about the closing of schools in Afghanistan for several reasons. I was invited for the
opening of a new school in Mazar-e-Sharif in 2012, which is considered the second largest
city of Afghanistan. It was a good experience to witness the completion of a large school
and the joy was apparent on the faces of all the teachers and students. The school was built
by an American aid agency and it took them several years to build the school. It is
unfortunate that the school was shut down some years later due to the deteriorating security
situation. It was reported few months ago (Apr 22, 2017) that Mazar-e-Sharif experienced
a deadly attack by the Taliban insurgents that killed and wounded over one hundred Afghan
soldiers on a military base. That gives us an insight as to how quickly the situation in
Afghanistan can change with one terrorist attack.
The education sector has faced many challenges that led to the failing of many
educational projects in Afghanistan. The education sector today in Afghanistan continues
to suffer.
Respondent #10: This respondent was a US military person. He states that the war
took on a life of its own. At first, I thought the war and reconstruction effort as necessary,
but now I view it as a waste of time and money. Basically the US never bothered to train
local Afghans to maintain and operate infrastructure. The gap in understanding their
religion and culture and negotiating the differences is contentious. We are creating
dependence on Western aid and assistance. At the end of the day, Afghans need to decide
what they want. The best outcome I can see is to allow the Taliban to have their own
autonomous state in the south.
Respondent #11: This respondent provided security for aid projects, both energy
and school security.
I worked in Afghanistan for two years. My confidence in helping to solve problems
with the tactics used by the military, foreign aid, the Afghan government, and the private
sector decreased. HTS teams provided socio-cultural information, but it went to the army.
Also the HTS teams varied through their research abilities. I worked with one team that
achieved much success in helping to provide local perspectives. Some teams provided low
quality work or bickered, and work by other teams were not used or respected by the
military. We needed research to bring in solutions that would work.
Foreign aid benefited the contractors and other private western firms, but not as
much for Afghanistan. The Taliban took control of many foreign aid projects after the
western agencies left the areas. The Afghan government does not know how to build any
education or energy infrastructure and we did not train them how.
Education aid summary: I provided security in rural areas near schools. Education
was weak and not available before 2001, but foreign aid helped to improve the education
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sector in Afghanistan. It could be better as people complained about the outcome. Some
parents were not satisfied with the levels of learning.
Schools were built by individuals that came to Afghanistan for one year to leave a
mark. Often times schools were built without proper planning and understanding or
appreciation for the political and socio-cultural nuances of the areas. Hence schools were
built without meeting the needs of the people. Perhaps if USAID had included Afghan
experts to help understand the issues of the projects.
I heard that schools were empty because they were built in the wrong area or too
far with bad roads. During the winter, there was no heat or the roads and schools were
flooded.
I saw many abandoned schools. I reported this to the US Army that schools were
closed and teachers never came. Locals complained that teachers were still paid, but would
not come because of security. Many schools closed, even if USAID spent millions and
millions in some areas. We never trained locals to take over the schools and learn how to
do things for themselves.
Energy aid summary: TPP was costly and helpless for all sides. Locals talked bad
about the project. Somme new dams were built using hydraulic power to control water. But
the energy sector is ineffective in most areas and locals never talked good about it. They
had difficulty in heating their homes or getting cooking fuel. I made reports to Army
commanders about energy projects that had been damaged by insurgents.
Respondent #12: (Female) This military person trained for work in civil units and
also as a combat advisor. The respondent also worked for the HTS effort.
Education aid summary: I investigated poisonings in a local girl’s school, which
NATO also worked on findings. The education outreach by the US did appear to be modest
and many schools sat empty.
The USAID and the State Department were very involved in assessing education,
and efforts for women’s groups. When I worked for HTS, we were integrated with
analyzing local impacts on education attendance. The education advances where I worked
was served by international troops.
I visited a site for a midwifery program that was funded in part by USAID. It was
threatened with broken windows to scare the young students. The other funding was by the
Afghan government and their department of education. The program was seeking
additional funds. The Koreans also funded some educational medical programs.
My most vivid memories were here at the midwifery school. There were 20 young
women undergoing the training. The training material was very good and provided by
USAID. Those administering the school were medically trained and we did HTS research
regarding the curriculum. I heard the Afghans involved had to leave and are now trying to
get to the US
The need for education in Afghanistan is profound and important. Young people
have few opportunities and are lost in a modern era. The educated live in central cities and
rural areas have no ability to improve or have social progress.
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Respondent #13: (Female) Coming from a US military background, this
respondent saw a lack of coordination between aid agencies. Designing aid for energy
infrastructure and education was unsustainable because there were no teachers or engineers
to maintain the structures and systems.
Often, we created programs that looked good on paper, but had no effect or negative
effects due to a lack of understanding the systems and culture. Funds did not go where they
were supposed to. Determining program objectives was difficult as there were competing
narratives from the military, aid agencies, the state, and NGOs.
Education aid summary: Many schools were built, but are now abandoned due to
lack of security, teachers, and parents’ concerns. Still there are some schools that are still
functional. It is my hope that girls in school will become part of the culture.
Training did work for men and women as long as they were separate and respected
the culture. There was a radio education program and even a prison literacy program. HTS
would gather information from the locals and report to the military. The military would
report to USAID, but it was USAID that made final decisions on where to build schools.
One program start seemed hopeful that provided women to build solar power panels at
home, but I do not know the fate of that one.
Energy aid summary: The US State Department built several dams that were never
functional, and I imagine other programs had similar fates. If the right people ran the
country after the initial round up of the Taliban and not funding the war lords, this country
would be very different. People preferred the Taliban to the war lords.
Respondent #14: As a contractor attached to USAID, this respondent had firsthand
knowledge of aid projects. This contractor had also worked with the Afghan government
in energy. Locals said that projects only benefited western contractors who received big
salaries. Ultimately, the contractor said that the aid projects were a waste and time
consuming.
Education aid summary: All I know is that schools did not have energy
infrastructure. They had no heat in winter. Students did not show up for school because it
was too cold. I was involved in building heating systems in some schools, but there was no
fuel. Even the government buildings were short on fuel and called the US Army to receive
fuel for heat. Eventually, security was so bad for schools that the weather was not the main
concern.
Energy aid summary: My company was in charge of TPP. I also worked on several
small projects relating to energy, such as installing new energy systems in government
buildings. For energy projects, aid was not enough and was wasted because Afghans had
no skills or knowledge on how to run energy infrastructure. They had 0 knowledge of
energy installation and the US firms provided no training due to lack of security, money,
and time. Language was an issue when locals were hired to work on menial jobs.
As I said, I provided maintenance for TPP for two years. My assessment is that it
was a wasted project that cost a lot of money and did not benefit the Afghan people.
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On my job, security was the main problem most of the time. For months we had to
stay on military bases due to insurgent activities. Getting fuel to the plant was time
consuming and costly. Roads were very bad in all areas.
Respondent #15: This respondent is a USAID Civil Engineer. He supervised teams
to install energy in Afghanistan.
Education aid summary: Education should be the number one priority for all parties
concerned.
Energy aid summary: We experienced lack of supplies and materials, trained or
skilled workers, and insecure areas. I did not work on the TPP, but it was given as an
example of an expensive but failed project in a speech by an American expert on energy
infrastructure. He explained it had been investigated by SIGAR. Afghan officials told me
that it was harmed by corruption from many parties. Zero tolerance for corruption and bad
management should be the rule.
The US should not have tried to do this without more commitment from other
nations. We failed and it made us look bad. It seemed there were no clear strategies or
central planning for success. Fragmentation hurt aid efforts. Corruptions by local regional
officials did more to harm projects than other factors. Locals were very appreciative for
anything that helped the villages.
Respondent #16: This respondent was in the shura held for Afghans in America.
He said that rebuilding Afghanistan was more challenging that earlier expectations.
USAID should have built rapport with all parties in Afghanistan to coordinate donations
and resources. USAID projects built credibility for the US for many in Afghanistan. New
roads and a railroad is necessary to build infrastructure for energy or education in
Afghanistan.
Education aid summary: The lack of infrastructure in impoverished areas made it
difficult to get resources to deliver education. USAID has helped to elevate the standard of
living for millions of Afghan citizens, and especially for girls is a big achievement of
USAID. If there is heavy Afghan government presence, people flourish with the influx of
foreign aid and foreign investments. More Afghan children are going to school than ever
before.
Areas that are infected with heavy insurgents still suffer from lack of education.
Children often fail to show up to schools due to lack of security and poverty and the schools
built by aid set empty to create ghost schools. There is a social stigma for women’s
education. Language is a barrier when curriculum and supplies are in a language from
another region.
In my opinion, aid should be given to local villagers to modernize their standards
of living and strengthen education efforts and projects, rather than building school
buildings that turn into ghost schools.
Energy aid summary: The energy sector suffered due to sabotage, corruption, and
inefficiencies for power plants and pipelines. USAID invested valuable resources to build
the TPP. The primary fuel for operation was diesel fuels, which was often unavailable due
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to border closings and insurgent attacks. The TPP is unable to provide power for
Afghanistan grids. Now it is to provide backup for emergencies. The US Senate committee
on foreign aid have launched multiple investigations into UASID work in Afghanistan.
Foreign helped to subsidize fuel for local consumption, and to establish hydropower
dams across the country. Building cooperation with local elders and procuring security
from tribal leaders increases the success rate of delivering fuel and providing education in
the remote areas of Afghanistan.
Eighteen percent of Afghanistan has access to
uninterrupted supplies as compared to 1% in the year 2000. More funding should go
towards building more hydro power plants and small-scale dams on rivers for Afghanistan.
Foreign aid should be used to harness the tremendous potential for solar and wind energy
in Afghanistan.
Most aid is wasted in providing security for the infrastructure and workers that help
the struggling sectors of Afghan economy. This is because power plants in Afghanistan
rely on expensive fuels for operations. Interruptions in supply chains causes power plants
to operate inefficiently, and they sustain costly damages. Pipelines suffer with sabotage
and vandalism. Lack of roads and threats of insurgency decrease efficiency too. The biggest
challenges are violence and the interruption of supplies at the border with Pakistan, plus
lack of roads, railroads, and the absence of a dry port. In winter, some passes are completely
cut off for months.
Respondent #17: A long time USAID worker reports on Afghanistan.
I have worked with UAID since 2002 in many nations. I have coordinated with aid
agencies and hundreds of NGOs around the world. I evaluated the living conditions of
people in developing nations and each area was different.
I was an aid expert in Afghanistan for 8 years. I coordinated with the U.S Army,
ISAF, and other international donors. It was tough to deal with different military and
diplomatic personnel with different stakes and backgrounds.
Afghanistan is a war-torn country and will be for good, because uneducated people
run the government. There has never been any training to lead people or run official offices.
There were no jobs available for local people except for with the government or their
military. Children die in large numbers due to lack of food and illnesses. Yet they are kind
and generous people and will give guests any food they have.
Afghans are pessimistic about their future. They are a failed state due to lack of
education. International donors tried, but their focus was wrong and they did not understand
the culture. There was no training of locals to continue any project funded by international
donors. This is true worldwide. Money is not the only consideration. Careful planning and
accountability is the only way that aid would work and we have those lessons from decades
of aid implementation. Audits and monitoring are needed for any nation building project.
The announcement by President Trump has shocked when they heard that no one
will help them. The only reason that the US will be there now will be to kill the Taliban.
Weapons will not increase the people’s help. The Taliban have nothing to lose as they are
so poor and this is their territory. The people will pay a heavy price.
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Education aid summary: Understanding the culture and religion is the key to any
progress in Afghanistan. It takes generations to create a slow change, and consistent efforts
in education. USAID built many schools that are now closed. I have visited the ghost
schools to confirm this. The Afghan government did not get involved in education, and
there was no money to run the schools, no teachers, insecurity, and no supplies. There were
no administrators to coordinate the school efforts. International donors and the Government
of Afghanistan should be blamed for not completing the job. There is not enough funds or
long term strategies. Coordination is needed. Locals have 0 knowledge about the outside
world. If there was a good education system, the nation could develop.
I was responsible for evaluation and assessing projects for educational resources. I
issued reports back to my office in Virginia about what needed to be developed and what
was suggested by the US Army.
Energy aid summary: Energy is another area that is critical to the nation’s
development. The TPP was a failed project, with no sustainability. People were not happy
from the beginning because the locals were not consulted, but only the corrupt officials.
USAID and SIGAR conducted investigations and produced reports and I helped. The
people said they had wanted small generators. Now they use animal dung for heat and
cooking and the children get sick.
Pakistan built a similar plant to the TPP. It did not cost as much and is working
well. The people benefit from it. But Pakistan has a strong government system, and the
Government of Afghanistan is incapable of running any project. Corruption and bribes
block the way. People are ignorant of the value of nation building projects and they steal
what they can. I met HTS teams talking to local people and they even held shuras.
Respondent #18: A USAID worker filled out this questionnaire. He is retired
military.
I thought the situation would be better, especially with USAID and other agencies
working so hard and saying they would rebuild Afghanistan. It is really a failed state. The
situation will be worse if the ISAF go after the Taliban. They cannot win this war that has
been fought for years and years. They more they try, the more the people will suffer. When
the Taliban control areas, it is horrible. There are no schools, good food, no clean water,
and women cannot leave their homes.
Education aid summary: International donors should build a skilled and educated
new generation if they want to help Afghanistan. Many people tried to help, but it is all
uncoordinated and inefficient. I heard a Canadian company sent a team to Afghanistan to
investigate education aid projects to help women and children. They reported on corruption
by the Government of Afghanistan, and were not happy at the Afghan officials and their
lack of commitment to education.
USAID built schools that were not used and I heard of the ghost schools. I spoke to
the locals and they talked about they needed food, medicine, and water. Local women
would ask me for powdered milk for their infants. This broke my heart. They wanted
protection from the Taliban while we were in the area. They said there would be
repercussions. I found there were contradictions between what I had been told by USAID
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and what the locals said concerning projects. USAID said locals stole supplies and locals
said the contractors never delivered them.
Energy aid summary: I attended a Shura where the KLE said that the TPP only
helped American companies. Now Afghan people are blamed that it is shut down. The TPP
project did not benefit the people, but was built based on American concepts of what to do.
How can Afghans maintain something like that with no training? One Afghan official said
the USAID never talked about the TPP because it would hurt the reputation of American
contractors.
There had no nation building projects during Taliban rule. But the American firms
only stuck to their plans and never coordinated with locals. It was dangerous work and
some people were afraid to work with me. HTS was there to talk to locals about their
perspectives and report back to military commanders. My team evaluated projects
completed by USAID and other American companies. I also worked as a coordinator
between Americans and Afghans.
Respondent #19: The respondent voiced the same opinions on energy and
education as the others, but with an insight on the gaps in understanding between Western
aid and Afghanistan’s social networks, culture, and religion. “The ways of culture and
religion are enforced by Taliban.” There is only Taliban religious and cultural enforcement
through strict religious law. Each member of the Taliban is easily replaced by anyone
practicing the laws of their religion. Their numbers will always be the same. Someone said
you cannot get rid of the Taliban, they are our culture. This meant that they were like a
Religious Police. It was Afghan cultural laws that conflicted with Western ideals.
Educating the young would change this, but that was not understood by aid agencies or the
US either.
Education aid summary: Educational aid was not in line with the environment,
cultural background, religious preferences, and local needs. The idea was that if given a
chance with good security, people would change and want Western ways. This may have
been true for a few, but not for many others.
Due to corruption and lack of input by the locals, the schools built were placed to
satisfy official’s needs, and not the population. Some schools only had a few students
within distance, and many areas had few schools, but large numbers of students. Aid
agencies wasted a lot of money on opening ceremonies and decorations. Money went for
personal uses, and during construction, there was a feeling of…we can buy expensive tools
even for a one-time use.
Respondent #20: This respondent was employed in the energy section of USAID,
with previous experience with the energy issues and department in Afghanistan. He has a
total of 19 years’ experience in this field.
Energy aid summary: I knew the energy sector in Afghanistan was very weak for
years. USAID and other agencies tried hard to help a huge country to improve, but it would
take time before Afghanistan could become independent in that area. There were some
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benefits as hydro power systems were built, along with energy lines placed, and low-cost
grid systems in some areas.
The failures in aid delivery for energy infrastructure was first to not coordinate with
locals. Western countries lack knowledge about Afghanistan’s culture, religion, and
necessary information that only the locals know. Instead USAID and their contracted
companies dealt with officials only who were corrupt. Most projects were built within
locations of the official’s personal areas with low occupation, while thousands went
without any needed energy. Westerners do not understand the system of corruption and
hierarchies. Officials do not care about those under their care and no communication occurs
so they do not know what the situation.
There was no training for maintenance on installations either, so that when USAID
pulled out, the energy infrastructure became useless. I helped to evaluate the TPP as was
required by USAID program manager in Afghanistan, regarding its function. When asked
during investigations, the contractors or USAID said there was not time or money for this.
Afghan locals were out of the picture. USAID funded the TPP, and contracted with
Westerners to build and implement the power plant.
The contractors had no contact with locals. The contractor had no knowledge of the
local terrain or seasonal conditions. There should have also been relationships built with
energy providers in other connecting nations. They knew what was needed to work with
the terrain regarding transition lines and installing new hydro power.
I remember one incident during a bitter winter in Afghanistan with no heat. A man
burst into our office and shouted that his family needed heat. We let him in to see that we
had no heat in our office either with no blankets to keep warm, and we were part of the
energy team. I feel that I contributed to some energy increase as I knew how to maintain
equipment and small generators. I helped some coordination between the US contractors
and Afghan utilities department. I was also part of a team that implemented hydraulic
power generators in towns in the southern and northern parts of Afghanistan. I did see street
lights in Kabul with power from solar panels.
What is needed most is training to create skilled technicians.
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Afghanistan is currently foreign aid dependent. The US Agency for International
Development (USAID) has allocated over 100 billion US dollars since 2001 for the
development and modernization of Afghanistan. The United States has invested over 700
billion US dollars overall. There is a breakdown or a problem in USAID funding for
Afghanistan, whereas not all the money allocated was utilized for intended purposes.
Today Afghanistan remains a LDC, a least developed country, with extensive poverty,
limited energy, poor infrastructure, and low literacy rates despite USAID and US spending
and aid projects.
This study examines examples of disconnects or the breakdown between funding
and the fruition of intended modernization goals for Afghanistan. This qualitative
dissertation utilizes primary reports from funding agencies including USAID, audits of
projects, and formal inquiries. Additionally, the study utilizes respondent data completed
by a diverse group of Afghan-born and American-born trained experts offering key
information. These 28 individuals have insight into the political and economic impact of
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USAID funding in Afghanistan, focusing on examples in the energy and education sectors.
The energy-sector case study is of the 335 million-dollar Tarakhil Power Plant (TPP), a
project funded by USAID, but considered a failure. The dissertation also includes a case
study on the education sector in Afghanistan. I incorporate my own eyewitness accounts
from serving as a social scientist for 8 months in 2011-2012 with the US Army’s Human
Terrain System (HTS) in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Therefore, the final analysis
triangulates data drawing on: 1) USAID and SIGAR official reports; 2) original qualitative
research data from respondents; 3) HTS observations, and 4) media and academic reports.
The theoretical framework for the improvement of a nation, or nation building,
relies on modernization and human capital theories. The analyses of the data within
modernization and human capital theories to form conclusions and recommendations. The
conclusions will show a combination of a lack of communications, accountability, security
risks, systemic corruption, and misguided planning and implementation. Top-down
planning for development projects, like the Tarakhil Power Point and educational aid, did
not succeed.
(Key Words: USAID, Afghanistan, foreign aid, modernization, human capital, security,
corruption, energy, education)
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